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BULLETIN

SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

نشرة جمعية الدراسات السودانية

In this Issue

Reviews

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The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum and works collaboratively with the Sudan Studies Society of the UK. The SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Bulletin, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

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From the Editor

With Gratitude

by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban*

The editor and the SSA organization wish to thank the administration at Arizona State University for providing the SSA with a home institution for the organization and for the Bulletin. A special thanks is extended to the ASU Production team, Abdullahi Galab, Egbet Abraha. Special thanks are also extended to Assistant Editors Christopher Zambakari, MBA, LP.D, now a Rotary Peace fellow at the University of Queensland, New Zealand, and also to Tarnkeet Kaur Kang, doctoral student in Global Studies and the Educational Policy and Leadership at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign for their time, energy and talent in soliciting and reviewing manuscripts and book reviews ahead of final editing and publication.

Continuing thanks is given to Marcus Jaeger for his stellar role as Book Review Editor. He has infused this portion of the Bulletin with a new life and vigor that has made this section of the Bulletin a most lively one.

Thanks is also extended to the contributors to this issue. Unpublished manuscripts are always welcome. Graduate students conducting research in either North or South Sudan are encouraged to submit manuscripts for peer review coordinated by Christopher Zambakari. Please send to me at: cfluehr@ric.edu.

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All submissions and communication about the bulletin should be directed to the editor, Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban.

Assistant Editor's Note

by Christopher Zambakari

In this issue of the Sudan Studies Association Bulletin, we feature two papers written by graduate students Soledad Herrero, MIPP Graduate (SAIS, Johns Hopkins University), and UNICEF Protection Specialist, and Marco Boggero, PhD student at John Hopkins University.

Soledad's paper is entitled Humanitarian Aid in Sudan: for better or for worse? It focuses on the provision of humanitarian aid and its dilemmas in the Border States in Sudan. The dilemmas discussed are explained by the very nature of the environment in which the aid is delivered, namely amidst violent conflict. She argues that humanitarian aid in Sudan has been effective in reaching those most in need. However, aid that is designed to alleviate suffering has also been diverted to warring parties. It has contributed to legitimizing rebels groups, thus limiting its effectiveness. According to Soledad, aid has often been designed to deal with symptoms and not the causes of war. As such humanitarian aid should not be criticized for failing to accomplish what it was never empowered or designed to do.

The second article is written by Marco Boggero and titled Private Security and Governance in Weak States: New and Old Cases. It examines the impact that private security firms have on governance and states. Boggero's paper, presented at SSA's annual conference in 2013, utilizes multiple case studies throughout Africa to explore the impact of the presence of private security on stability, and the political implications for their operations, noting the limited international regulations available for such entities. The author considers the role of private security firms within Somalia, and contrasts this experience with that of Angola and Sierra Leone. These case studies provide the context for his analysis of these companies in Sudan. Noting the complicated governance and security history in Sudan, Boggero discusses the implications of foreign private security firms that have emerged in response to the oil industry.

Individual Memory Discourses and National Memory Politics in the Two Sudans After the Secession of South Sudan

By Margret Otto

1. The Role of Memories in Times of Political Change

An important part of research on memory concerns the role of memory in times of political change. Halbwachs[1] and others describe memories as activities, which accompany and influence social transformations. Individual and collective memories emerge in different fields of action and are closely interlinked. In the case of national memory politics, political power constellations support or suppress the conservation of memories. As a result, individual and biographical memories are often not respected but excluded. Therefore activists and researchers demand a "human right of memory".[2]

Research on remembering in the context of civil war and violent conflict analyzes their complex and contradictory constructions. These are well known examples of State intervention in the shaping of collective memories:

- In France, the memory of the Algerian War could not enter into the collective memory though millions of people were affected by it. Instead the struggle of the Resistance against the German occupation has a very prominent place in the national memory, though many fewer people were involved, because the French national memory politics emphasized its importance.[3]
- In Rwanda decades after the genocide individual and collective memories were intensively integrated into reconciliation processes. Beside remembering, forgetting-- perceived as an act of forgiveness-- was expected to be an important contribution to the reconciliation process between the former conflicting parties.[4]
- Memory construction on the Spanish Civil War shows how deeply official national memory politics can be in conflict with divergent collective memories. During the regime of Franco, a heroic official memory of the Civil War from the sole perspective of the victor was installed and counter memories could find their way into the Spanish public only at the end of the regime.[5]

In the case of Sudan an important dimension opens up with the fact that two new countries emerge. Looking at the long history of Sudan it is relevant which temporal dimensions are represented in individual remembering and collective memories and which periods of the Sudanese history are integrated or excluded when the new States construct their specific national memories.

2. Construction of Memories in Sudan and South Sudan

In July 2011 South Sudan became independent. Immediately, politicians in both countries declared a new beginning and distanced themselves from a common shared history and memory. Such new memory discourses are leading to reinterpretations of the common history and are influencing individual biographical memories of the people. The suppression of memories becomes visible as a political strategy.

And yet, individual memory discourses help to keep alive biographical and family contexts, which are part of the personal identity. Both aspects are the subject of this paper.

My study is based on a series of interviews, which I conducted in 2012 in Khartoum and Juba. I asked interviewees how they remember the people and life circumstances in the other parts of Sudan before the secession and what the separation of their countries means to them.
In the following I will give three examples of memory discourses from the perspective of individuals and how they conflict with an official discourse.

2.1 Conservation of Memories and Political Identity in Sudan

Sudanese interviewees who had dedicated themselves to fight for a common society, felt the separation of South Sudan and South Sudanese as a big loss. They described the loss in terms of lost friendships, neighbourhoods and professional cooperation. These interviewees shared the historical visions of a common political and social perspective with Southern Sudan from before and at the beginning [time of] the independence of Sudan from the British Colonial power in 1956. They localise the origin of Sudan in the Nubian culture and not in an Arab origin and they do not share the racist attitude of the government . South Sudanese were important partners for them in the common struggle against the increasing Islamization and the domination of a hegemonic elite and they shared their efforts toward a democratic secular society. So, beside the loss of personal relationships, these interviewees highlight the endangerment of social change in Sudan.

In the actual political situation such memory discourses express loss and resistance. The resistance is turned against the current memory politics

of the Sudanese government which intend to cut every historical connection with South Sudan and deny its historical and actual importance.

2.2 Memories as Legacy: Remembered Memories of South Sudanese

I also interviewed South Sudanese who came back to South Sudan after the Referendum and the Independence in 2011. Foremost they mentioned the memories of South Sudan they had conserved during the time they spent in the North. In the centre were the memories of their lives at their places of origin from where they were driven away by the war. In the North Sudanese Diaspora the memories of the Civil War in the South, the persecutions and destructions were kept alive and transferred to the children. These memories became a legacy which motivated many of them to return back to the South to re-create a life in the places that they remembered as their homes.

They have two sorts of memories of their lives in Northern Sudan. They remember every day experiences of social and economic marginalisation, racial attacks against them and devaluation of their own culture and religion. But interviewees also remember positively friendships and good neighbourhoods and much better security conditions and services. They adapted themselves to every day rituals.

Today, however, good memories of the North are not "allowed" in the public discourse in South Sudan. They can only be exchanged within the group of returnees themselves. Thus, the "good memories" of the times in Northern Sudan remain individual. Interviewees tend to suppress and forget them. Former, bad memories on the other hand have a connectivity with memories of ex-combatants and with the South Sudanese national memory. It is only with this partial memory that returnees can join the national memory discourse.

2.3 Interconnection Between Individual Memory and National Memory Politics in South Sudan

South Sudanese ex-combatants who fought during the Civil War with the rebel army see themselves as those who merit the victory they struggled so fiercely for. For them the war was connected with huge deprivation, sufferings and loss. Their whole lives were dedicated to the struggle. The armed resistance included a permanent change of place and many documents were lost. Under these conditions the maintenance of memories is a race against time, as experiences are forgotten or blurred. The individual memories are elusive. This is also true for the memory of all the people who supported the combatants locally. The fighting of the rebel army was only possible when the local population gave logistic and material support. However, such support was often anonymous and ex-combatants strongly emphasized in the interviews how important it

was for them to preserve the memory of this wide-spread support that their struggle received from the local population.

The same is true for the contribution of women as female combatants and women as main organisers of the local support. Interviewees feel that these women should be remembered as models in the collective memory. Their stories can form the basis for the public recognition of women and the demand for equality in contrast to many traditional gender roles.

For the ex-combatants themselves, their memories are not in the first place individual. On the contrary, for them they are a representative cornerstone of the national memory with which the first national government wants to build up the self-reliance of the South Sudanese Nation.

3. Outlook

In his research on cultural memory Assmann[6] describes the construction of a collective memory as a foundational memory. Here the intention is to construct a memory like a memorial, to use it as an ideological foundation. This occurs often in times of change and transformation with the purpose, to direct and impose specific memory discourses. The integration of historical events and times is a further characteristic of foundational remembering. When comparing the different memory discourses in Sudan and South Sudan described above I will therefore look for such characteristics and the impact they have.

It seems evident that the construction of memories of ex-combatants and the South Sudanese government show a very obvious dissociation towards Sudan. In the narratives of the South Sudanese interviewees little corresponded to the feeling of loss expressed by North Sudanese. Even more, with the new border, they emphasize a mental and emotional separation from the others.

Reinterpretations take place. The common efforts together with men and women from the North to end the civil war, the engagement of many Sudanese from the North, who joined the rebel army are not mentioned any longer. The commemoration of the combatants and the battlefield is in the centre of the new national consciousness which manifests itself in honouring the martyrs in the national anthem and in turning the flag of the SPLA/M into the national flag for South Sudan.

The national memory discourse of the South Sudanese government aims to establish a foundational memory and to strengthen the new border with symbolic constructions. The temporal dimension[7] of the South Sudanese ex-combatants and governmental remembering goes back mainly to the beginning of the second civil war 1983, i.e. the biographical memory and the cultural memory are here in a way identical. The memories of the individual life story are in a way generalized into a national

memory. Such a generalization is exclusive, as the memories of other groups in the South Sudanese society are not accepted as part of the national memory.

As for the Sudanese political opposition their memories continue to be an important part in their struggle against an authoritarian regime. This regime neglects in its construction of a national consciousness any historical common roots with South Sudan. The absence of history in this prescribed national discourse of their government is unacceptable to them. These interviewees cultivate memories of earlier protest movements and insurrections from the Sudanese history and connect them with their demands for a political change. Their concept of remembering has therefore also characteristics of a foundational memory. It should be a collective basement for further actions.

The temporal dimension of this group goes back to the date of independence from the British colonialism in 1956 and even further back to times in the 1930s when a Sudanese national consciousness emerged. The cultural memory goes back to the Nubian empire, which is considered as the original cultural root of Sudan. With this temporal dimension the construction of memories is more inclusive. Different cultures and religions could be integrated.

A comparison of memory discourses in each country has necessarily to place them into the historical context of South Sudan or Sudan respectively. Though there is a common history the historical developments were different in each country at the same time. The different ways that memories are constructed and given space or suppressed can often only be understood with the historical context in mind.

Notes

1. Halbwachs, Maurice (1992) On Collective Memory
2. Winter, Jay (2010) Foreword: Remembrance as a Human Right. In: Assmann, Aleida and Short, Linda (eds) : Memory and Political Change
3. Prost, Antoine (2000) The Algerian War in French collective memory. In: Winter, Jay, Sivan Emmanuel (eds): War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century 161 – 176
4. Buckley-Zistel, (2008) Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda
5. Aguilar, Paloma (2000) Agents of memory: Spanish Civil War veterans and disabled soldiers. In: Winter, Jay and Sivan Emmanuel: War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (eds.) 84-103
6. Assmann, Jan (2007) Cultural Memory and Early Civilization
7. Assmann, Jan (2007) Cultural Memory and Early Civilization

Sudan: A Cartographic History, Part III

By Richard A. Lobban, Jr.

Introduction

The first article (*Sudan Studies Association Bulletin*, Volume 30, Number 2, pages 19-23) examined the ancient and late medieval traditions of map-making and the nomenclature of Africa, the Nile valley, and Kush or Nubia. The second article (*SSA Bulletin,* Volume 30, Numbers 1 and 2, pps. 30-34) picked up the story of regional cartography from the Enlightenment period to the age of Exploration. This third and last article will cover the colonial partition, post-colonial times and modern border issues of Sudan and South Sudan.

The following German map was amidst the Turco-Egyptian colonial period when Sudan was still known as Nubia and the conquest and control of the regions to the east and west of the Nile was tenuous at best. The Blue Nile descends correctly from Ethiopia but the knowledge of the White Nile tapers into ambiguity in the *Sudd* barrier as the "discovery" of its source in Lake Nyanza ("Victoria") was still not known.



Neueste Karte von Nubien, Habesch, Kordofan und Darfur, 1844, Meyers Handatlas, Instituts zu Hildburghausen: Amsterdam. Lobban Map Collection #82251844.

Even before the Mahdist revolt (1883-1898) and the 'reconquest' of Sudan there was active exploration by cartographers, military officers and scientists. Still the source of the White Nile at Lake Nyanza (Victoria) was not known with precision until the 1860s with the travels of Richard Burton, John Speke, James Grant and Samuel Baker. Some fifty Union and Confederate military officers from the United States after the civil war did some of the first modern maps of Sudan including Lt. Col. Charles Chailée-Long (1842-1917) who was an aide to Gordon Pasha and discovered Lake Kioga on his way to Uganda and Major General William Wing Loring (1818-1886) in the 1870s. As the southern Sudan became better known, the height of land between the Nile and Congo Basins became the southern border after the fascinating and important imperial struggle between the French and English at the "Fashoda Incident" (the capitol of the Shilluk kingdom at Kodok) and the establishment of the Lado Enclave before Gondokoro and Juba rose in importance in the southern Sudan.



Extract from "Sketch Map of Central Africa to Illustrate Mr. Wills's Papers", Royal Geographical Society, 1887, Lobban Map Collection #86301887

As the British colonial government was constructed in 1898 in the wake of the destruction of the Khalifa's forces at the massacre/battle of Kareri they sought to move the center of political gravity back to Khartoum from Omduman (the Mahdist capitol). The first bridge across the Sudanese Nile was the Blue Nile Bridge that served the railway and vehic-

ular traffic. The bridge across the White Nile to Omdurman across Wad Dakin Island did the same for the tram that brought workers from that city to Khartoum. Various traffic roundabouts (circles) provided firing positions for British troops in case of civil disorder as well as making for the symbolic grid of the Union Jack. In subsequent years, more bridges crossed from Omdurman to Shambat, a second Blue Nile bridge from Burri to Kober in Khartoum North ("Bahri") and still more bridges on Shari'a Mek Nimir and to expanding Gereif and with a provocative bridge to Tuti Island, never having been linked to the mainland, and with the construction of a new airport south of Omdurman and north of Jebel Aulia dam, another bridge is being constructed there. Bridges at Shendi and Atbara and elsewhere in the north have systemically put the old ferries (*bantons*) out of business.

Khartoum steadily grew southward to the New Extension. Omduman grew north to Thawra and west to Suq Libya and south to Fitehab; Khartoum North grew toward Haj Yousif and Shambat. In 1970 the Three Towns capitol had about 500,000 people, today it is estimated that there are some 6-7 million inhabitants.

Extract from "Khartoum Guide to City Centre" 1967, Sudan Survey Department Lobban Map Collection # 83101967.

The case of Halayeb is another artifact of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era. In trying to determine which nation should control that territory a strange and tentative compromise was reached. This territory descended from the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium and especially from the 1902 administrative boundaries that were set at that time. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 and Sudanese independence in 1956 did not solve the questions of territorial authority, that was only further polarized when Egypt imposed military occupation and yet Halayeb is still claimed by Sudan for reasons of its own strategic security and local resource development.

When the Anglo-Egyptian imperial military conquered Sudan it was really only the core of the modern nation of Sudan. Control of the south was very tenuous for decades and Darfur remained a sovereign sultanate under Sultan 'Ali Dinar until British troops advanced from Kordofan and killed the Sultan in 1916 and militarily annexed that territory.

Neighboring Darfur to the east is Kordofan which boasts a railway to the south and on to Darfur. But complicating southern Kordofan is the fact that this is the meeting ground of Muslim Baggara cattle-herding pastoralists and well as non-Muslim Dinka pastoralists. On top of this the zone of Abyei is another colonially inherited border "time bomb" that sits astride region vastly endowed with great petroleum sources. Not surprisingly, with great wealth at stake, and a religious, economic, and ethnographic divide and debatable boundaries, this region has been a frequent flashpoint.

Another dimension of the deep conflict between the parties of North and South Sudan is that the pipeline carrying valuable oil to the northern



Source: Africa Confidential 2010

refineries and on to major exports at Port Sudan lies in the north while the oil is heavily located in the south. While a team approach, mediation and collaboration between the parties seems to be the obvious way out, the long history of civil wars, slavery, proxy forces, opposing models of governance, and deep distrust have made this very difficult to resolve.

As a result of these factors, and wars with Anya-Nya (1955-1972) and the SPLA (Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army) from 1983-2005, the tensions

finally resulted in Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that brought the Khartoum government and the SPLA to form a Government of National Unity. The world breathed a sigh-of-relief parallel to that of the eleven years of the Addis Ababa Accords that also brought peace with a model of regional authority. The provisions of the CPA expected and required a mission "to make unity attractive". Since John Garang, SPLM leader and chief CPA negotiator advocated unity and the north would lose so much with separation, it was barely expected that a fruitful and deep peace would result. Unfortunately, the north with its Islamist project did very little to reach such expectations and when a southern referendum took place the overwhelming vote was to separate and create its own sovereign nation of ten states with the barest of infrastructure and poor standards in health, education, and civil society. Enthusiasm for the new independent nation was still broad, but "hope is not a plan" especially in a very troubled political neighborhood of unstable nations, marginal democracy, and various insurgencies. Nonetheless, when the referendum was finally held, the vast majority of the southern voters expressed their preference to separate and build their own new nation. The new Republic of South Sudan certainly has many resources but few infrastructural elements to develop them. Roads, schools, hospitals, clinics and other measures of civil society were in short supply. Borders in the oil rich areas of Western Upper Nile (Unity State) and Upper Nile were poorly defined and ethnic diversity in the south was to prove more of liability than asset.

The unresolved questions of pipeline use-rates, cross border raids and proxy forces only made things worse. Still there is no refinery in the south and as relations between Khartoum and Juba deteriorated there



Source: Republic of South Sudan.

were thoughts of building a new pipeline from the oilfields to the Kenyan coast.

Source: The Economist, 4 January 2014

But as these discussions were unfolding some traditional issues of economic rivalry between Nuer and Murle people broke out with violence, and theft of cattle in the Bor region east of the White Nile up to the Ethiopian borderlands. These conflicts were to presage the virtual civil war starting on 15 December 2013 between Dinka and Nuer.

Source: The Economist, 2013

Since then, the political map of the new Republic has only worsened in December 2013 and through April 2014 at least. 500,000 citizens are now internally displaced or have become international refugees. Tens of thousands have been killed. The bloody conflict between between Nuer Riak Machar and elected president Dinka Salva Kiir Mayardit can be partially mapped in this diagram of their social network. Factors political history, access to oil, personal rivalries, foreign intervention, weaknesses in civil society, and ethnicity are some of the sources for this outbreak of violence.

Some of the very latest "maps" of Sudan are those produced by the software of CASOS center at Carnegie Mellon University. These data are all from the open source of the Sudan Tribune newspaper from 2003 to 2010 and each link is derived from conterminous reports in that paper. The powerful software can "map" these network "nodes" to illustrate relations among the taxonomy of several variable categories. The dyads between nodes do not evaluate the relationships but that can be done by Subject Matter Experts" (SME's) such as those reading this article.

Or, finally a contextual social network map of Sudan indicates some of the factors why this conflict is so difficult to resolve.



Network map of the main actors in South Sudan. Organizational Risk Assessment (ORA), Richard Lobban, 2014.



Network Context South Sudan. Organizational Risk Assessment (ORA), Richard Lobban, 2014.

Conclusion

Clearly, the two Sudans have had a problematic and lingering colonial inheritance with boundaries made by outsiders that formed less (more?) foundation for division than for unity. The decades of post-colonial in

dependence have had more years of war than of peace. Ethnic and religious plurality was more often a point of frustration than of national resolve and purpose. The road map to the Sudanese future apparently will also be a very bumpy road.

For additional background, a classic in the history of cartography is Lloyd A. Brown, 1949, *The Story of Maps*. Dover: New York, or Carl Moreland and David Bannister, 1995, *Antique Maps*, Phaeton: London.

Humanitarian Aid in Sudan: for Better or for Worse?

By Soledad Herrero

"For the whole war we lived with no rights and always in fear (…). It was a bad time.....We were living in the dark. We would rather die in the light."[1]

1. Sudan, the Turbulent State[2]

Until its recent division in 2010, Sudan was the largest country in Africa. With almost half of the population living under the poverty line[3], Sudan has a tragic record in state rankings: the third position in the ranking of failed states[4], the 177th most corrupted state (out of 182)[5], and occupying the 169th position in the human development index (out of 185).[6]

Sudan was born as an independent country in 1956 with a civil war already ongoing, and since then war has been a fact of life for more than three-fourths of its political existence. After a period of peace under the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972-1983), the civil war in the South was reignited in 1983. Sudan struggled through different episodes of drought and famine through the 1980s, which when coupled with the ongoing civil war, produced recurrent humanitarian crisis of dire proportions. In 1989, UNICEF, on behalf of the UN, brokered a humanitarian agreement with the Sudanese Government and the rebel group the Sudan People´s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). The *Operation Lifeline Sudan* (OLS) provided humanitarian access to the civilian population caught in the conflict. This represented a groundbreaking modality that defeated the tradition of the Cold War, where aid organizations were relegated to refugee camps. From the OLS until today, Sudan has been and continues being one of the biggest recipients of humanitarian aid in the world.

During the period of the OLS, the government refused to grant humanitarian access to war-affected territories in the North (specially the Nuba Mountains, in South Kordofan State), with the exception of limited assistance to those living in the "peace camps." These camps, tightly controlled by the Sudanese government, included an aggressive policy of Islamization and a prohibition of cultural expressions of identity.[7] This

situation prevailed until a Cease-Fire Agreement for the Nuba Mountains was brokered in January 2002, after which international aid agencies were granted access to all areas of the Nuba Mountains. This led to the initiative of the UN and non-governmental organizations known as the Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT). The NMPACT became closely linked with the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement. This represented a novel development beyond the OLS as for the first time a humanitarian intervention was explicitly connected to a political initiative.[8]

Despite the additional challenges posed by the ignition of a parallel conflict in the East in 1998, new episodes of drought and famine, and the increasing international pressure against the regime[9], the North-South peace talks started yielding results. However, optimism was short lived. One year after the SPLA/M and Sudanese Government signed the framework agreement (the Machakos Protocol) that became the basis for the final settlement of the North-South civil conflict, renewed conflict exploded again in Darfur in 2003.[10]

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the SPLA/M and the Sudanese Government was signed in 2005 and the Beja insurgency of the East was settled in 2006, the peace initiatives in Darfur have had limited results in the prevention of violence.[11] Even if the referendum on independence and separation of South Sudan took place relatively peacefully, both countries were on the brink of war in 2012 because of a number of unsettled issues, including border demarcation and oil. Additionally, in June 2011, fresh conflict emerged in the so-called Transitional Areas of South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei. Regrettably, and despite lengthy discussions over a humanitarian proposal endorsed by the UN, Arab League, and the African Union to bring humanitarian assistance to these areas (the Tripartite Agreement) no humanitarian access has been granted to SPLA/M controlled areas since the renewal of the war.[12]

As eminent Africanist de Waal explains, Sudan can be regarded as a "turbulent state" whose history has been characterized by the dominance of an elite in Khartoum, which has put in motion different mechanisms for the exploitation of the periphery including seizing land and livestock and the manipulation of identities along religion and ethnic lines.[13] The central elite is not cohesive but rather an instable bloc of factions whose only common ground is their determination to stay in power at any price, including the endorsement of extreme violence. For the elite, managing Sudan´s different crises has become a way of life. This creates an indeterminacy which makes Sudanese politics infamous. As de Waal notes "This has many consequences, but one is particularly grave: it is

almost impossible to make peace".[14]

2. Humanitarian Aid and Sovereignty

During the Cold War, international relations were regulated necessarily by an unconditional respect for the principle of state sovereignty. Aid formed part of the Cold War *realpolitik*, as a way to ensure alliances and stability in some regions. However, because of the inviolability of the sovereignty principle, populations living in conflict-affected regions received assistance only in government-held areas or in a second country where they had sought refuge.[15]

Ironically, the end of the Cold War was followed by the unleashing of a wide number of conflicts, most of them within fragile states[16], and highly resistant to peace. At the same time, the end of the Cold War enlarged the boundaries of international obligations, making wars be regarded as not solely the problem of the state where they take place but of the international society as well. This resulted in part because of a growing recognition of the crisis of statehood in many countries in conflict. Additionally, the softening of the international position regarding sovereignty allowed international relief to be delivered directly to conflict zones.

In this new context, humanitarian activities, initially restricted to the provision of food, shelter, healthcare, and water and sanitation, enlarged to include less tangible aid, notably physical and legal protection against human rights violations. The concept of security expanded from the classical state-centric view to one including the notion of human security.[17] The responsibility to protect doctrine emerged[18], in part as a recognition that although national security and human security should be mutually reinforcing, in the last years more people have died as a consequence of the actions of their own governments or rebel forces in civil wars than by external threats from outside states. These concepts were employed in the 1990s to promote military interventions that combined peacekeeping missions with humanitarian aid. However, as the justifications were stretched in some contexts and the financial costs of the "humanitarian interventions" increased, the dilemmas of humanitarian engagement in wars became more visible and exposed to criticism.[19]

Concurrently to the incorporation of the protection and human security concepts into the humanitarian sphere, the boundaries between humanitarian intervention and development activities have progressively diminished. This dilution has derived from attempts to address the cause of populations' vulnerability, and as a result of the realization of the change in the contexts in which conflicts take place nowadays. Humanitarian aid is therefore delivered not in episodes of violence but

through complex and prolonged political emergencies[20], which requires a mixture of humanitarian and development interventions.

3. Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Sudan

As we have seen, the landscape of conflicts has substantially changed since the end of the Cold War. Wars are longer, recurrent, and peace agreements tend to fail.[21] Sudan reflects this reality. Just as conflict has been a permanent part of the history of Sudan, so has humanitarian aid. The intractability of conflicts like Sudan has made wars almost unwinnable. The fragility of the state has made the needs of the population more pressing. This situation, together with the expansion of the boundaries of the international obligations, has locked war, human needs, and international humanitarian aid together.

The dilemmas that will be explained below are largely explained by the nature of humanitarian aid. First and foremost, in Sudan, as in other contexts, humanitarian crises are frequently strategically created by the elites controlling the government to manage threats. Humanitarian aid thus tries to help those populations that the political interests of the state have decided to sacrifice.[22] Second, because humanitarian aid is carried out in a political and physical space provided by political authorities, it is subject to political abuse.[23] As Terry argues, in this complex scenario, humanitarian actors have two choices, participate in the conflict dynamics, or refuse to engage at all.[24]

3.1. Feeding Rebels or Victims?

When humanitarian aid is provided amidst the conflict, it becomes in one way or another a part of the war economies. During war, some relief supplies intended for vulnerable populations are diverted into the hands of combatants. One of the reasons for this diversion is that civilians are perceived to have weaker perceived property rights over aid supplies than over their own produce, so appropriation of relief by the army creates fewer tensions.[25] In Sudan for example, there is documented evidence that the SPLA/M and its humanitarian branch (the South Sudan Relief Commission) officially empowered by the OLS, misappropriated aid and employed distribution practices during the 1998 famine, creating major constraints to reducing mortality.[26] During the outbreak of violence in 2011 in both South Kordofan and Abyei, the warehouses of several UN Agencies and other NGOs were entirely looted by militia and armed groups.[27] How systematically this occurs, however, is in question.

In contemporaneous conflicts like the Sudanese, the line that divides those who fight and those who do not has disappeared. Combatants camouflage within the civilian population, and villages have turned

into battlefields. After years of war and neglect by the central State, the SPLA/M has become almost the only source of authority in some areas of Sudan. In the areas under its control, almost every person associates in some form with the SPLA/M. Soldiers do not necessarily remain separated from their families. In many contexts, distinguishing combatants from civilians has become more difficult than ever, and thus determining the proportion of aid ending in wrong hands has become a very difficult task.

The likelihood of resources being swallowed by combatants increases to the extent that humanitarian aid funds are channeled through contexts where accountability is low and monitoring systems inadequate. Somalia may represent a more extreme case than Sudan in this regard. Because Somalia had to rely on remote mechanisms, allegedly as much as 50 percent of the humanitarian aid was diverted to rebel groups.[28] In that regard, arrangements of humanitarian access like OLS or NMPACT are worth being pursued, although as we have seen above, they still may not prevent the diversion of aid. The most reliable mechanism may be empowering the local structures and communities so they can prevent the diversion from happening. In any case, putting in place monitoring mechanisms amid violence and deprivation may be a very difficult endeavor, and therefore humanitarian actors will have to constantly strike a delicate balance between the dimension of needs and the mechanisms available.

Although there are no questions that humanitarian aid may have been diverted, the low intensity of the conflict in Sudan has allowed parties to find ways to stock up the necessary resources without hampering their military capability. The economic value from revenues derived from oil resources and land exploitation seems to be a far more crucial factor for warring parties than aid.[29] At least for the case of Sudan, we can apply John Burton's conclusion that "in most, if not all conflicts, the role of humanitarian aid as a source of support for warring factions has probably been slight".[30]

3.2. Weakening the State or Filling the Gap?

Aid for victims of conflict remains the primary responsibility of the state or eventually the parties to the conflict: humanitarian actors should only interfere interfere when formal structures fail. But because the majority of current conflicts nowadays take place in fragile states, government structures with almost no exception fall short in their capacities to deliver basic services to the population.

In Sudan, the government has largely proved either unable or unwilling to shoulder its responsibility. The priority of the government has not

been the operation of economic and social structures but of the military operations and the maintenance of their fragile political control. According to International Crisis Group, 75 percent of the government's 2012 budget was allocated to defense and security. Similarly, the 2012 national budget reduced expenditures for states to 28.8 per cent, down from 39.9 in 2011 and 48.1 in 2010.[31]

However, Sudan is not Somalia. While the government has been unwilling to allocate financial resources to social sectors and to the periphery, the government possesses some capacity to function. The Government of Sudan has always made clear that accepting aid is an exercise of its sovereignty. Incrementally since the 1980s, a large proportion of humanitarian assistance in government-controlled areas has been provided through government structures with technical and financial support of humanitarian actors. This has been not only the result of the humanitarian actors' intention to build state capacities but sometimes has come as a government imposition. The massive humanitarian interventions in Sudan accompanied by permanent allegations of crimes against humanity and genocide have progressively increased the Sudanese government´s obsession for controlling aid actors, which have been under perpetual suspicion of being instruments of Western interests. The tension peaked in 2009 when the ICC issued a warrant for the President Omar Al-Bashir, which led to the government´s decision to expel 13 NGOs from the country.[32]

In the case of non-government controlled areas, the work of humanitarian actors has inevitably taken place outside state structures during the conflict. But as in any civil war the state is also a party to the conflict, yet this arrangement seems the only acceptable solution. In this type of context, only by strictly complying with the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, do both warring parties allow humanitarian actors to operate. For example, although the responsibility for the lack of implementation of the Tripartite Agreement for the provision of aid in South Kordofan and Blue Nile has lied by large in the Government, one initial obstacle during the drafting of the proposal was the refusal by the SPLA/M to accept government's representatives as part of the delivery of aid.[33]

In some contexts, humanitarian aid in Sudan has built bridges between rebel and government structures. The NMPACT established a cross-line initiative that involved the humanitarian structures of both the government and the SPLA/M, narrowing the long-established gulf between parties.[34] Similarly, after signing of the CPA, several UN Agencies and NGOs worked in South Kordofan to integrate the SPLA/M structures (Secretariats) into regular government structures.

In theory, humanitarian actors can use smart advocacy to push governments to recognize and undertake their responsibilities.[35] Smart advocacy has been proved very effective in countries like Colombia, which has obsessively pursued the task of cleaning up its image as a narco-paramilitary state. However, when working with "rogue" states like Sudan, the impact of "naming and shaming" may be limited and even regarded as counterproductive. As a consequence, humanitarian actors (particularly NGOs) in Sudan have frequently restricted their outspokenness for fear of denial of access to the population they intend to help. Only big humanitarian agencies with some leverage, mainly with help from the UN, have dared to be more outspoken in their advocacy but still have tended to prefer bilateral silent advocacy with the Government.

3.3. Reducing Inequalities or Creating Dependency?

Collier has identified three key factors that were present in countries where conflicts took place: resources, inequalities, and low income.[36] According to Stewart, out of these three elements, inequality, particularly horizontal inequality, is the major factor that drives current conflicts.[37] All variables are somehow related to humanitarian aid. Aid targets the most deprived populations in the most extreme conditions with the purpose of addressing their most basic needs. In this sense, humanitarian aid reduces an essential inequality, the one that may separate people from life and death.

Humanitarian aid can have some positive impact in the strengthening of informal structures, which in turn can play an important role in the initial stages of the development of fragile states.[38] The zones of peace established during the OLS around the humanitarian corridors produced a "more normal pattern of trade and production".[39] The work that humanitarian actors currently undertake in Sudan with the Internal Displaced Population´s (IDP) Committees has at least the potential to boost the self-organization of the communities and empower their structures and leaders, reducing the capacity of being manipulated.

The inclusion of education as part of the humanitarian response is perhaps one of the biggest contributions that humanitarian aid can make for the reduction of inequalities. While not part of life saving activities, the adoption of norms and standards on education in emergencies[40] has enhanced the role of education as part of the core response in emergencies. While the population living in conflict will never achieve the same level of welfare as a population in peace fare, providing access to education may be the most efficient strategy to break the cycle of inequality, marginalization and poverty.

But equality is not achieved through the simple provision of basic needs,

and therefore the contribution of humanitarian aid to the reduction of inequality may be limited. Development aid has greater potential for playing a major role in this regard. Although we have pointed out that conceptual delimitation is no longer that relevant, the reality is that carrying out programs with developmental goals in the middle of violence may be a difficult task.

Although the risk of dependency is a more problematic risk, there is little evidence that communities imprudently reduce production because of a reliance on low quantity, intermittent aid.[41] De Waal has investigated how African communities' coping strategies aim more at ensuring the ability to resume future production when the crisis passes than at preventing starvation.[42] The current conflict in Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan represents an extraordinary example of local coping mechanisms. Despite the fact that this region has been subjected to fighting and bombardment in the last year and a half preventing any possibilities of farming or access to humanitarian aid, the conditions in which refugees are reaching Ethiopia and South Sudan are not as extreme as it might have been expected. When crisis produces population camps, however, avoiding dependency becomes more complex. In Darfur, currently an estimated 1.7 million people reside in IDP camps.[43] With IDPs having little prospects of return, efforts toward the integration of these populations and the creation of alternatives for income generation become a crucial priority.

Whether the levels of dependency vary across contexts and practices, the capacity of humanitarian aid to promote survival economies has so far proved limited. Although the lack of distinction between humanitarian and development aid has permitted actors to expand their activities, and even though there are some successful experiences like the NMPACT[44], traditional income generating activities are relegated to later stages of the crisis and conducted by organizations that are not normally present in emergencies.

3.4. Legitimizing Rebels or Gaining Humanitarian Space?

When rebel actors have territorial control of a region, humanitarian actors have no option to gain "humanitarian space" but engaging with armed groups in control of a region. Smith argues that in the Horn of Africa, liberation movements have gained international status "not because their claims or demands have been accepted, but because they became active players in international relief operations".[45]

In the context of Sudan, although SPLA/M quickly won local support and territorial control in South Sudan and in some parts of the North, the provision of aid through indigenous relief agencies linked with the

SPLA/M increased not only its popularity among the population, but also its international visibility. The legitimizing effect of SPLA/M's participation in OLS and NMPACT may well exemplify the negative side of the popular development notion of "empowerment". Although they may have addressed to some extent the recurrent criticism of the relief system for making aid recipients "passive dependents on the competence of outsiders", as Terry points there may be a "subjectivity inherent in labeling one action *empowerment* and other *legitimacy*".[46]
However, by having control over a territory, the SPLA/M (as other armed groups in Sudan) holds a key attribute of statehood. It can be argued that the legitimacy therefore derives from that capacity, and its involvement in humanitarian operations is only a reflection of this. Additionally the SPLA/M, as an insurgent movement dependent on support from the local population, was careful in avoiding discontent among that population. In contrast, for decades the government did little to avoid antagonizing the population of South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and some areas of Blue Nile, all regarded as sympathizers of the rebels. By failing to gain legitimacy in the eyes of this population, the Sudanese government left a vacuum easy to be filled. And although SPLA/M behavior towards the population under its control at times fell below acceptable standards, it did not need much effort to win the allegiance of the citizenry.

3.5. Politicizing Aid or Bringing Opportunities for Peace?
In general, there is a consensus that to avoid the risk of politicizing aid, the neutrality of humanitarian aid must be retained. However, the broadening of the concept of security to one including the notion of human security has paved the way for aid playing a peacemaker role. This trend was popularized by Anderson, who argued that aid should not only be delivered responsibly, minimizing its impact on the conflict, but that it should also "help war to end by lessening intergroup tensions and strengthening intergroup connections".[47] Many humanitarian actors have taken these ideas on board and are now conflict-proofing their operations and seeking to empower local individuals and organizations in conflict management and peace building while at the same time than providing assistance.

Aid may be able to contribute to a climate favorable for dialogue at the local level, by bringing confronted communities together to discuss issues related to their basic needs. For example, in the disputed area of Abyei, some humanitarian agencies have tested mechanisms for activities with intercommunity participation of Misseriya and Dinka population, providing a unique space for dialogue for these antagonized communities.

Humanitarian agencies have a unique comparative advantage, which is their proximity to the conflicts on a day-to day basis, making their en-

gagement in laying the groundwork for peace building possible. However, the changes in war environments of the past decades have imposed a separation between aid providers and aid recipients, which may have lessened the ability to identify with each other.[48] In Sudan the situation has changed across time and context. While in Darfur, the fragile security has imposed movement restrictions on humanitarian workers, in the Transitional Areas during the period after the signature of the CPA and until the resumption of violence in 2011, humanitarian actors were able to interact extensively with local communities.

Humanitarian agreements sometimes are integrated into a broader political process, either as a base for propelling further agreements, or as confidence building measures during talks. Through the first months of existence, OLS was credited with helping to maintain communication between the parties in a moment where divisions prevailed everywhere else, and had the psychological value of being perceived as "harbinger of peace".[49] Furthermore, the protection of relief activities became a step toward a larger de-escalation of the violence.[50] However, the Khartoum regime learned how to turn relief into a political tool, and the tranquility associated with the OLS was used by both parties to prepare for renewed combat.[51] NMPACT went even further than the OLS, as it explicitly incorporated humanitarian, recovery, and peace building objectives. The framework recognized aid's capacity to mitigate conflict, and was designed from its inception to have strong links with key political and military actors involved in the Nuba Mountains ceasefire, including the Joint Military Commission/Joint Monitoring Mission (JMC/JMM), as well as diplomatic actors.[52]

In some occasions, the humanitarian agenda has been compromised because of larger political agendas. The international community was slow to react in the provision of humanitarian aid in Darfur in 2003 for fear of spoiling the peace process between the North and the South.[53] The prohibition of bringing assistance into the Nuba Mountains by the OLS has been criticized as a political compromise which seriously limited the legitimacy of the UN operation.[54]

But since the 1980s, the more problematic trend in Sudan has been the concentration of international attention on humanitarian issues rather than on the need to undertake a political process to address conflict. With the exception of the period of discussion of the CPA and the Darfur agreements, most of the external pressure exerted on Sudan has been on behalf of humanitarian access, not peace. The Sudanese government has learned through time to use the denial of humanitarian access to remove pressure from the political demands made by the international community. At the time of the writing of this paper, a year and a half

since the renewal of the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile has elapsed, an inadequate international political engagement has produced limited results towards the resolution of the conflict in these regions. The final status of Abyei is still unresolved, and the Darfur crisis continues producing new displacements and death.[55]

4. Conclusion

This paper has largely illustrated the dilemmas of the provision of humanitarian aid. These dilemmas are largely explained by the nature of humanitarian aid: because it is given amidst violent conflict, it becomes part of that context, and thus, part of the conflict.[56]

In the case of Sudan, humanitarian aid has been effective in its main goal of saving lives and alleviating the suffering. Aid has provided essential services, reduced inequality, and at times contributed to creating an enabling environment for peace. However, aid has also been diverted to warring parties, may have contributed towards the legitimization of rebel groups, and shown limited capacity to bring development and promote local economies.

Despite the complex political and operational scenario, humanitarian aid has filled the gaps in the provision of basic services to vulnerable populations. Although arguably it may have weakened the accountability of the state, the historical relation of the central government with the periphery seems to indicate that the social contract among them was severely eroded before humanitarian aid came into play. Similarly, given the historical and continued polarization between Khartoum and the periphery, it is arguable whether armed groups like the SPLA/M would have achieved the same legitimacy without its involvement in humanitarian operations.

Humanitarian aid has had some limited positive impact in the reduction of inequalities and in the strengthening of local capacities. However, the extent to which developmental goals can be incorporated depends many times on the severity of the emergency and the security constraints. The expectations on what humanitarian aid can achieve should remain realistic; there will be occasions when carrying an immunization campaign in a war-affected region may be a titanic task in itself. Acknowledging the difficult environment where humanitarian aid is delivered, nevertheless, should not excuse the obligation of agencies to increase their efforts for finding more creative ways of delivering assistance with stronger engagement of local communities, and for avoiding replicating the same interventions across emergencies with different characteristics. For that to occur, donors should act responsibly and decrease their restrictions on humanitarian grants so that technical teams have the

freedom to tailor interventions according to the realities on the ground.

However, as Anderson concludes, "it is a moral and logical fallacy to conclude that because aid can do harm, a decision not to give aid would do no harm".[57] Even if there may be a moral ambiguity in providing aid, the decision of not providing aid is no less controversial. Sudan´s war began in 1955, and with the exception of an eleven year pause, it has continued inexorably with or without humanitarian aid. Sudan may well exemplify de Waal's argument that "war begets wars".[58] In this scenario, as conducting counterfactual analysis is almost impossible, the human, social and political cost of not providing that aid is rarely calculated.

Peterson has affirmed that "international aid has managed Sudan´s political decay rather than halted it".[59] However, although there is now a wide recognition of the potential role humanitarian aid can have in peace building, a realistic assessment of what aid can accomplish should be done. While acknowledging its potential in conflict management, addressing the root causes of the conflict may require a level of program sophistication that humanitarian actors may simply not be in a position to deliver. As Prendergast argues, "the fault does not lie with the food but with those throwing food at political problems".[60] It is therefore unfair to criticize humanitarian aid for not accomplishing goals that it was never empowered or qualified to do.[61] In the profusion of civil wars, Western powers have had in recent times little strategic incentive to intervene and run political risks, replacing political action with humanitarian aid. This has meant that civil wars like Sudan's are managed by dealing with their symptoms, not their causes.

The coping capabilities of the local population offer more hope for survival than any other alien machinery brought by humanitarian actors. While in civil wars there will be situations where external assistance will be required, the best contribution the international community can do is to ensure an environment free of violence and intimidation in which those capabilities can be exercised to the fullest. Humanitarian aid should continue addressing the suffering while minimizing its negative unintended consequences, and extending to the maximum extent its capacity to bring self-empowerment and to promote peace building at the grass root level. But it will not be able to bring peace and protection on its own. Other fronts should accompany it. The Sudan crisis of statehood is beyond the scope of the paper, but only when its turbulence is addressed, will war will stop begetting war in this country.

5. Recommendations

Recognizing the dilemmas associated with delivering humanitarian aid, the following recommendations can contribute to minimizing the harm-

ful side effects and increase the potential for providing opportunities for peace and self-reliance. Rather than a long list, recommendations are grouped around issues that are more relevant to Sudanese context and therefore have been discussed in the paper at length.

5.1. Conflict Management Lens

Humanitarian agencies should improve their knowledge about the local context, allocate time to analyze the socioeconomic-political and cultural environment, and diversify information sources. Although presently international humanitarian agencies' teams are comprised of mainly national staff, it is important to ensure that the humanitarian teams include local personnel with optimum knowledge of the local dynamics.

Flexibility is the key concept in providing agencies with the tools to reduce their contribution to conflict. Humanitarian actors should look at the type of assistance provided in each context and its fungibility; the more attractive aid may be, the bigger need for reinforcing monitoring systems.

5.2. Empowering Local Communities

Humanitarian actors should increase the responsibility and accountability of communities and not treat them as mere passive recipients of aid, and look at aid distribution modalities with their largest possible participation. Although in chronic emergencies like Sudan it may not be possible to conduct a proper planning scenario with local communities each time, the humanitarian actors should find ways of enriching their programs with the views of representatives of the communities regularly. Additionally, humanitarian actors should try to avoid the establishment of parallel administrations which stands like islands in vacuum. Instead, humanitarian aid should help connecting the local structures with formal governmental administration when possible.

When assessing needs, an *assessment of capacities* should also be accompanied, especially on the local resilience and subsistence economies. If the situation allows, food aid should be replaced by animal health services, agricultural, fishing gear or similar. Food security intervention should be done at earlier stages, and agencies with expertise on the matter should be ready to play a role at an earlier stage of the emergency response.

5.3. Smart Advocacy

Although the mandate of humanitarian actors may differ, in general non-governmental actors can have a position that countries cannot replace, as they may be bounded by their own national interests. The humanitarian community has the responsibility of taking a stand and to push for actions that will reduce deaths and protect human rights in

situations of conflict.

Humanitarian agencies will have to make a political assessment of the implications of their advocacy strategies. Humanitarian agencies should not extra limit their boundaries and they should ensure they are driven by the humanitarian principle to avoid losing their moral clout. To reconcile responsibilities and risks, humanitarian agencies should strengthen collaboration not only with political actors and peace makers, but also seek complementarity with other non-governmental organizations which do not deliver services that can be threatened.

5.4. Funding

At least three sets of problems can be identified in relation to funding mechanisms. First, although contributions to humanitarian aid should be an obligation of rich countries, it remains based on the voluntary contributions of governments. As countries have a tendency to allocate aid funds according to their political priorities, it creates major differences between crises. On the other hand, the need to fund raise, particularly for forgotten emergencies, generates not only disaster pornography[62] but also an extraordinary burden on the organizations that should be devoted on getting aid delivered. Although mechanisms like the Central Emerging Responding Fund (CERF) has brought some improvement on the discretionary funding of emergencies on case-by case basis, it still represents a small percentage of the amount of funds the humanitarian agencies receive. Second, although donors have become more aware of the importance of prevention, resources are still harder to obtain for prevention than for cure and often have a limited temporal timeframe. Third, the informality of the initial stages of the humanitarian aid has given way to a professionalized system that, although it has substantially increased the levels of accountability, has made humanitarian aid to lose its creativity and capacity to adjust to local contexts.

A larger, less volatile and more flexible system of fund allocation and management should be made available to avoid these structural problems. Although there have been positive developments in recent years, donors should not impose rigid distinctions between countries, between prevention and attention, and between humanitarian and development. Similarly, donors should allow humanitarian actors to experiment with new models without fears of funding being restricted when new approaches do not yield the expected results.

5.5. Minding the Gap

In the contexts where humanitarian aid operates, the problem is not famine but war. The international community cannot content itself by using the minimum common denominator (humanitarian aid), as a solution

to protracted conflicts like Sudan. Humanitarian aid can have limited contributions towards peace, but this may be regarded as a by-product and not the main objective of humanitarian aid, which will replace political action. In countries suffering from a crisis of statehood, key stakeholders cannot live under the illusion that aid will drive the agenda towards peace. The international community -- as represented in the UN and other multilateral and regional bodies – as well as practitioners and academics must be aware of the limitations of what aid can achieve and push for political settlements to conflict.

Acknowledgement: This essay is dedicated to the people in South Kordofan and Abyei; for those who continue coping with adversity, fear and deprivation, for those who are still to this day hiding in caves, for those that humanitarian actors have not been able to reach. It is also dedicated to my colleagues of UNICEF and to all the hidden heroes in that region: community leaders, doctors, teachers, social workers, and water technicians among others, for their courage and determination to stand up for the right of all human beings to live in dignity.

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South Sudan and the Threat of Collapse, A Case of Rushed Secession or Mismanagement of the Political Transition

Summary of Lecture by Jok Madut Jok, at Brown University, March 31, 2014

Prepared by the Editor, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

While offering an audience of mostly non-experts on Sudan a review of its history, Jok Madut Jok nonetheless offered the fresh perspective of an insider on the forces that led to the independence of South Sudan and the reasons for its false start as well, as its eventual success. As former Minister of Culture and Heritage and Professor of History at Loyola Marymount College in California in the RoSS as well as researcher and anthropologist, Jok is in a unique position to comment, reflect and analyze. What follows is a summary of his major observations and analyses.

The 1956 independence decision to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the colonial Sudan at all costs was the beginning of the re-colonization of the South by the North. The history of the failure of all parties to resolve the "southern problem" for the first quarter-century of independence finally ends in the game changing decision by Ja`afar Numieri to institute the "September Laws" in 1983 that effectively made Shari`a state law. The Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was founded in the same year by John Garang and was not secessionist but envisioned a "New Sudan" comprised of a unified North and South emancipated by a war of liberation. Jok argues that this vision changed the dynamic of the other marginalized Sudanese peoples in Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur making the war between the minority-ruled Khartoum center and the remaining periphery.

Jok observed the many insidious effects of decades of chronic warfare, focusing on the norm of pervasive violence as it has affected southern youth. With a hyperfocus on the military struggle violence in communities was reproduced, especially gender-based violence. Indeed dishonoring women became a strategy of war as has been seen in other chronic conflicts. Moreover, the SPLA mobilized women's fertility whose main role was population replacement, although he noted that a Women's Battalion did exist. As a result abortion rates soared and a woman's womb became a "national space" whereby once normative taboos against post-partum sexual intercourse for 18 months were frequently violated

by SPLA soldier-husbands. Unsafe "bush" abortions caused an untended consequent rise in infertility rates.

With the further spread of violence in the South cattle, grain and other foodstuffs were regularly raided to feed the army. As a result of little registration to keep track of new births, memory was relied upon, with a response to a question about the age of child being "He/she was born in the year when all of the goats were eaten"—meaning that this was the first year of the SPLA fighting.

Jok's review of the litany of Peace Agreements leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 is well-known to the Sudanist reader. But his analysis is refreshing. He argued that Sudan's conflicts–and by extension African conflicts—are multilayered and far more complex than what originally meets the eye or the way they are treated by the international media. With the immense challenges facing the implementation of the CPA after 2005, he asked if external intervention by the many parties to the peace talks and agreements delivered independence to South Sudan too soon? Recognizing that what brought the warring parties to the table(s) of Machakos and Naivasha before signing the CPA in Nairobi was the acknowledgement that the decades-long war was militarily unwinnable, Jok nonetheless sees the external interveners as driving the terms of the peace. Their greatest failure was not to recognize the tremendous damage that the decades of war had wrought on the South and its peoples. Simply requesting that the SPLA disband and that soldiers voluntarily disarm was naïve and actually resulted in an expansion of violence throughout the South. He noted ironically that more have died in post CPA low-level conflicts fueled by the massive presence of small arms and light weapons in the region. South Sudan rivals the US in the number of armed civilians. The promised independence so promoted by President George W. Bush, and celebrities like George Clooney and Don Cheadle was rushed too soon and its implementation mismanaged. In this way the agency of the South Sudanese was denied laying the base for the subsequent post-independence difficulties.

Jok argued that the critical development of South Sudanese citizenship had insufficient time to add the new identity that would begin to supercede ethnicity. Instead, given the mismanagement, ethnicity and "tribalism" were reaffirmed and now it is the responsibility of the state to build citizenship. "Nations are made and not born," he remarked, and this takes at least a generation, if not longer. "South Sudan" is still the worst place on earth to be a mother in terms of overall well-being; the human security index is among the lowest; women's literacy is still a "pathetic" 5%, he noted. For a country with $1 billion a year in revenue, these are the priorities that need attention. What are needed are 5 or 10 year plans

to grow civil society and build Southern Sudanese citizenship.

Moreover citizen-building must be inclusive. The military men brag that they liberated the country so they exclude the majority of people. The lack of an inclusive narrative has meant that for some this lamentable comment was made by one of Jok's informants: "War is better than peace because in war you know who is shooting at you, but in peace you can easily be betrayed." The greatest amount of human insecurity is in triangle of countries neighboring South Sudan, Uganda and Central African Republic. The narrative of national history must be inclusive and tell the truthful story of the struggles of the diverse South Sudanese who survived against the odds to gain their independence.

South Sudan though "drunk with oil," amounting to 97% of its total wealth, is nonetheless facing a youthful population 73% of whom are under 30 years of age and 70% of them are unemployed or marginally so. This volatile mix is now recognizable from the North African anti-state rebellions. South Sudan only realizes 50% of its oil wealth as it is necessarily shared with the North which takes high fees for its transport via the two Sudan's only pipeline through the north for export at Port Sudan. Jok opined that this oil wealth should be spent for capital infrastructure projects in the South. Its other resources have been neglected, for example it holds the largest concentration of cattle wealth in the continent. Its local potential for farming and fishing are legendary yet South Sudan still imports basic commodities. Jok joked that South Sudan is the only place on earth "where fish die of old age." He invoked a Dinka expression roughly translating as "hand to mouth" that—unlike the English equivalent meaning barely surviving—means that eating 'hand to mouth' is not good because you should set some aside for later use if needed. South Sudan needs to set aside a portion of its wealth for its basic development.

Finally Jok noted that playing the "ethnic card" is now more common and this is revealed in the recent unfortunate turn of events expanding generally to Nuer and Dinka from the personal dispute between Riek Machar and Salva Kiir. Old fears of Dinka dominance have resurfaced, and has been exacerbated by the mal-distribution of wealth and power and the rising frustration of the population. The numbers of internally displaced is rising again, from a half-million to perhaps a million now as the current situation is re-playing events in the post-CPA period. Once again power and resource competition have overshadowed the "peace dividend" as the root causes of the chronic conflicts are ignored once again.

Reconciliation with lasting effect will not occur unless a new formula is

proposed and seriously implemented by local agents. That includes: 1) secession of hostilities 2) humanitarian aid to stabilize the nation and communities 3) commitment to a process of accountability, justice and reconciliation. The last point is the most important and an even hand in terms of accountability and justice will need to be at work to bring about the much needed reconciliation.

In my view, Jok Madut Jok has brought a fresh perspective to the analysis of post-independence South Sudan and his courage in truth-telling and forward thinking is to be acknowledged.

Private Security and Governance in Weak States: New and Old Cases

By Marco Boggero

What kind of effect do private security firms have on political stability in weak states? Some argue that the use of private security worsens state power and prevents national institution building; others claim it is an evolutionary element in modern-day global governance. In this article, with the aim of studying the case of Sudan- where a limited use of private security is a relatively new phenomenon- I look at relevant cases from the last two decades. Methodologically, I choose cases where I can probe the positive and negative effects of private security on governance. I study the interplay of politics, institutions and economics, particularly the recent evidence regarding Somalia. Eventually I draw some points for analysis and discussion for the Sudanese case. I use comparative and historical methods and rely primarily on secondary sources.

Introduction

Do private security firms thwart stability and governance? Or is the causality reversed- i.e. instability calls for private security? This question is complicated by a deep ideological divide in the framing of the debate and approaches to governance. Herbert Howe once pondered on this question and concluded that "private groups are probably more a reflection than a cause of African instability"[1]. However, the question remains unanswered. We do not know what the impact of privatized security on state governance is.

I summarize the available evidence on the relatively small private security firms in Sudan; then, after a short methodological note, I will review the case of Somalia and show the variation in the outcomes of governance in the comparison with Sierra Leone and Angola. Eventually, I look at some of the policy challenges that are related to this phenomenon in Sudan.

The first report to emerge on Chinese private security firms in Africa came from a Small Arms Survey report about firms deployed around oil wells[2]. More evidence came to the forefront with articles on Sudanese

troops engaged in a joint rescue effort, with armed Chinese private security contractors[3]. A CSIS report mentioned that new urgency had arisen after the kidnappings and that concerns have been raised about the deployment of poorly trained private Chinese security forces by some Chinese companies abroad[4]. Whereas mercenaries- in the form of individual contractors- were used over the years[5], no foreign firm had been allowed to deploy security teams before over an extended period of time in Sudan[6].

More recently, a magazine for the Asia-Pacific region, The Diplomat, points to a specific company, Shandong Huawei Security Group[7]:

> There is a strong likelihood (the contractors) were drawn from the same pool of former security forces personnel that Shandong Huawei recruits from and perhaps even came from the company. Chinese sources say it was the Sudanese military that told news outlets armed Chinese contractors were participating, so it appears that Beijing wants to keep its use of private security contractors out of the public eye[8].

1. Methodology

In order to understand the phenomenon of private security I choose several assumptions. First, I generally avoid the term *mercenarism* because of its value-laden character- in spite of that fact that it retains its usefulness for historical comparison. Since I see a convergence towards the use of the term *Private Security Companies* to encompass both Private Military and Security Companies[9], I am going to prefer this term.

Secondly, to make cases more comparable, I restrict my focus to Africa, and in order to avoid the problem of selection on the dependent variable, I look for case studies for comparison that exhibit variation in terms of the impact of private security firms on state governance. While it is unquestionably hard to find cases that are unequivocally positive or negative, I have selected cases where the literature and political analysis tend to reach a homogeneous result. Thus, I have selected the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola, that have gathered substantial critical reviews, from human rights standpoint and democratic accountability, and the positive case of Somalia, positive in the sense that the operations of security firms has not raised significant reservations thus far.

Third, I assume that the study of informality is key to the study of the State, but I am also cautious with the universalistic aspirations of neo-patrimonialism. Instead, as I focus here on Sudan, I find de Waal's historical account of a Sudanese-specific *Political Marketplace* of loyalties quite convincing[10]. By stressing the exceptional nature of Sudanese, I

am led to moderate the reliance on a clearly defined a-priori notion of monopoly of violence, with clear boundaries and formal certainties.
Fourth, I relied on some fields of academic literature more than others. I build upon the scholarship of Will Reno's *Warlord Politics and African States* as well as of Avant's *The Market for Force: the Consequences of Private Security*. The literature expanded a thousand fold and eventually focused on Iraq or Afghanistan, adding important case studies[11]. I must limit my perimeter as I cannot delve into all the important aspects that the literature on private security contractors has started to examine[12].

Finally, while I focus on the perspective of the State, I am not oblivious of the other parallel disciplinary interests and wider policy problems. A range of disciplines within and beyond the social sciences, from economics to history, from sociology to criminology have contributed to the debate. For example, piracy has received attention from various fields, driven both at the same time by scholarly interest and by the very resurgence of modern piracy.

2. Somalia: an outstanding case of public-private cooperation?
Somalia has become a case where private security has garnered positive attention from scholarly literature on three broad areas: prevention of piracy, prevention of illegal fishing, training of the Coast Guard[13]. I evaluate the evidence after a brief review of the country's political history. Somalia is a country that has had no recognizable government for a long time. Colonization and decolonization left deep scars; Harbeson's synthesis is useful to explain the subsequent path of instability:

> It is the nature and viability of the state as we know it that is at issue in the civil wars on the Horn (…) in a region where Western notions of the nation-state are much less deeply rooted than elsewhere (2009:129).

Between 1991 and the start of 2007, Somalia lacked any type of central administration and the state was, for much of this period, simply unable to provide for the security of its population. In 2006, an Islamic militia took control of the capital for six months until government forces backed by Ethiopians regained ground. Since January 2009, the current government Transitional Federal Government has been in charge and in January 2013, Somalia was recognized by the United States.

Over the course of this complex evolution, private security firms deployed in Somalia have been used for different purposes and hired by different governments. First, there is a multiplicity of governments on the contracting side. The Transitional Federal Government, Puntland, and Somaliland have each contracted private security companies,

primarily to prevent piracy and illegal fishing in their coastal waters. Secondly, firms were predominantly western. A New York Times article for example, focusing on a single American company contracted by the State department claimed that the "Bancroft's team in Mogadishu is a mixture of about 40 former South African, French and Scandinavian soldiers who call themselves 'mentors'"[14]. Third, the rise of the Sharia courts of Mogadishu provided a political explanation for the use of private security. Hansen writes that it "provided the TFG and Puntland with a common enemy, and created new opportunities for PSCs".

Fourth, private security firms had an effect on governance that can be best articulated, again, by Hansen:

> it cannot be uniformly concluded that private security always serves to weaken already fragile public authorities. (..) PSCs can assist aspiring state structures in gaining some de jure aspects of sovereignty. This was most notably the case in Puntland (P.596).

I will examine these claims in detail, first in Puntland, a region in northeastern Somalia, then in Somaliland.

First, Hansen stresses the positive results of private security, including the following:

> even more significantly, Hart's networks in the United Kingdom, and their experience in using the UK legal system was to provide Puntland with an important victory in the fight against illegal fishing (p.587).

Both Hansen and The United Nations Working Group stress clan politics as a driver of privatization but at the same time, a sword of Damocles. The UNWG states that:

> In Bossaso, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), operates outside the Constitutional framework for security institutions in Somalia and has engaged in operations unrelated to piracy, including a recent operation to prevent a candidate for the Puntland presidency from campaigning in Bossaso[15].

The role of private security has been focused on supporting the needs of Somaliland coast guard. In spite of the potential positive impact, the political risks involved included the possibility of supporting Somaliland's claim to sovereignty[16].

Thus, we could conclude from this synthesis that there is only limited

evidence that private security provided short-term support to state authority. Not only nothing can be said about the longer-term effects on governance and the democratic control over violence, but of the three areas examined- prevention of piracy, prevention of illegal fishing, training of the Coast Guard- only the latter two are significant for state stability in Somalia. While private armed guards on board ships have proved a remarkable deterrent against attacks[17], maritime security of shipping does not bear on Somalia's land governance. Last but not least, a firm like Sterling Corporate Services, aka Saracen International, has lost its anti- contract in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland in 2012 in the midst of criticism by the UN's Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) of the training a Puntland Maritime Police Force[18].

3. The More Problematic cases: Angola and Sierra Leone

There are several similarities between the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone. Both countries experienced a fragmentation of government authority and both became case studies for the existence of fundamentally different, *new wars,* where the distinctions between conflict, organized crime and large-scale human rights violation are blurred[19]. In both cases, the governments contracted PSCs for direct armed support = in the post-Cold-War turbulence of the nineties.

On the one hand, Angola went through a long civil war (1975-2002) following the liberation war against colonial rule. During the civil war, private security companies (PSCs) were contracted by both the rebel group UNITA as well as by government forces. In this context, Reno writes of how South African firm Executive Outcomes has a range of security specialists- a euphemism that covers a wide range of definitions- from mine clearance experts, to riot advisors, surveillance and security services or disaster relief firms (Reno 1998: 60).

On the other hand, in Sierra Leone President Strasser contracted Executive Outcomes which effectively helped train the loyalist army, push the rebels out of the capital, retake the diamond-mining area and destroy the rebel headquarters. However, Executive Outcomes became deeply involved in the political arena by training the *Kamajors*, an ethnic group that rose in power as a result of this external support. In so far as Executive Outcomes created a parallel force and fragmented the political system, the overall effect on governance was undoubtedly detrimental.

However, in hindsight, the literature critically reappraised the work of private actors in military operations. Scholars came to argue that private security does not strengthen governance. On the one hand, strong states are best able to manage the risks of privatization and harness the PSCs to

produce new public goods while on the other hand, "weak states are the least able to manage private forces for the public good but have the most to gain from privatization" (Avant 2005:7).

According to Avant, Sierra Leone gained short term functional gains- Executive Outcomes helped push the rebels out of the capital and regain control of the extractive resource- but undermined national control of force by stirring up political competition.

Element of Comparative Analysis

At this point, I shall go back to the central question on the relation between private security and state stability, and explain what distinguishes the cases I have outlined, especially in term of the temporal unit of analysis and the origins of private security.

1) temporal unit of analysis

Both in Sierra Leone and in Angola, there was early optimism about the potential of privatized security. Howe writes of initial reports indicated the citizens of Sierra Leone regarded EO as professional and able to control violence[20]. There was support in favor of private security, especially when compared to multinational interventions.

A similar story can be told for Angola where EO routed the remnants of the UNITA rebel group that controlled access to oil fields and it made Angola safe for resource extraction. Howe wrote that: "EO provided stability to Angola and Sierra Leone (...), countered the mercenary stereotype by behaving correctly with the civilian population". Commentators noted that EO was professional, in sharp contrast with Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) prolongation of the Liberian conflict[21]; praise came from Herbert Howe, David Shearer[22], and later from Chesterman and Lehnardt[23].

Overall, the Angolan experience attracted a great deal of interest[24] but it later evolved towards a more critical and pessimistic stance. Musah and Fayemi wrote that the alliance between PSC, arms manufacturers, mineral exploiters, and Africa's authoritarian governments and warlords sustains the militarization of the continent[25].

With hindsight, Alex Vines wrote that serious human rights abuses committed by PSCs had occurred in Angola and were documented by Human Rights Watch, including the looting of a town and the introduction of indiscriminate weapons (Vines in Musah and Fayemi 2000: 174). There is a similar lesson in Sierra Leone although there were fewer reports of abuses than in Angola, except for the use of fuel-air explosive and anecdotal evidence of minelaying around the diamond

mines (Vines in Musah and Fayemi 2000:175).

An up to date reflection on the evolution of *local* private security is found in a recent survey of Angolan perceptions:

> The ownership of numerous Angolan PSCs by powerful senior military, police and government officials is widely perceived to be a key feature of Angola's private security industry, raising a series of fundamental concerns (p.55). (…) (The people) tend to perceive such PSCs as "private reserve armies" under control of the ruling elites. For instance, some have alleged that private security guards were hired for 24 hours surveillance of their home residences, while others question more generally to whom PSCs are accountable to and for what purposes do they need the information they collect on persons.[26]

By looking at a longer time period, the restructuring of policing and public armed forces remained weak in Sierra Leone as well. The ratio of private to public police rose and reached a 1:2 level; with a hybrid of public and private units being created[27]. Abrahamsen and Williams write that:

> (what) has emerged in key areas of Sierra Leone is very far from a traditionally conceived security sector with the police at its center. Instead, the post-conflict period has seen the emergence of security networks involving a range of public, private, global and local actors, reflecting a shift in broader social forces. (…) While the police retain their formal authority and the monopoly of armed force, the practical coordination of their activities with those of the private security company is one of continual and often delicate negotiation.

Thus, new studies elaborate on perceptions with surveys. Such studies may suffer from bias and need to be understood within the broader perspective of post-conflict challenges for the security sector as well as its war history, which may influence how PSCs are perceived although they present useful and original material.

Somalia's case is too recent to allow for comparable reflections but a local private security market is rising and is presently being encouraged in Mogadishu by the international community[28]. Research on local private security firms in Somalia is not yet available at the time of writing although a victimization survey is ongoing in Galkaayo.

2) The origins of Private Security

Whether Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola, or other countries are selected, there are differences in the origins of private security. The difference in political origins of the recourse to private authority is a fundamental variable to explain its appropriateness and potential desirability.

Leading scholars such as William Reno or Deborah Avant provide the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis. For Reno, the dissolution of cold war patronage networks opened the way to the conversion into warlord politics (Reno 1998: 12). The liberalization of markets and the politics of reform hastened the privatization of state assets. Reno's focus on warlord politics emphasized how statehood became a façade as rulers "manipulate definitions of sovereignty and statehood to protect their personal authority (Reno p.8).

Other relevant explanations that are often advanced are related to September 11 and terrorism threat; cuts in defense spending, and revolution in military technology. A prominent explanation emphasizes ideology- i.e. the rise of Neoliberalism defined and legitimized the privatization and outsourcing of military services in several Western contexts (Krahmann 2009) but this argument is not a sufficient description for African countries nor particularly helpful to my argument. As the era of warlord politics is undergoing a transformation, better historical arguments and narratives can describe the political economy of development in weak states.

The ambiguous origins of Chinese Private Security in Sudan

I cannot firmly establish when and where Chinese private security firms entered Sudan but I can put forth some plausible hypothesis.

In 2005, both the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Those were pivotal years for Sudan and for the soon to be born South Sudan. John Ryle writes that: "The years following the CPA were to see sudden unplanned influxes of capital, a huge increase in the presence of both oil workers and aid workers, grand development projects, most of them undertaken in haste" (Ryle 2011: 2). Even if the independence referendum and the separation of South Sudan, in 2011, took place relatively peacefully, both countries were on the brink of war several times.

In this climate of cyclical insecurity after the CPA and amidst the global economy's booms and bust, Chinese contractors first entered Sudan. Given the first source available in the literature, one can presume that it was around or before March 2008 that Chinese PCSs started to operate[29].

As Chinese security firms have been associated with the *oil police*, a dimension of international patronage for resources can be put forward as Sudan's oil sector is dominated by Chinese companies. An alternative reading could stress pivotal security incidents. The attack on the capital stands out with the battleground vividly shifting from the periphery to the center. The Justice and Equality Movement, a Chadian rebel group, threatened the capital itself, thus providing perhaps shifting perceptions of security at home and abroad. The timing, however, does not fit with this explanation since the attack occurred on May 10, 2008.

From the evidence available Sudanese and Chinese security teams seem to work in close collaboration rather than in standalone groups. This hybrid is reminiscent of the *security assemblage* that has taken place in Nigeria (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 137-39). As the Niger Delta security worsened, the oil companies integrated public forces into their private security operations. A similar course may have been chosen in this case, as dangers increased over the course of 2008.

Governance of Private Security in Sudan

What kind of effect do private security firms have on political stability in weak states? I shall now draw some reflection on the possible effect of private security firms on the delicate balance of the Sudanese state and highlight three potential challenges.

The first relates to sovereignty and regulation and of the basic features of the modern state- i.e. the monopoly on violence. On the one hand, Sudan never achieved full control over its territory and Sudanese elites achieved their thin monopoly on violence by using a mix of army, police and militias. Yet, if one assumes that the state has at least some monopoly on violence, the existence of privatized security diminishes such a monopoly. Not unlike the weak-state rulers who pursued a warlord strategy (Reno 1998: 218), the state here consents to diminishing its future sphere of autonomy.

Yet, an additional question is how can controversies that may arise be solved? Foreign private security adds the potential problems of coordination and governance. It is an established position that existing Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs should include a component that focuses on the private security industry[30]. The latter was not factored into SSR programs of the CPA, mostly because there was no information about any private security industry at the time[31].

Sudan is a party to the *OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa*. Yet, there has been growing recognition by the AU of the need to review the Mercenary Convention written in the seventies[32]. On the

other hand, Sudan is not a signatory to the *International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries*. The convention did not receive the requisite twenty-two state ratifications for over a decade- until September 2001[33]. Despite the fact that the United Nations is continuing to promote the ratification of, or accession to the Convention, the UN is seeking support for a process towards an additional protocol to the Convention to address newer forms of mercenarism such as the activities of private military and security companies[34]. Indeed, the international community initiated several proposals for new regulation (see table below).

Main initiatives for International Regulation or Industry self-regulation
Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)
UN Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies
• **Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights**

China- but not Sudan- is a signatory to the Montreux Document, which lays out a suggested code of conduct and best practices for private security contractors in armed conflict. In an apparent contradiction, while Sudan is not a member of Montreux, one Sudanese firm is a signatory to the Montreux-related International Code of Conduct (ICoC)[35]. The document itself is not legally binding and reviews showed that it created only limited momentum for domestic reform[36]. It is nonetheless a foundation to establish- or re-establish- state responsibilities. Yet, even if Sudan became a signatory, however, it is unclear which legal code of conduct would govern the purely **domestic** operations of private Chinese security personnel, and *without* the situation of armed conflict that underpins the Montreux Document.

Secondly, the question of sovereignty has discernible connections to the potential problems of organized crime. Since private security provides less accountability than public armed forces or public policing, the potential for corruption and crime is greater. Globalization has inserted Africa deeper into the global economy making individual Africa countries more vulnerable to crime[37].

Last but not least, a potential difficulty of private security is that it is an experiment, not a tested policy, and as such it presents risks for Chinese policy in Africa. Brautigam argued that a policy of non-intervention is preferable to a China that regularly intervenes or uses military force to foster political change (Brautigam 2009: 311). Arguably, the use of

Chinese PSCs amounts to limited intervention. Sudan is a particularly dangerous environment for such an experiment with previous controversies occurring in relation to Darfur, the violation of the arms embargo on the eve of the Beijing Olympics, cross-border conflicts between Chad and Sudan (Boggero 2009). Sudan is, I argue, a very risky environment where to experiment with private security firms, with high reputational risks for the overall Chinese policy in Africa.

Conclusions

In this essay, I have discussed the relationship between private security and governance in weak states on the basis of past cases arguing that the origins of private security and the trade-off between short-term and long-term can help reflect on the policy desirability and the potential for misuse or abuse of private authority.

Then, I elucidate three of the potential challenges at the heart of Chinese use of private security firms. Chinese security contractors could one day fit into a narrative of benevolent social control that helped Sudan during a contested transition but it could also descend into the mercenary narrative that will taint the reputation of its development policy. To avoid this, I argue that both China and Sudan should review and clarify the role of private security contractors. Regional or global governance initiatives ought to be widely supported since they could prevent abuse, create some of the pre-conditions for democratic governance and contribute to create sound foundations for economic development.

Notes

1. Herbert M. Howe. Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* , Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 1998) , pp. 307-331
2. Sudan Brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, Number 10 March 2008, p.7
3. *Wall Street Journal*, 1 February 2012. China's Workers Are Targeted as Its Overseas Reach Grows.
4. Also note a SIPRI Essay/CSIS newsletter (SIPRI, *M. Duchâtel and B. Gill*. Feb. 12, 2012: Overseas citizen protection: a growing challenge for China . An earlier version of this article appeared on 6 February 2012 in PacNet, the newsletter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum (it can be found at: http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1209.pdf; accessed 15 January 2013)
5. Cf. Singer (2000) or Venter (2003) where he writes that *Iraqi pilots, and then Russian mercenaries, flew war planes. Khartoum salted its ground forces with members of the Afghan mujahedeen, Yemenis and other foreign nationals including some former Executive Outcomes mercenaries who had originally been active in Sierra Leone and Angola*. P.151
6. From a conversation with Alex de Waal, December 2009
7. According to their website, the firm has 3500 staff. It started and put "Overseas Development Strategy" into practice in October 2010 and set up the first Overseas Security Service Center in Beijing. http://www.hwbaoan.com/sysen/jj.asp. Accessed 23rd March 2014

8. Erickson & Collins (2012). Can be accessed at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/21/enter-china%E2%80%99s-security-firms/
9. Several scholars are taking this path. Cf. Chesterman and Lehnardt (2007); SIPRI concluded that it is impossible to distinguish between Private Military and Private Security Company. So does Branovic in his *Private Security Database*.
10. Cf. de Waal, A. 2009. Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace. *International Affairs*.
11. Some of the classic were Mockler's *The New Mercenaries, Germani's White Soldiers in Black Africa*, O'Brien's *To Katanga and Back*; St. Jorre's *The Nigerian Civil War*. For examinations of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a long list. Here are only few of the most prominent: Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army.* (New York: Nation Books, 2008); Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate soldiers and international security : the rise of private military companies* (London ; New York : Routledge, 2006); Gerry Schumacher and Steve Gansen, *A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006); David Isenberg, *Shadow force : private security contractors in Iraq.* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2009); James Jay Carafano, *Private sector, public wars : contractors in combat-- Afghanistan, Iraq, and future conflicts* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008); Rolf Uesseler, *Servants of war : private military corporations and the profit of conflict* (Brooklyn : Soft Skull Press : Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2008).
12. I forego, for example, important topics such as the privatization of foreign policy (Stanger 2009) or the security policy of the United States in Africa (Aning K et al, The role of Private Military Companies in US-Africa Policy. Review of African Political Economy. N. 118: 613-628)
13. An exception would be the role of
14. Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict ", The New York Times, 10 August 2011. Also cf. Christopher S. Stewart, "A Bet on Peace for War-Torn Somalia", The Wall Street Journal, 26 April 2013
15. Press release, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12898&LangID=E
16. Hansen writes that *Norway's support for Somaliland's state-like structures can nevertheless be seen as, and de facto is, support for state building in Somaliland, and the project can be seen to indirectly strengthen Somaliland's claim to statehood. A reduction in the price paid by ship owners to the insurance companies might make Berbera port more significant, perhaps even a rival to the neighboring Djibouti port, and such increased importance might in turn give Somaliland stronger arguments when negotiating for international recognition.*
17. No ship with private guards on board has been successfully hijacked. For data and a constantly updated map, cf. http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map
18. In 2011, Saracen's training camp near Bosaaso became the best-equipped military facility in Somalia after African Union *Mission* in *Somalia* (AMISOM) bases in Mogadishu. The report claims that: *This private army disingenuously labelled a "counter-piracy" force, has been financed by zakat contributions mainly from high-ranking officials from the United Arab Emirates, including the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The Government of the United Arab Emirates, however, has officially denied any involvement in the project.* Report of the Monitoring Group (S/2012/544), par. 63
19. The notion has less and less academic support. Cf. Strachan and Scheipers (2011)
20. Howe 1998: 313. Avant cites Elizabeth Rubin , "An Army of One's Own", Harper's Magazine (February 1997)
21. Yet, Howe added that "Princeton Lyman, ambassador to South Africa during EO's Angolan campaign, believes that EO could become a victim of its own success: "a serious political backlash could occur if the growth became extensive" (Howe and Urell 1998).
22. Shearer, D (1998): Private armies and

military intervention, The Adelphi Papers, 38:316, 7-8).

23. Cf. Chersterman and Lehnardt (2007), in the foreword, "a PMC in Sierra Leone made a valuable contribution to the democratic process"
24. Some of the notable books are Cilliers and Mason (eds.), Peace, Profit or Plunder. The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Institute for Security Studies, 1999). Cilliers and Dietrich (eds.), Angola's War Economy (Institute for Security Studies, 2000).
25. Musah and Fayemi (2000: 23-25)
26. Case study on Angola is by Lisa Rimli in *Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola* (Bern: Swisspeace, 2008. Ulrike Joras and Adrian Schuster (eds.). p.39. Also, she writes that: *private security business in Angola has survived five years of an overall militarily stable peace since 2002. In 2000, estimates on the number of PSCs in Angola ranged from 90 to 150. in 2004, 307 private security companies were operating in Angola, 140 registered and 167 with pending registration procedures. Moreover, the total workforce of the mentioned companies was comprised of 35,715.*
27. National Security estimates total employment in the sector at approximately 3,000, while other sources suggest it may be as high as 4,000–5,000. By comparison, the Sierra Leone Police employs 9,300 persons (Abrahamsen and Williams)
28. Author interviews with Roland Marchal, March 2013
29. Sudan Brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, Number 10 March 2008, p.7
30. See David M. Law *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform* (London: Transaction Publishers and DCAF, 2007); Brzoska, Michael & David Law, *Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform in Peace Support Operation* (Oxon & New York: Routledge 2007) ; and *Addressing the role of private security companies within security sector reform programmes* by Anna Richards and Henry Smith (Saferworld report 2007, available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/PSC_%20report.pdf , accessed 20 September 2009)
31. Small Arms Survey report urged *"UNMIS (to) call for the removal of any other forces—local militias, "oil police," or other armed groups—by the Parties prior to the ruling".*
32. In this sense, Gumedze writes that: *In May 2004 the African Union convened a meeting of experts to review Organisation of African Unity/African Union conventions and protocols, including the 1977 Mercenary Convention (…) but to date nothing concrete has happened, at least in the public domainThe recommendations of the meeting were approved by the executive council of the AU in June 2004. The meeting mandated the chairperson of the AU commission to undertake preliminary studies to determine the best way to implement the recommendations, and authorised him to convene meetings of experts to examine the recommendations and to develop the necessary legal instruments. To date nothing concrete has happened, at least in the public domain,*(Gumedze 2007:23).
33. *The treaty had extremely poor timing. The document came out just as the private military trade began to transform, from only being made up of individual mercenaries to being dominated by private companies. Moreover, despite its intent to clarify matters, the 1989 Convention did little to improve the legal confusion over private military actors in the international sphere. Industry analysts have found that the Convention, which lacks any monitoring mechanism, has merely added a number of vague, almost impossible to prove, requirements (Singer 2003)*
34. United Nations, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of people to self-determination, UN Doc A/HRC/7/7, 9 January 2008
35. Available at: www.icoc-psp.org. Maritime Security Services Company joined on 1 February 2013. The website claims that: *MSSC has been empowered by the Government of Sudan to exclusively issue all license applications, manage permits and provide maritime security support services relating to the protection of ships and crews to/from Port Sudan. With our HQ in Khartoum and operational hub in Port Sudan and a core team experienced in logistics support services our mission is*

to provide value added security support services from/to Port Sudan that improve security solutions for International ship owners, Global insurers, and Private maritime security companies alike.

36. The author participated to a critical review of the Montreux Document. For the full version: http://ihrib.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv3.pdf
37. "This integration has occurred in both the legitimate and illegitimate spheres, and these are often difficult to disentangle, as China far and away accounts for the largest illicit flows globally, estimated at $2,18 trillion between 2000 and 2009". Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (2013). The evolution of organized crime in Africa: Towards a new response. ISS Paper 244 (April): 1-27.



Spirits and Slaves in Central Sudan: The Real Wind of Sennar

Susan M. Kenyon

Reviewed by Gerasimos Makris

Artfully considering the interlock between humans and spirits, in her new book on the *zar* spirit possession cult in the Sudanese town of Sennar, Susan Kenyon highlights the multivocality of the *zar,* its almost uncanny ability to give voice, comment and highlight the fluid boundaries between selves and others in all their historical particularity and contingencies.

In Kenyon's work we have a fine example of how historical anthropology can shed light on a significant dimension of Sudanese Islam, always embedding it into its proper socio-historical context. Her work reveals the interconnections of Sudanese Islamic experience from below, among Sudanese communities whose divergent and often painful histories remind us of the pain and injustices of history in its colonial and post-colonial garb, as well as the hopes and efforts of people, families and groups to gain some degree of control over their destinies and to move forward.

The book is divided in five parts. In the first part/chapter, the author establishes the position of *zar* within the Islamic Sufi intellectual and experiential universe of northern Sudanese religiosity. More than that, she reveals the dynamism of the *zar* cult as a reflection, but also as a mirror, of Sudanese history. Referring to the *zar* and its spirit as 'palimpsest memories', Kenyon shows how these retain the dynamism, randomness and capricious nature of historical experience, as well as the openness of interpretation. As she writes, '[t]his history also shows that powers in *zar* are neither inevitable nor absolute' (p. 22), but leave outcomes open and contested.

The second part of the book includes three chapters. In chapter two, Kenyon uses the story of Zainab, the grand-dame and almost founder of *zar* in early 20th century Sennar, as a prism for the discussion of (military) slavery in the Sudan up until the defeat of the Mahdists in 1898 by the Anglo-Egyptian forces. The chapter concludes with a well-crafted

sentence referring to the establishment of freed slave-soldiers into agricultural colonies/settlements: 'Social prestige was turned on its head as the former elite became foot soldiers and the former slaves, landowners' (p. 38). Indeed, chapter three focuses on the establishment of the Malakiyya settlements and that of the city of Makwar/Sennar. Again, the story/history of Zainab and her family of freed military slaves serves as an entry into the particular, as a prop which Kenyon masterly uses to weave the shreds of light and darkness during the Sudan's colonial era. There, in a stealthy manner, *zar* pops in and out of the picture painted by the ethnographer describing life in the Malakiyya settlements and shaykha Zainab's house in the 1920s, 30s, 40s and 50s. Finally, in the fourth and last chapter of part II, Kenyon narrates the advent of the second and third generation of Sennar *zar* practitioners during independence, the years of Nimayri and the post-1989 Islamists. While doing that, she shows how new sets of problems presented themselves demanding solutions from *zar*, a cult which, allowing a more tolerant view of the world, proved surprisingly resilient in the face of the on-going Islamist advance: 'In this sense *zar* remains popular in Sudan because of the rigidity of global Islam' (p. 72).

In the next three chapters, which constitute part III of the book, Kenyon briefly discusses some issues related to the reality of possession experience and issues associated with the summoning of the spirits (chapter 5), before embarking into a more or less detailed presentation of the various spirits categories. As we see in chapter 6, in the way she discusses the identities and symbolic signification of the *zar* spiritual entities, Kenyon does not depart from the commonly held view that these represent 'the various waves of foreign invasion or migration that the area has experienced over the past few hundred years' (pp. 91-2). This is so for *zar/bore,* as Lewis, Constantinides, Boddy and others have shown, but not necessarily so. However, this is not necessarily so for *zar tumbura*, as I have suggested elsewhere (Makris, 2000). True, Kenyon focuses mainly on zar bore; tumbura enters the analysis only marginally. Still, it would have been interesting to expand more on *tumbura* and its devotees, if only for comparative reasons, as well as for an opportunity to discuss in more detail the versions and continual permutations of the self among the devotees of the two cults –thought, to be fair, it should be acknowledged that she has offered us some excellent ethnographic insights from *zar tumbura* in some of her other writings.

In all cases, I should confess that the detail of information and the wealth of material that these chapters do include in relation to the spirits will prove of great assistance in my own on-going work on *zar tumbura* in Khartoum and Omdurman and I have already started compiling a long list of questions to be answered and issues to be raised with the *tum-*

bura people in the Sudanese capital. This is not something that should be spoken of lightly or be seen as a happy coincidence associated with two individual researchers. More than that, it should alert us to the fact that where anthropologists work on kindred issues in more or less adjacent geographical areas and indeed when they work for a long time, in our case since the 1980s, then we can reasonably expect results of significant comparative value, which in turn may allow us to construct adequately detailed pictures of relatively long socio-cultural processes as they unfold during dense historical time. And this is, I think, what allows a sensitive ethnographer such as Kenyon, with a long experience in the field among both humans and spirits –collectively approached as the '*zar* people'– to discuss *zar* as a religion and to situate it within a wider discourse on African religions, without this diminishing in any way its Sudanese Islamic credentials.

In chapter seven, we follow the more informal everyday activities of the *zar* cult in Sennar in a manner that brings forward interesting issues associated with the nature of memory and the nature of modernity. Again, the author's way of referring to individual spiritual entities as if they were humans enlivens the analysis and allows for the textual representation of the diverse *zar* dimensions with equal clarity. At times, one may get confused between spirits and people, but that is part of the game. At the same time, in chapter seven Kenyon introduces a significant transformation in the making that I have somehow noticed during the last few years among the *tumbura* people in Khartoum and Omdurman, albeit in a different way.

This concerns the emergence in a bolder manner of hitherto spiritual entities of lesser importance as primary interlocutors of both *zar* professionals and group devotees. Kenyon discusses this change in terms of familiarity and affordability when it comes to their therapeutic potentialities. As she writes, '[t]he services they offer make it clear that their help is readily available, usually in the company of supportive friends' (p. 140). The three spirits she focuses on are siblings (Bashir, Luliyya and Dasholey) and are associated with the Habashi (Ethiopian) group of spirits. Popularly, all three are considered to be little spirits, even *slaves* of other spirits, a thing that allows Kenyon to insinuate parallels between the little spirits' slave status and the *zar* adherents' evocation of slavery-related past and the cult's Malakiyya connection.

Coming to the fourth part of the book, chapters 8, 9 and 10 illustrate a wonderfully rich *zar* cult ceremonial life with '[t]he chief goal of its rituals… [being] to restore order and balance when these have been disturbed' (p. 156). Describing in detail the rituals of inauguration, divination, coffee drinking with the spirits, sacrifice as well as the celebration

of calendar events, Kenyon discusses the symbolism of *zar* and the resourcefulness of its practitioners – without ignoring the occasional antagonisms and clashes among many of the cult officiants. Two issues I would like to comment upon concern knowledge and, again, the previously mentioned little spirits.

On p. 199 Kenyon writes that the cult's 'symbolic rituals are very old and reminds us of the essential cosmopolitanism of *zar*, past and present. Yet, they are unevenly understood.' Well, on the contrary, rather than considering it a loss, which on page 202 could be seen *sadly* in association with a 'shift of focus', away from the Malakiyya tradition that upon which the house of Zainab was so firmly rooted, perhaps it should be seen as a trait of the interplay Marc Augé has explored between memory and oblivion. This would allow us to consider questions concerning how and by whom knowledge is produced and controlled.

Concerning the lesser spirits, the Malakiyya *zar* masters of yesteryear 'were instructed by important spirits on how to negotiate with unpredictable strangers and to seek a solution to apparently impossible situations' (p. 200) – hence their lavish compensation. In contradistinction, today 'one retains the services of the lowborn [little spirits], expensive but in the long run more effective, to accomplish what in the past was more readily assumed to be the right of the mighty' (p. 199). But does this imply that the cult's past symbolic coordinates have totally disappeared in the midst of time, that its Malakiyya tradition has vanished into the thin air of today's hastily established modernity in Sennar? Not at all. As we read in chapter 11, which constitutes the book's fifth and last part, Kenyon puts into perspective the many and not always happy changes the Malakiyya ex-slave *zar* house of Zainab has experienced.

In this chapter, charting the current (post-Malakiyya?) turn of *zar* in Sennar, Kenyon discusses the appearance of Grade, a new spirit which works somehow independently from the wider *zar* spiritual panoply and its inherited symbolic load. She also considers the apparent conflation of *zar burei* and *zar tumbura* in a manner similar to what I have observed in Khartoum and Omdurman and alludes to an individuation process operating with Grade and this *burei/tumbura* intermixing, wherein spiritual entities and human clients work within the *zar* universe in a noticeably more autonomous or independent manner than in the past. What is more, Kenyon directly relates these developments to the prevailing political and economic condition, stating among other things that 'the idiom of the market has become the basis of transactions with the spirits' (p. 211).

Returning to her discussion of the little spirits' mediatory role and their

practical association with their low status devotees, shopkeepers, janitors, cleaning ladies, Kenyon concludes her account of *zar* in Sennar as an eminently practical discourse (p. 215), where spirits with 'local history and meaning' bridge the human and spirits worlds dealing deals, offering solutions and investing with some sense of control everyday lives. In these exchanges, the anthropologist argues, the Malakiyya moment of *zar* informs its present incarnation from the backstage, imperceptibly through the subaltern scent which still characterizes its people, human and spirits alike.

This is a well-written and evocative book, free of jargon, and offering readers a good view of a Sudanese reality without exoticising it.

Trade and Market Bulletin North Darfur

Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency


Trade and Market Bulletin
North Darfur
Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency
Covering the Quarter September to November 2011 • Vol. 1, No. 4 • www.dra-sudan.org • mohamedharoun12@yahoo.com
Highlights
• Cereal prices have continued to rise during this quarter, in anticipation of a poor harvest. The introduction of WFP's food voucher scheme appears to have exacerbated the price rise in a number of markets in North Darfur, including El Fasher, Seraf Omra and Kebkabiya, although this deserves further investigation.
• Seriously deteriorating food security in Malha is evident from the high millet prices and deteriorating terms of trade between cereals and livestock
• The cattle trade between South and North Darfur has resumed since the export of meat from South Darfur has been temporarily suspended. There may be distress sales of livestock in parts of North Darfur during 2012 due to poor pasture
• Although fruit and vegetable prices are following normal seasonal trends, prices overall are substantially higher in 2011 compared with 2010
• There is some improvement in the flow of trade across North Darfur as the number of checkpoints has substantially reduced, but banditry continues to be a major threat
• Opportunistic gold prospecting is continuing in Kutum and Umm Keddada localities, drawing individuals from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds and geographical areas. A high level of cooperation is noted between gold prospectors.
Recommendations
• The food security and livelihoods cluster should mobilise a rapid assessment focused on Malha to determine the severity of food insecurity and to identify (emergency) interventions if needed
• Rapidly rising cereal prices in North Darfur is an issue for the Strategic Reserve Corporation to consider in terms of action to stabilise prices
• Emergency livestock interventions should be considered, (as recommended in the North Darfur 'Rapid Livestock Assessment Report'), for example the provision of fodder and water to reduce distress sales, and controlled destocking[1].
• Ways of building on the good relations that currently exist between gold prospectors of different ethnic groups should be explored as this could ultimately have wider peace-building benefits. This might include the provision of services and improved security to gold prospectors in Kutum and Umm Keddada localities. This is an issue that deserves further investigation
[1] The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards could be a useful reference. See http://www.livestock-emergency.net/
Participating CBOs and the markets they monitor
EVNRHD El Fashir, Tabit, Tawilla, and Wadda
KEADS Kutum and Kassab
KSCS Kebkabiya and Saraf Omra
URDP Um Kadada and El Lait
DRA Abu Shook and ZamZam camps
SAG Melilt
DWDA Dar Alsalam
Buzza Malha
This project is funded by the European Union
SUDAN - North Darfur: Market Locations for MVTA Project
1

Reviewed by Leway Kailani

The bulletin covers the Quarter of September to November from 2012, and is published in Arabic and English. The first section headlines cereal production, sheep and groundnuts prices, a yellow fever outbreak, and the overall situation on transportation; it also include recommendations.

Despite the fact that prospects for the next cereals harvest look better than the last season, yet the prices did not reflect that, partly because of the high inflation rate (46.5% in November 2012) and in addition to unwillingness of the farmers to sell. Other negative factors affecting the harvest are the shortage of labor due to gold prospecting, which in turn attracted more than 500,000 as per official estimates with some yellow fever cases reported in Jabal Amir. Malha and Al- Lait markets registered the highest millet prices during the quarter. Graphs and tables provided in the first page compare the millet prices in selected markets in North Darfur, Millet prices in El Fashir and Kebkabiya markets over 15 months are offered for prices of food aid sorghum in selected markets in North Darfur. The status of the other markets is referred to at the end of this paragraph.

The price of Livestock was relatively stable during the quarter of interest, although sheep prices rose in October because of Eid Aladhi. The insecurity of along Nyala/El Fashir and Kutum/El Fashir routes affected the quality and size of the cattle in El Fashir market. Yet the prices remained high despite the poor quality of the cattle. As the federal government has encouraged the export of livestock to compensate for lost revenues and foreign exchange from petroleum after the secession of South Sudan, livestock prices have risen much faster than the rate of inflation. Graphs provided the price of cattle in El Fashir and Um Kadada markets from

September 2011 to November 2012.

On the other hand, the bulletin reports that the prices of some cash crops such as groundnuts, dry okra and tomatoes recorded a fall, mostly because of the prospects of a good harvest in case of groundnuts and in line with normal seasonal trends. Other cash crops such as sesame, Karkadi, watermelon seed and gum Arabic did not have the same availability. For gum Arabic is it off-season as compared to others. Sesame is categorized as a conflict-sensitive, a concept that explains the inter- relationship between the cash crops and the ongoing conflict. The paragraph gives a detailed and logical explanation for the unavailability of the rest of the cash crops. On the other hand, the price of the dry *tombac* (Sudanese snuff) has risen as a result of poor harvest because of the floods and expectation that trade between Sudan and South Sudan will be resumed.

The daily wage for the agricultural work increased in this quarter and that attracted more people who would alternatively be collecting firewood and charcoal and that subsequently increased the price of the charcoal and firewood.

Fruits and vegetables prices are affected by seasonality, security which affects the transportation plus pests and insects. The prices of fresh tomatoes fell sharply; within four months from august 2012 to November the price has decreased by 164% in contrast to the price of onions which rose by 76% at the same period serve as a good example for the impact of seasonality. Another factor causing shortage of labor in the agricultural sector is gold prospecting. The main site is Jabal Amir in Seraif Locality in North Darfur. The official number of gold prospectors is about 50,000 with large amount living without basic hygiene facilities, which explains the rise in yellow fever cases with up to 22 diagnosed and 2 deaths according to ministry of health reports.

Lastly, under transportation access and costs, the bulletin explains the effect of the routes on prices. Mainly the insecurity and the heavy rainfall affected many routes with detailed description of the routes, markets affected and the prices as well.

The bulletin which is provided by DRA and funded by EU provides analysis for the patterns of the trade and markets in Darfur on ongoing basis. The data is collected by seven CBOs plus DRA , 15 markets including three in IDP camps on weekly basis with some other data collected monthly and analyzed quarterly. The data and bulletin is very useful resource in finding peace building opportunities. The bulletin comes in 10 pages with two languages with tables, charts , pictures and maps.

Ancient Nubia: African Kingdoms on the Nile

Sue D'Auria, Marjorie Fisher, Salima Ikram, and Peter Lacovara



Reviewed by Anne M. Jennings

This edited volume is the result of years of archaeological research in Sudan and Egypt. It contains a great deal of important information, beautifully presented. The book is divided into two parts: Part 1, consisting of 18 chapters, each of which discusses a different aspect of ancient Nubian history and culture; and Part 2, consisting of 48 chapters, each of which presents a closer look at the archaeological sites that have been excavated so far. Each chapter was written by a specialist in the subject, some of whom contributed more than one chapter. It also includes a Forward by Zahi Hawass, former Director of the Egyptian Ministry of Antiquities; beautiful photographs of the areas and the artifacts under discussion by Chester Higgens Jr.; a chronology of Kushite rulers; and a timeline comparing dates in Egypt, Lower Nubia, and Upper Nubia. In addition, there are several maps showing ancient sites as well as modern towns and cities in the Nile Valley from Cairo to Khartoum.

The Introduction, by Marjorie Fisher, gives a short summary of the contents of the book, while setting forth the tone which is sustained throughout by the other contributors: her assumption is that the subject of ancient Nubia is a fascinating one, well worth investigating and filled with exciting discoveries. In the chapter, "The History of Nubia", Fisher continues with a clear and accessible discussion of Nubian history, from the Lower Paleolithic era (1,000,000 to 100,000 B.P) to the Islamic period, which began ca 1400 AD. In a remarkably concise yet compelling manner, Fisher guides us through its major high points – the Neolithic; the Bronze Age and A-Group; pre-Kerma; the Nubian C-Group and Egyptian Old Kingdom; Kerma and the Kingdom of Kush; the Egyptian New Kingdom domination of Kush; the Twenty-fifth Dynasty pharaohs; Napata; Meroe; Christian/Medieval periods; and Islamic -- incorporating the most recent archaeological finds into the established framework.

In "The Land of Nubia", Peter Lacovara defines the geographic area we call Nubia and the various names ancient Egyptians used when writing about it: Ta-Sety (the Land of the Bow); Wawat; Yam; and the Kingdom of Kush, among others. In the chapter entitled "The Early Exploration and Archaeology of Nubia", Lacovara gives us an account of the 1907 Archaeological Survey of Nubia by George Reisner, Cecil Firth, and A.M. Blackman, and the basic chronological framework they put in place in order to categorize their finds. Later expeditions, sent out by the University of Pennsylvania, Oxford University, Harvard University, and the Austrian government led to discoveries at Kerma, Gebel Barkal, Meroe, and the Egyptian frontier fortresses at the Second Cataract.

Zahi Hawass, in "Saving Nubia's Legacy", provides insight into the workings of the salvage operations undertaken by UNESCO and the Egyptian government in order to save the temples threatened by the heightening of the Aswan Dam in the early 1960s. Dozens of sites were excavated and more than thirty monuments were moved. In Sudanese Nubia, many sites were (and still are) threatened by the construction of a series of dams along the Nile; both Lacovara and Hawass acknowledge the work of William Y. Adams, Charles Bonnet, Freidrich Hinkel, Fred Wendorf, Pamela Rose, and Timothy Kendall among the many others who helped in this endeavor. Hawass gives short descriptions of the major temples that were moved to other locations, and names those that were sold or given away to foreign governments in appreciation for their help. To his credit, Hawass also mentions that the Merowe Dam has displaced more than 50,000 people in Sudan, as the Aswan High Dam displaced approximately 50,000 in Egypt.

"Archaeological Salvage in the Fourth Cataract, Northern Sudan (1991-2008)" is a report by Geoff Emberling on excavations at a previously poorly-known area, where the government of Sudan planned to build the Merowe Dam (not to be confused with the site if the ancient kingdom of Meroe, further south). They found that the Fourth Cataract area was not as sparsely occupied as previously thought, with extensive remains from the Kerma period. There is now speculation that the entire Fourth Cataract area may have been part of the Kingdom of Kush, with continuity with the Napatan era more than 500 years later. Most surprising was the discovery of the remains of a pyramid, perhaps that of a Napatan queen. Such findings have already considerably altered understandings of some periods of the Nubian past.

Peter Lacovara, in "The Art and Architecture of Early Nubia: the A-Group to the Kerma Culture", reminds us that the artistic accomplishments of the ancient Nubians have long been underappreciated, overshadowed as they have been by those of pharaonic Egypt. During Egypt's Second In-

termediate Period, Kerma expanded in the area from around the Second Cataract to the area around Aswan. There are still questions concerning Kerma as a political entity, but scholars now recognize it as the first to rival Egypt for control of the Nile valley in the south. It may in fact have been the first flowering of the Kingdom of Kush. Huge mud-brick structures, the Eastern and Western Deffufas, were built at the center of a large, well-populated urban area, and the cemetery there reveals the presence of workshops; funerary chapels; and huge funerary tumuli, indicative of a complex and stratified society.

In "The Art and Architecture of Nubia During the New Kingdom: Egypt in Nubia", Marjorie Fisher outlines the history of Nubia under the subjugation of Egypt from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Dynasties. Less is known archaeologically about this time period because of the destruction of so much, both in ancient and modern times. Fisher writes that Egypt consolidated its presence as conqueror by building and enlarging fortresses along the Nile; resettling Nubian populations; and building a series of Egyptian-style temples in Nubia. During this period, Nubians and Egyptians lived and worked side by side, intermarried, and buried their dead in the same cemeteries. Assimilation and syncretization of religion, art styles, and temple construction flowed in both directions, influencing later generations of both Nubians and Egyptians. The ancient and important religious center of Gebel Barkal, considered, from the Eighteenth Dynasty onward, to be the place of the Primeval Mound, the Nubian residence of the god Amun, and the original home of the Eye of Re, was of major significance to both Egyptian and Nubian kingship.

Peter Lacovara discusses "The Art and Architecture of Kushite Nubia", focusing upon the Twenty-fifth Dynasty pharaohs and their contributions. Their ancestral tombs were at al-Kurru, but little is known about their rise to power. The conquering Nubians of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty brought about a renaissance in art and architecture in Egypt, reinventing and reinterpreting ancient motifs and themes. Many of the pharaohs ruled from Napata, and installed female relatives in the temple of Amun at Thebes as "God's Wife" - representing pharaoh in the northern part of the empire. They also erected several temples and shrines at Karnak, developing a distinct sculptural style which was more Kushite and less Egyptian in terms of facial features and musculature. Lacovara gives us further examples of syncretism and revivalism during the reigns of the Kushite pharaohs in this short but interesting chapter.

"The Art and Architecture of Meroitic Nubia" is a description by David O'Connor of the shrines and temples built by the rulers of the Kingdom of Kush – ancestors of the pharaohs of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty. The history of Kush is divided by scholars into two successive phases: Na-

pata (mid eighth-century to mid third-century B.C.) and Meroe (mid third-century B.C to mid fourth-century AD), and named after the two major cities that developed during those times. Napata, near the Fourth Cataract, was home to the great temple complex of Gebel Barkal, and continued to be important because of that even when Meroe arose further south and eclipsed it. The city of Meroe covered approximately one square mile, but it has not yet been fully excavated; the empire of Meroe, on the other hand, extended from around the Third Cataract to south of the Sixth. In an excellent summary, O'Connor discusses the temples; palaces; royal tombs with their chapels and pyramids; the large slag heaps; and the pantheon of both Meroitic and Egyptian deities worshipped there, and like Lacovara, informs us of the syncretism of the two cultures which is shown in temple architecture as well as in regalia portrayed in wall art. The Meroitic alphabet was invented ca. 100 A.D., enabling the Kushites to write their own history.

Robert G. Morkot, in "Kings and Kingship in Ancient Nubia", relates that much of the direct evidence of ancient Nubian kingship comes from archaeological finds and from depictions, as little was written on the subject at that time. A-Group burials at Qustul suggest that this powerful state was contemporary with Late Predynastic Egypt, and already had kings before it was destroyed by First Dynasty Egypt. Napatan and Meroitic rulers adopted many of the features of pharaonic kingship while maintaining Kushite traditions. Morkot discusses the more controversial questions concerning Nubian kingship, such as the relationship of royal women to the succession; the role of the queen (the Kandake) ; the relationship of the king (the Qore) to the "royal brethren", to his predecessor, and to the army; and the role of matriliny in the succession.

When describing "Women in Ancient Nubia", Joyce Haynes and Mimi Santini-Ritt impart a great deal of good information about both Napatan and Meroitic queens. These scholars tell us that royal women were a powerful group with several titles, and whose names always appear in cartouches. They contend that the female line was essential to the succession. Napatan queens had many rights and privileges which Meroitic queens expanded upon, some becoming independent rulers – the *kandake* – and some taking the throne as *Qore*. The most important cultic position held by a royal woman was the "God's Wife of Amun at Thebes", the highest religious office there, which made her the defacto ruler of the Theban area during the Twenty-fifth Dynasty. She was a celibate priestess consecrated to the service of Amun, but also the representative of pharaoh in Upper Egypt, and thus helped him to secure political power there. Haynes and Santini-Ritt acknowledge that information about non-royal women in Nubia is scant, but what little is known is also included in this chapter. Both of these chapters together present a rich

compilation of the roles of royalty in the ancient Nubian state.

In her excellent chapter on Nubian religion, Janice Yellin summarizes what is known so far about both elite and popular religion in ancient times. Ancient Nubians did not construct permanent religious structures (except at Kerma) until after the Egyptian conquest. Deities worshipped by the elite were, by the New Kingdom, syncretized Egyptian/Nubian divinities. The cult of Amun of Napata was the most prominent, and the Amun temple at Gebel Barkal was of great importance. Three Egyptian mother goddesses – Mut, Hathor, and Isis – were also particularly prominent, probably because they shared aspects of pre-existing Nubian goddesses. Non-elite Nubians worshipped Egyptian deities, but continued to worship Kushite divinities, such as the lion god Apedemak, as well. Nubian deities were worshipped in caves and on hilltops and other sacred spaces even after temples were constructed by the Egyptian state. Yellin discusses various practices in popular religion, such as magic; oracles; libations; and processions, which continued even after the Meroitic Period ended, and impresses upon us that Nubian religious traditions were never entirely subsumed by Egyptian state religion.

Peter Lacovara and Christian Knoblauch, in "Burial Customs in Ancient Nubia", focus mainly upon Late Neolithic; Pre-Kerma; Pan-Grave; A-Group and C-Group burials, graves of Middle Kingdom and New Kingdom Nubians, as well as the royal pyramid burials at Napata and Meroe. Much information was gleaned from some well-preserved, unplundered graves at Kerma, and the massive royal tumuli there, complete with ceramics; jewelry; sculpture; weapons; and tools, as well as human sacrifice, are discussed. After the decline of Meroe, there was ultimately a return to the ancient Nubian burial customs, which featured tumuli rather than pyramids.

In "Texts and Writing in Ancient Nubia", Susan K. Doll reminds us that much of the story of writing in Nubia was written by non-Nubians until Meroitic times. The earliest examples of texts referring to Nubia are written in the ancient Egyptian language, recording the invasion of Nubian lands, and the subjugation of its people. The Nubians are referred to as strong, courageous and wealthy, leading to the inference by modern scholars that the Egyptians were threatened by this enemy. A letter sent to Nubia from Egypt during the Second Intermediate Period indicates that there may have been some literate Nubians at this time; Egyptian was the imperial language, and records left in Nubia during the New Kingdom were written in that tongue. Doll suggests that Nubians may have spoken their own tongue (an early form of Meroitic?) privately and Egyptian officially. Doll speculates in a delightful way on the effects of language imperialism; language mixing; and the formation

of pidgin languages and creolization. She chides those scholars who still believe that the development of language dialects is a sign of language degradation rather than of cultural change. When discussing the invention of the Meroitic alphabet, she mentions other alphabets invented in other times and places, citing such things as pronunciation clues; signs; and syllabaries. Doll comes to this conversation with a much appreciated cross-cultural view, comparing the development of Meroitic writing to the development of written languages elsewhere, giving the reader a sense that this is a natural occurrence in any civilization. Unfortunately, an exact translation of Meroitic still eludes linguists.

In "Daily Life in Ancient Nubia", Peter Lacovara presents a short chapter, reflecting the dearth of information on the subject, about the lives of ordinary Nubians in ancient times. He tells us that they were quite reliant upon hunting and herding, and most lived a semi-nomadic lifestyle. Nubians became famous for their skills in archery because of the importance of hunting to their way of life, and the importance of herding is reflected in their art and religion. Kerma developed, over centuries, a more urban lifestyle, with their great wealth coming from the control of trade routes as well as from military conquest. During the later New Kingdom, Egyptians built large urban centers and temples, and Nubians and Egyptians lived together in these areas. The other cities at Napata and Meroe attracted Nubian craftspeople, administrators, and clergy, but throughout these periods it appears that most Nubians probably lived in small villages and seasonal encampments.

In "Nubian Adornment", Yvonne J. Markowitz describes some of the bodily adornment found in burials, from the A-Group era to the Meroitic period. Jewelry was crafted from many different materials, from organic substances such as seeds and plant fibers, to precious metals and stones. Some jewelry served as cultural markers, such as the matched sets of arm ornaments worn by the Medjayu – Nubian bowmen employed by the pharaohs. The name "Nubia" itself might have been based upon the Egyptian word *nbw*, meaning "gold", and the area from which the pharaohs mined that metal. Markowitz does an admirable job of discussing the various items found; how they were created; and what they were used for, and the photographs of these ornaments are beautiful.

Nubian pottery belongs to one of the oldest ceramic industries on earth, and Christian Knoblauch and Peter Lacovara, in "Nubian Ceramics", tell us that even after the introduction of the potter's wheel, Nubian artisans did not completely abandon the skill of hand-throwing. The study of ceramics is employed by archaeologists to provide information about the cultural identities of the people who used the sites; to indicate the degrees to which various cultural groups were related to and communi-

cated with each other; to investigate changes in patterns of subsistence and habitation; and to ascertain levels of social complexity at a given site. Knoblauch and Lacovara discuss all this with reference to the astonishing ceramics created in ancient Nubia, most of them done without the aid of the wheel. Their descriptions of the various kinds and styles of pottery made throughout the Kerma and Meroitic periods are enhanced by the beauty of the photographs.

Salima Ikram, in "From Food to Furniture: Animals in Ancient Nubia", details the various roles that animals played in Nubia. They were a crucial part of Nubian cultures and economy, and Ikram draws evidence for this from burials, settlements, temples, excavations, and rock art. Cattle provided the most important source of nourishment, and were a manifestation of wealth as well; Ikram suggests the "cattle culture" of the modern-day East African pastoralists as an ethnographic parallel. For the ancient Egyptians, Nubia was the source for many of their animal imports, such as elephant ivory; skins of the great cats; giraffe tails; ostrich eggs, and more. Ikram describes the ways Nubians used animals as pets; draft and military helpmates; furniture; clothing; and adornment. She also discusses animal burials and bucrana in Kerma; the temple of Apedemak at Musawwarat al-Sufra; and the ways in which animals were inspirational in religious iconography.

Part 2 of the book is a Gazetteer of 48 chapters describing in more detail each of the sites which were excavated, ranging from south (Gebel Qeili) to north (Elephantine and Aswan), with very helpful maps, site plans, and photographs. Each chapter is well-presented, replete with data, enabling scholars who are interested in more specific areas to read it there. I have one question, however, concerning the discussions of Gebel Barkal. Each scholar who wrote about this temple complex described its great religious significance to the pharaohs of the Eighteenth dynasty and beyond, but I am confused as to the reasons why. Was it a sacred site to the Nubians before they were invaded by the Egyptians? Was that reason enough for it to become sacred to the invaders as well? How much is known about even more ancient Gebel Barkal? Such questions aside, this beautiful tome, as a whole, contains a great deal of important information. Each of these chapters is well-written and informative, and several are quite enjoyable to read. This book should be on the bookshelf of every scholar interested in the history of the Nile Valley.



South Sudanese Diaspora in Australia and New Zealand: Reconciling the Past with the Present

Anne Harris, Tanya Lyons, and Jay Marlow

Reviewed by Katie J. Hickerson

Between 1991 and 2011 the number of Sudan-born Australians rose from 1,259 to 22,855. At the time this volume went to print in March 2013, the combined number of Sudan-born residents in Australia and New Zealand was approximately 30,000 people (7). This growing minority, and the government programs to resettle them, took center stage in the Australian public sphere in 2007 following the racially-motivated murder of eighteen year-old Liep Gony. Responding to the crisis, the Australian Minister of Immigration and Citizenship Kevin Andrews told reporters, "I have been concerned that some groups don't seem to be settling and adjusting into the Australian way of life as quickly as we would hope." In the eulogy to her son, however, Martha Ojulo said she was "not happy for the media to call Liep a refugee or Sudanese, because Liep is an Australian." Andrews' derisive comment and Ojulo's moving eulogy, embracing a national identity while discarding others, attests to the need for this timely volume to shed light on the lived experiences of Sudan-born communities in Australia and New Zealand.

The editors, Jay Marlowe, Anne Harris, and Tanya Lyons, bring their individual areas of expertise from social work, education, and African studies to this study of Sudan-born communities in Australia and New Zealand. In seventeen chapters, they compose a "state of the Diaspora" based on the experience of Sudan-born communities that "represents a significant pattern of humanitarian migration from the African continent to this region" (2). The term "Sudan-born" is the bureaucratic category used in the Australian census in 2006 to encapsulate all people with ancestry in the two Sudans; even with the addition of "The Republic of South Sudan" in the 2011 census, most respondents categorized themselves as belonging to "Sudan-born" groups (15). The subjects of the chapters include demography, housing, employment, education, gender roles, and linguistics. In the introduction, the editors contextualize

the bureaucratic term "refugee" and explain that this term is rejected by many people resettled, mostly through government programs, in Australia because of its pejorative connotations. Anne Harris and Nyadol Nyuon's chapter argues that much of the way people categorize "refugee" is as a noun; it codes assumptions about socio-economic level, psychological wellbeing, assumed disadvantage, and victimhood into a human body (95). Instead, they propose the adjective "refugeity", which "describes those moments when we all feel displaced, chased away, disenfranchised, and lost from our roots" (95). Melissa Phillips' also addresses identity politics in her chapter, "Being South Sudanese in the Diaspora", where she notes the growing trend in public discourse to call members of Sudan-born communities "African-Australian" (78). Phillips found that most of the people she interviewed defined themselves as "Sudanese Australian" or "South Sudanese Australian", but other descriptors commonly included ethnic and national allegiances like Dinka or Nuer, and only once did someone mention "African" (76). The popularity of the term "African-Australian" attests more to attempted race construction in the Australian context than reflecting identity markers of Phillips' interviewees.

Chapters Two, Three, and Four address census data, demography, and the relationship between pre-migration, identity, and labeling (Robinson; Lucas, Jamali, and Edgar; Phillips). Anne Harris and Nyadol Nyuon's chapter is an American-Nuer conversation on transnational migration and intercultural activism. Jay Marlowe's chapter engages with the literature on refugee studies and critically examines "integration" and modes of cultural maintenance and intercultural contact for South Sudanese men settled in Australia. The following three chapters address housing challenges, labor practices, discrimination, and educational opportunities for the South Sudanese Diaspora (Lejukole; Correa-Velez and Onsando; Boese). Hebbani, Obijiofor, and Bristed's chapter draws from interviews with South Sudanese women in Southeast Queensland and cites intercultural communication challenges including family relations, English language competency, and employment. Grossman's chapter is based on interviews with Nuba women and presents a genealogy of Nuba identity and links it to larger discussions on global flows and transmigration. Wille's chapter examines the gendered dynamics of belonging and integration. Milos uses conflicts with Australian Family Law as a way to understand generational tensions and child-rearing practices in Sudan-born communities. Losoncz interrogates the term 'disrespect' to offer new ways for the South Sudanese community and Australian authorities to build more fruitful intercultural understanding. The next two chapters are on the South Sudanese community in New Zealand. Chapter Fifteen presents insights gained from a parenting class for South Sudanese communities, while Chapter Sixteen charts the

pre-arrival expectations and the lived experience of resettlement in New Zealand (Deng, Pienaar; Marete). The final chapter summarizes the volume's scholarly contributions and possible policy implications: mainly, the need for a more integrated approach to providing services upon resettlement.

This volume suffers from the inherent problems of many edited works: the juxtaposition of quantitative and qualitative chapters is jarring at times, and the quality of the chapters varies. While in principle the inclusion of New Zealand is welcome, these chapters do not have the same depth as those on Australia. Several researchers use the "snowball" approach to find research subjects, meaning working through social networks connected to churches and community centers, yet there is limited discussion of non-state sponsored community groups and no studies on religious affiliation. Several articles mention the exams by which resettled refugees gain citizenship, but this important process is never explained or explored in either the Australian or New Zealand context. This leads to other questions about whether and how more members of the South Sudanese Diaspora are moving to Australia, or if Sudan-born Australians are returning to South Sudan. Several studies cite the burden of remittances, but the destination and use of these funds remains opaque. Finally, while the editors use the term Diaspora to identify these communities, their introduction and chapters do not engage in the rich literature on diasporas.

Despite these criticisms, the editors successfully accomplish one of their goals: this work provides scholars with a foundation on the divergent challenges and opportunities facing Sudan-born communities in Australia and New Zealand. Just as importantly, it opens new fields of inquiry on Diaspora, global flows, race construction, and identity formation. Through these chapters it is apparent that the contested nature of Sudan-born identity in Australia and New Zealand is similar to that of Sudan-born communities elsewhere in Egypt, Kenya, and other resettlement nations. This volume highlights "the significant and unique experiences faced by the population of former refugees from Sudan, and their connection with their former 'homeland', the newest African state, of South Sudan" (2). Given renewed strife in South Sudan, let us hope that the connection between the Diaspora and the "homeland" is more than new migrants in old flows, and that scholars build on this work to give nations like Australia and New Zealand better tools to receive them.

Slavery in the Sudan: History, Documents, and Commentary



By Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, Translated by Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, and Edited by Sharon Barnes

Reviewed by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

The day I finished reading "Slavery in the Sudan" I attended a doctoral defense for a student for whom I am the major professor. The successful defense was by a young American woman of mixed African American and Haitian descent. Her study was of racial identity among college students from the African and Caribbean Diaspora who are "assumed" to be black, but who may not self-identity as such. She related a story recalling her days as an undergraduate in Maine where she joined others for an outing to pick blueberries. A young white girl approached her and asked her if she was a slave. Shocked, angry, and feeling the sting of the question, she nonetheless collected herself and sat down with the girl to offer a lesson in America's complex history of slavery, race and identity. All Sudanese and Sudanists know that Sudan has such a history that, although researched by academics—many of whom are colleagues in the SSA —is still a subject that has avoided needed public discussion or sufficient critical assessment for its legacy. Notable exceptions exist, including discourse by the descendants of its victims in the South, in Darfur, and in Blue Nile and by a few progressive voices from the northern tier of the nation (Mukhtar, 2004). One such prominent voice is the author of the newly released *Slavery in Sudan, History, Documents, and Commentary* by Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, the well-known late leader of the Sudanese Communist Party. We have Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim to thank for translating this work (edited by Sharon Barnes) and bringing it to the present discourse confronting the two Sudans, badly damaged by race and the legacy that the book addresses.

The storied history of what was once Africa's largest Communist Party, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), can be traced through its well-known tracts on Sudan's working class and on women, but it now has another text to add to its formidable library. Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud,

head of the SCP until his death in 2012, wrote *Slavery Relations in the Sudan* –rendered as *Slavery in Sudan* in this work— that was likely written in 1993 while he was in detention (see Abdel Halim's note after this review). Nugud studied philosophy and economics at the University of Bulgaria after he was dismissed from the University of Khartoum for his political activities. He was twice elected to Parliament during Sudan's brief periods of democracy in 1965 and 1989. He was detained and put under house arrest by the Beshir military coup, but was able to go underground until he resurfaced at a momentous opportunity for the country in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. and lead the SCP until his death in 2012.

The translator's note is a valuable introduction to the overall context of the general history of the Sudan and to her personal interest in the subject. A further note from Abdel Halim appears after this review in response to question that I raised with her when preparing this review. She introduces the term *jihadiyya*, the slave soldiers who largely comprised the armies in the formation of the Nile valley and Sudanic states of the Sahel. She traces the stain of slavery in Sudanese culture even following the slave descendants who liberated the nation, such as the famous Ali Abdelatif leader of the White Flag Society in 1924, whose name "is never uttered without being prefaced by the word "hero" (*al-batal*) (p. xxv). His non-Arab origin was belittled and questioned as discussion of his leadership included allusions to slavery in his ancestry. Abdel Halim includes a section on judicial cases involving ex-slaves, including what I can confirm is one of the most discussed cases heard by Shari`a Supreme in the northern Sudan in 1972. The case is detailed in my *Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan* (1987: 125-129; Arabic edition, 2004) and involves a petition before the Khartoum North Shari`a court for an engaged couple to be free to marry although the father from a 'noble,' or at least a notable family, refused to grant his permission as *wali* (marriage guardian) because of the allegation of slavery in the origins of the proposed bridegroom. The case was appealed to the Provincial court on the ground of a lack of "equality of standard" (*kafa`a*) in the contracted marriage' it was finally heard in the High or Supreme Court where the landmark decision ruled that even if there is/was slavery in the background of the groom, he became equal to her with his university degree. Moreover, the court argued that slavery in Sudan was a commercial enterprise that does not conform to the Islamic conception of slavery and that it was a "form of theft and robbery imposed by non-Muslim merchants" (Fluehr-Lobban, 1987:129). I mention this reference to my own work only to underscore one of the major points of Nugud's political tract, that denial and misrepresentation of slavery, race and this legacy are major factors in the case of Sudanese slavery, which is not exceptional but ordinary for slave states, including Muslim ones. He opines that if

the Turks of the Turkiyya and the 'Jellaba" of northern Sudan were not Muslims, then the very definition of who is a Muslim must be rewritten.

Nugud's political tract was written while he was in self-imposed confinement during the early years of the Beshir regime and therefore in isolation from academics and colleagues he might have consulted. It must be treated in this light, but nevertheless it is a well-researched and well-documented work that should be considered together with works by Sudanese and Sudanists, including Jay Spaulding (2007), Ahmed Sikainga (1996), Terrence Walz (2012), Janet Ewald (1990), Stephanie Beswick ((2004), Amir Idris (2001) and Jok Madut Jok (2004), among others.

In the Introduction we learn of Nugud's personal motive to pursue the subject of slave relations in Sudan using primary sources, the documents of slavery themselves, where they exist (p.2). The sources themselves are introduced and Nugud reveals that his treatment of slavery is more than just as a mode of production in the Marxian sense, as this approach is "divorced from historical reality, not appreciating the economic basis of its social relationships (p.7). He notes that unlike the legacy of slavery in Sudan, the fate of a white American or British citizen is not dependent solely on his family, ethnic group, or region of origin.

Nugud observes that the 19th and 20th century Abolitionist movements against racial discrimination counter-intuitively obscured the decay of slavery and this fact mixed with the effects of colonial policies themselves and left the enslaved with little consciousness of their status. Even movements by the enslaved – the well-known cases of the Zinj and Mamlukes—ended up by reproducing slavery. Despite the success of these movements, the masters retained all rights over the enslaved, even denying the slave any dif consciousness of changed status.

Nugud asks, 'why was 1924 Revolution silent about slavery?' when the period of 1918-1924 was a critical time when the Condominium government made slavery a priority. Moreover, why were the leaders of the White Flag Society silent about slavery when its leaders were alleged or factually descendants of slaves? He addresses the strong folkloric heritage involving the subject of slaves, even in popular songs such as "He delivered a slave to the hair-braider" which is treated in northern society as entertainment, he notes that there is no folkloric history of songs or poems of lamentation by slaves or their hope for a better future.

Nugud is clear to point out that although slavery is no longer extant, its psychological, cultural, and behavioral effects have residual effects-- "A pasture may grow in a garbage dump, but it is still a garbage dump un-

der the grass." (p. 11) Sudan is not alone in this, the United States is still living with this pain for over 150 yrs. Referencing the SCP leader Abdelkhaliq Mahgoub's brave stand at the 1965 Round Table Conference on "the Southern Question" he quotes him, lamenting that southerners were not present to hear them: "We were hoping to see some of our brothers here, who call us the grandsons of Alzubair Pasha, to show a change of attitude [by us, the northerners]. Yes we are these sons, but we are not avoiding our history, we take a critical, objective look at it and learn our lessons and take examples with no bitterness. The slave trade was driven by the European colonizers for their benefit; it is their disgrace, and the disgrace of all those who participated in it …" (p. 11-12).

Nugud begins his broad historical survey and critical review with the ancient states of Kush-Meroe and the early Christian kingdoms. Slavery was present in these states, and he references the *Baqt* as a mutual trade pact that included an annual delivery of a prescribed number of slaves as a normal part of trade and commerce. Contrary to the usual view that *baqt* is the Arabic rendering of the Latin Pactum (pact), he prefers the Nubian language meaning of baqt, "a share in the field" (Nugud is from Dongola). The Nubian king Shekanda was in sworn allegiance with "*Rukn al-din wa al-dawla*" (a phrase meaning the 'intersection of religion and the state' that has been resurrected in discourse around the Sudanese Islamist state) to deliver the 'usual' number of slaves while keeping half of the wealth to develop the country. This normalization of the delivery of slaves Nugud describes as a "disgrace." The better-known cases of the Mamluke rulers of Egypt and the legendary slave entrepot of Samarkand were successful, he argues, because of their close knowledge of trade routes and the international value of and currency in slaves; for example a 1000 dinar slave was called an 'alfie.' (p. 21-22). He further confronts Arab literary representation of enslaved persons, including Kafour, a Nubian slave lampooned by the famous Arab poet al-Mutanabbi which offers, says Nugud, "no consolation to the stain of ownership between owner and slave." Here he offers an alternative view of enslavement that focuses on the victims and their families having a heritage of slavery (p.25).

In his second chapter, European slavers are acknowledged as pioneers of the global economic system in Africa (p. 29), paving the way to their own Industrial Revolution and Abolition of slavery in England and its territories in 1803. Mentioned in this context is slave owner president Thomas Jefferson, who practiced what he calls "the American version of the Baqt" (p.35).

The third chapter explores slavery in the Islamic states of the Funj and Darfur. He introduces *hujja a Shara'iyya* cases involving the movement

of slaves (p.35). The Tabaqat wad Dayfalla contains thirty separate mentions of slavery which Nugud refers to as the "curse of slavery" as both a currency and a penance for sins in Islam. Interestingly Sudanese Sufis practiced concubinage with enslaved women and some of their offspring became Sufi Sheikhs. Moreover, the Sufis refused to engage in slave trading or *ghazwat* (slave raids) and never bought or sold slaves. Nudud revisits a major theme of the book, that of the social relations involved with slavery, noting that some families shared slaves and that they were given in religiously-based charities, such as *waqf* and *zakat*, a pillar of Muslim practice.

Nugud offers a critical treatment of Jay Spaulding's work on the Funj (pp. 42-47) and in doing so he makes a plea for an indigenous history. Although highly respectful of the work of both Spaulding (1982; 2007) and Theodoro Krump (cited in Spaulding, 1974) he nonetheless disagrees with Spaulding about the possible Nubian roots of confinement of the princes and children of the elite (p. 43). Nugud further argues that Nubian Nile agricultural production-- with the irrigation techniques of *saqia* and *shaduuf*-- did not need to rely on slavery and were more dependent on free labor. Sudanists and archaeologists can certainly pursue the pros and cons of this argument.

The fourth chapter on "Slavery in the Mahdist State" is most engaging as it begins to take the reader into the post-Turkiyya modern era. Interestingly, he does not specifically discuss Turkish rule in the Sudan (1821-1885) as the immediate cause and precursor to the Mahdiyya. However this era is referenced often in the text, for example that the Turco-Egyptian conquest was for the purpose of recruitment of men for their armies and that their system of accounting was helpful to the Mahdist administrators-- introducing the well-known *daftar*, accounting notebook, a word that survived into colonial and post-independence Sudan. Rather, the Turkiyya is discussed as background to the Mahdiyya, despite the fact that Turkish rule is remembered as oppressive associated with the whip, the *korbaj*.

Slavery in the Mahdiyya is discussed mainly in terms of the laws regulating *jihadiyya* (slave soldiers) and treating it as a source of great revenue for the state treasury, *bait almal*. After the fall of Khartoum in 1885 the *bait almal* appropriated a huge number of slaves from the Turks, including enlisting slaves into the army with promises of emancipation for slaves who volunteered to join the military, or rewards for masters whose slaves were recruited. The *bait almal* kept control of the continuing slave trade until the 'reoccupation' (Nugud rejects the more usual 'reconquest') in1898. The Khalifa Abdullahi prohibited the export of slaves --not as part of a plan to restrict or end the domestic slave trade-- but as

part of a military strategy to conquer Egypt by cutting off its supply of slaves for its army. *Bait almal's* control of the slave trade had the overall effect of reducing the slave trade's volume from what prevailed during the Turkiyya. All of the *Ansar* (followers of the Mahdi and successor the Khalifa) were required to conduct any business in the slave trade through the *bait almal*. The Mahdi's proclamation about the spoils of war recommended temperance and the giving away of slaves as a means of renouncing any economic motives for jihad. Instead, an extensive set of laws was put into place to regulate slaves in the estates of those killed by Mahdi's armies or those who served the Mahdist state as *jihadiyya*. For example, the children of people killed in jihad belonged to the *bait almal*. Female slaves as concubines should be returned to their original owner. Slaves could be transferred from one *raya* (company under one flag or banner) to another as part of the control of slave movements. Laws also determined the ownership and status of abandoned slaves (who had less market value), the seizure of stolen slaves, and the recovery of runaway slaves. All of this was under close scrutiny and regulation in the Mahdist state.

Nugud pays special attention to the Sudanese woman slave, her degree of freedom in their statuses as 'owned woman,' as 'servant', 'mistress,' 'concubine,' 'mother of a child,' or 'emancipated.' The Islamic legal principle "*ma malakat aymanakum*"—"those whom your right hand owns" meaning slaves—was applied. However, according to Nugud, despite efforts of the *khalifa* to follow divine law, nonetheless the owner was able to dispose of his property as he wished. Omdurman as the center of the state treasury was also the central slave market, with an average monthly sale of 900 slaves (p85). Although a stable supply of enslaved persons was maintained, the prices were variable mainly due to the instability of Mahdist currency. Islamic jurisprudence prohibited castration and separation of families, especially a mother and child (p87), an apparent difference with the Ottoman practice of castration of slaves who served the harems of the sultans and nobles. One Mahdist reform allowed the slave soldiers to testify in court. However, Nugud concludes, "slaves remained slaves despite the reforms…and a slave never recovered his freedom" (p. 87).

Emancipation through military service existed in all slave-owning societies, including the Mahdist state. Nugud expresses a sensitivity to the lower status of female slaves who could not have the relatively higher status of *jihadiyya* and he discusses many cases involving their sale, their transfer as property, and their status as wives. While they were advantaged by marrying jihadiyya, conflict arose between the soldiers who wanted to keep their wives and their masters who wanted them returned. A clear distinction was drawn between enslaved women as purchased

for cash and those acquired as a result of the spoils of war.

Nugud discusses a little known mutiny of slave soldiers at al-Obayyid –due to lack of food or pay—who occupied the town and then withdrew to the Nuba mountains. Mahdist military leader Amir ab-Anja pursued and defeated them and executed their leaders, beheading them and hanging their heads in the mosque "for they had earned Allah's wrath" (p 72). From this review of the Mahdist period Nugud concludes that "it is not surprising once we realize that slavery and enslavement were not passing marginal phenomena that struck the "immaculate, pure" Sudanese society, but were a fundamental element of the society's formation, production, services, trade, war, peace, psychological and moral values. Slavery was part of the social structure, the social division of labor, and the attitude toward manual labor in the system and patterns of earning a living and having a family life." (p.77)

In Chapter 5 on "The Condominium" Nugud develops his most powerful critique. The basic policies affecting slavery in Sudan were shaped in London and Cairo 70 years before the 'reoccupation' in 1898. These policies gave justification for the conquest of Sudan, but were rooted in the history of the Great Atlantic Slave Trade and events in the West Indies and the United States. The policy of "gradual emancipation" developed a go-slow approach intended to appease both the abolitionists in Great Britain as well as the elite slave-owning class of the Sudan as the "gradual, natural death" of slavery was practically envisioned by Condominium rule.

Beginning with Kitchener's assertion that it was impossible to immediately eradicate slavery, Nugud argues that the real reason was that the Condominium government lacked the capacity to employ freed slaves and there was fear of resistance by the slave owners, the violence of which they experienced in wars with the Mahdists. Memoranda on the subject were strictly confidential with the intended effect to discourage but not outlaw slavery. 'Progress' on this policy of gradualism was part of the Governor General's annual report which was sent to Lord Cromer. Cromer addressed the elite of Omdurman on January 5, 1899 saying: "There will be no interference whatever with your religion." And in a private letter to Governor-General Wingate on December 21, 1914 he wrote, "We run Sudan largely by bluff" (p. 92).

The Kitchener Memorandum was supposed to resolve the question of slavery, that all children born after January 1, 1898 were said to be free—and could not be bought or sold. But inherent contradictions prevailed, for example the status of children born to slave parents, or the child of a free man and a slave woman without a valid marriage contract. None-

theless, the policy for domestic public relations and international consumption was one of "freedom and emancipation" of slaves, keeping alive the memory of the English martyr Charles Gordon.

The 1903 Condominium Annual Report characterized Sudanese as "not industrious" and opined that emancipation would lead to indolence. It constructed a fundamentally contradictory policy of emancipation and the status quo. Many public and confidential Judicial Circulars (*Manshurat*) dealt with the practical management of this contradictory policy. Circular Number 33, for example, merged the terms "domestic slave" and "house servant" to that of "Sudanese servant," deliberately confusing a fundamental difference between master and slave and the employer-servant relationship. An interesting option was proposed for a voluntary agreement between a slave and master for the latter's freedom, but requiring the slave to pay a *fidya* (ransom), as compensation. Nugud remarks on the "miserable destiny" of a slave who could not earn wages by virtue of his status to pay a ransom—"Or could it [*fidya*] have been one of those compromises that the Sudanese society has regularly mastered in the face of conflict? The majority of masters became content with a serfdom relationship, so as to keep the slaves' labor in production and services in exchange for a share in the harvest, livestock, or seasonal work" (p.98). Interestingly the same idea was used in divorce reform (*talaq al fidya*) in 1977 allowing a woman to divorce her husband by paying a compensation to a husband who does not otherwise accept the divorce (Fluehr-Lobban, 1987). A complete translation of the Shari`a Circulars from 1902-1979 was carried out collaboratively by the translator Hatim Babiker Hillawi and my historical treatment of the Circulars (1983).

By 1925 the Condominium government directed the Civil Secretary to issue another memorandum on slavery to be enforced by the District Commissioners (DCs) suggesting that the "natural end" to slavery was still the unachieved goal. But, this should be done in due course and in "fairness to the class of slave owners"; moreover reconciliation of continuing differences should be handled by the government's DCs. In 1926 the government was still discussing the status of slave concubines. And by 1936 the government was still apologizing for not having uprooted the institution. For doing so "would create a public danger with the creation of large class of ex-slaves without employment…" (p. 103). With remarkable language, deaf to the interests of the enslaved, these words defend government inaction: "The Sudan government has therefore permitted some of the unobjectionable incidents of slavery to persist in so far as they are not harmful to the servant and only so long as he consents to it." (p.103)

The registration of slaves appears in government censuses, although prior figures had not considered losses that took place in the *ghazwat* (slave raids). Figures comparing the 1905 and 1912 figures actually recorded an increase in the number of slaves in Rufa`a and Hasahiesa. The District Commissioner of western Kurdufan estimated the slave population at 23% of the total; in al-Obeid, that is 1 slave to every 24 inhabitants; in Bara it was 1 per 7 persons; and a total Kurdufan population of 533,000 had a total number of slaves at 36,8807, or 1 slave per 11 persons in 1926.

Nugud is implicitly critical of the tepid "Memorandum of Sectarian Nobles" issued in a letter dated March 6, 1925 by Sudan's notables, Sayid `Ali al-Mirghani, Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi and `Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi. Nugud surmises that they effectively became apologists for slavery, denied its significance, and made of Sudan an exceptional case. "The letter had that purely Sudanese smell when it stated: Since these Sudanese are really not slaves in the sense understood by international law…"-- opining that "even slavery in Sudan is not really slavery! But it is the arrogance of the Sudanese who are delusional descendants of Muslim Arabs who think they are the chosen ones, even [from] within the best people of humankind" (p. 122).

These Circulars dealing with slavery (*Manshurat al Mahakim al-Sharia* from 1900-1979) were translated by Hatim Babiker Hillawi and edited and introduced by me, and published in the *Journal of African Law* in 1983. They can be examined by researchers for a closer study of this history. "Who felt the heat?", Nugud queries. It was the English Legal Secretary and the Egyptian Grand Qadi, (p123)—The Legal Secretary sent a memo to the Grand Qadi to say that slavery is entrenched in Sudan and if the government wanted to eradicate it, it should go slowly. Messages were exchanged about the relationship between the then separated Civil and 'Mohammedan' courts. At first slaves were not to be included in estates of the deceased, but neither the Grand Qadi nor any of the circulars mentioned the religion of the slaves as a factor. More tepid regulations followed that failed to deal with the crux of the problem, full abolition of the institution of slavery. The Grand Qadi writes in 1925 to the Legal Secretary: " I know people who find it painful that the government is getting between them and their slaves; issuing a circular [declaring freedom of slaves] will increase and multiply that pain and spread it around" (p. 127).

Indicative of the passion of exchanges and 'clash of cultures' that Samuel Huntington would have approved, the Legal Secretary commented in one of these exchanges (paraphrased by Nugud): "if the Arabs of the Sudan followed the ethical and legal norms that their Prophet proclaimed, much could be said to support the Grand Qadi, but regrettably they did

not. The Legal Secretary did not ask himself whether colonizing a whole nation with its slaves and masters was according to what Jesus Christ proclaimed" (p. 127). The Legal Secretary had the last word in his declaration that all courts, both civil and 'Mohammedan', should presume that all persons before courts were free and had always been free since September 1898. He said he could see a period of disgruntlement, but they should confront it. "Freedom papers," issued by the Condominium became the 'currency' in the courts regarding enslavement, but no acknowledgment was made that in Islam manumission of a slave(s) is a way to pay for crimes or misdeeds, while it made conversion to Islam mandatory for a master to grant that freedom. Islam allocates funds in *bait almal* (state treasury) to pay *fidya* (ransom) for manumission. For example, no *ma`azun* (registrar of marriages and divorces) can record a marriage between woman and her master unless she consents (Circular no. 28, February 16, 1928). But still another 10 years passed as courts struggled with the 'death' of slavery, and the policy of presumed freedom after 1898. In a 'final comprehensive' Circular #46, dated April 25, 1936 consisted of 11 articles that summarized the previous circulars. This circular restated that freedom is a presumption after 1898, even without documentation, and that the law applies equally to free persons as it does to slaves.

Renting out slaves was not a Sudanese invention, but exists as a general practice in slave societies. But to the enslaved it is obscene, opines Nugud, especially for the enslaved women working as prostitutes. Indicative of the many contradictions in the Condominium policy was the fact that when there was a need for manpower-- for building colonial infrastructure, factories and public utilities-- at first the government attempted to import skilled labor from Egypt and Yemen, but the need was too great and "former slave workers descended on the labor market." This is well documented by Ahmed Sikainga (1996) and others cited in Abdel Halim's Bibliography. Again and again, the "natural indolence of the Sudanese ex-slave" was cited as justification and easily could have been taken out of a pro-slavery American tract of the pre-Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. The Labour Bureau began to keep records on "working" and "idle" slaves in 1916, and 5,000 were registered in Khartoum and 6,000 in other provinces, working in departments, of forestry, military workshops, post and telegraph, railways, river transport and supplies (p 135-36). Fellata (of Nigerian and Sahelian African origin) labor filled gaps in the most menial work. In sum, the great scarcity of manpower with colonial dam construction stressed the system and exposed the impracticality of the contradictory policy of 'gradual natural death of slavery' between local and imported labor;

Nugud adds an important dimension when he delves into Sudanese

popular culture and folklore, as in the *dobait*, popular poems of lament and loss. He mentions sarcastically "the pain and injustice felt by the *awlad al-Arab* (sons of the Arabs) because they had to hire hands while lamenting their loss of slaves. This was largely seasonal labor needed for harvesting gum Arabic and agricultural work. But occasional enslaved labor was also needed for popular ceremonies, weddings and circumcision parties.

Ultimately, the disintegration and decline of slavery relations was both socioeconomic and psychological. In Willis' Annual Report 1926l that "slavery became a matter of color and social status rather than an ethical and legal matter. This reality parallels the American civil war, slave labor was losing its economic value and the institution was on its deathbed, but not yet dead—"a deathbed is not death" (p143). The book ends with the last Circular the Condominium issued in 1936, that ultimately went back to Kitchener's 1898 memorandum and the subsequent failed history of ending slavery. Nugud concludes his critical historical review with a judgment of the Condominium: "…it did not declare, nor did it dare to declare, that any person born after January 1, 1898 is a free person, and it was not able to issue an obituary for the natural death of the last pulse of slavery and enslavement relations. The Sudan had just missed a chance to celebrate the emancipation of the last slave; will it ever celebrate the literacy of the last illiterate?" (p.149) With the central issue of free versus slave status in the sharpest focus, Nugud fails to sufficiently critique the impact of the "Closed Districts Ordinance" which he describes as being issued for "naive reasons" (p138), revealing the lack of a historian's hand.

The greatest strength of the book is that we now have a book in English from a leading northern political figure on the key—mostly unaddressed—subject of slavery in Sudan. Its greatest weakness is that it ends with the Condominium and does not critically review the history of the various post-independence governments' inaction over the legacy of slavery. As any Sudanese or Sudanist with extensive experience in Sudan would testify, that legacy is a living one. When Richard and I traveled throughout Kordofan on a University of Khartoum research trip in 1971 we were introduced to a person described as a slave by a Sudanese DC who seemed to want to exhibit him to us foreigners. Thirty-six years later in 2007 when I was carrying out research on Shari`a and Islamism in the post CPA period in Khartoum there were many forums (*naduat*) meant to explore the past and the popular response to "make unity attractive." Southern leader Jimmy Wongo reported at one of these naduas that he still hears "Gom, ya `abd" (Get up, slave!) when boarding local transport in the then suq al-Arabi—the suq that has gone the way of market forces as did slavery in Sudan.

If we compare this tract with those of another of Sudan's politicians and polemicists, Hasan al-Turabi who penned many works on Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood (later the National Congress Party and Popular National Congress party) and its attitudes toward women, ethnic minorities and a variety of issues of the day, I would venture that there is nothing (to my knowledge) of a true comparison with the scope of this work on slavery by Nugud. I expect that it will be read and discussed within the two Sudans and by Sudanese in the Diaspora as well as by those who study and care about their ultimately shared future. Like in the US, the major slave trading families became the Sudanese nobility-- or political notables-- descending from the Mahdiyya and serving those in the Condominium government who came from the outside as "liberators" from the evils of slaving. Exposing and documenting this hypocrisy is a great contribution to comprehending the contradictions that lead to bitter relations, war, and ultimately separation.

Although written during the Beshir years, Nugud is tougher on Christianity than he is on Islam as providing religious justification for enslavement and the ongoing institution of slavery. This may reflect a concern with a critique of the emergent politicized Islam now treated by scholars as Islamism/*Islamiyya,* that characterized the government since the 1983 September Laws. This may also be the reason why he ends his narrative with the Condominium. Perhaps it is due to the relatively harsher treatment of the enslaved practiced by Christians compared with the well-known manumission of slaves to expiate wrongdoing in Islam. The slave markets had disappeared, but the legacy of slavery remained. But, by not offering a comparable critique to the post-independence governments as for the Condominium years, Nugud misses the opportunity to critique the "civilization project" (*mashrua` al-hadari*) as well as the abuse of the Shari`a and the harm that was inflicted by governments ruling in the name of Islam on selected Muslims as well as all non-Muslims for the decade preceding the book's writing. Nonetheless, this worthy translation should be included in the library of all contemplating the complexity of Sudan's past and the future of the Republics of North and South Sudan.

Note on the Translation of Slavery in the Sudan from the translator Asma Abdel Halim [asma.abdel-halim@utoledo.edu] in response to my questions:

Question from reviewer: 1) "Besides your personal experiences that you describe in your translator's note, from what other intellectual or other sources did your interest in translating this work arise? Was the death of

Nugud in 2012 a motivation?

My interest arose when I heard more than one person praising African slavery and trying to give it a human face. The only difference may be seen when the status of slavery in Africa ended by the ability of the enslaved people to return to their land and people and be treated as full human beings.

However, living in bondage was not different than any place in the world. Those who were taken to America and other places were not able to return. Those brought to Northern and central Sudan were not able to return either and both lived similar situations. I started the translation one year before Nugud's death. He generously gave me permission to translate it, and I was really sorry that it came out after his death.

The book was written while Nugud was in hiding and it is amazing how he was able to get all the references he used. I spent a good deal of time looking up those references. Nugud had translated what he quoted into Arabic, and of course I could not offer my own translation of what exists in English, so I had to look up the original books and articles. I suppose one could not survive 14 years in hiding without having an intricate network to link one to the outside world. This is also, as far as I know, the first book to come face to face with slavery and dismiss the myth of the humane face of African slavery.

I could not find the exact year in which Nugud's book was published, except for the date in his Introduction of 1993. I am not sure if that is correct, and where and by whom was the book first published in Arabic. The book I translated was published in 1995 by Dar Althaqafa aljadeeda. There is a new edition, that is exactly the same as the first one that came out from Azza publishing house in 2003.

Question # 2 from the reviewer: In my own original work on family law and more recently on Sharia and Islamism in Sudan I continue to see and hear cases where the mention of slavery in the background of an individual is made--most often in relation to family law and marriage for reasons you well understand. I wonder how the slavery narrative will develop as South Sudan heals and develops.

Response: *If you are asking whether South Sudanese will be seen as different, I guess that will continue for a while, especially with strong rejection, by South Sudanese of anything Northern. The new generation in the North, the Republic of Sudan, rarely participate in the racial narrative. Those who suffered slavery and are known as ex-slaves now do not know any roots in South Sudan or southern Darfur and Kurdufan. South Suda-*

nese are stigmatized in the Sudan because the south was a source of slaves and as Nkrumah said " slavery did not happen because of color but color happened because of slavery." In the past 20 years, several marriages have taken place between men who are descendants of slaves and "free" women in the North. Of course free men marrying slaves or their descendants has been known to take place throughout time. None of the descendants, as far as I know, has claimed kinship in the South. I can say that full assimilation of those descendants is well underway. However, relations between North and South are further complicated by religion and the archaic interpretations we live by.

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Note to Contributors

The Bulletin solicits the submission of news items of personal nature, announcements of upcoming scholarly events or anticipated publications, abstracts of dissertations or scholarly papers, panel proposals, articles, book reviews, bibliographical or historiographical essays, impressions about recent visits to the Sudan, research experiences in the Sudan, exchange programs with faculty in the Sudanese Universities, Sudanese proverbs, anecdotes, etc. Articles and other submissions should be typed with full author's name and short bio. All submissions should be sent via email to the editor at least three weeks before the production deadline.

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