


SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

NEWSLETTER

نشرة جمعية الدراسات السودانية



In this issue: Announcement of International Conference at Bergen University in March 2006, review of Gérard Prunier's Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide and Haydar Ibrahim's The Downfall of the Civilizational Project 1, articles by Matthew LeRiche, Laura DeLuca and Omu Abalu, Helen Young, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban, and a translation by Abdullahi El-Tom of a speech by Abdel Rahim Hamdi, and other material.

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our purpose

The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Newsletter, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

join us

Membership: Membership is for each academic calendar year which entitles the subscriber to receive all the issues of the SSA Newsletter, and to discounted registration rates for attending the annual meetings of the Association.

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From the Guest Editors

Dear fellow members of the Sudan Studies Association, and subscribers to the newsletter,

First of all, Abdullahi A. Gallab, our regular Newsletter editor, moved his job and family from Utah to Arizona. It has been tough, and he asked us to step in, in the best tradition of SSA volunteerism, to make sure this issue of the Newsletter appeared. We were happy to contribute. It reminds us of how our Association, which has been going strong for more than two decades, still relies on the uncompensated efforts of all its members. Thanks, Abdullahi, for your work on the Newsletter over these past years.

In that regard, we want to offer a special appreciation to the administrators and staff at Rhode Island College, and especially the African and African-Studies Studies Program and the Office Print folks at RIC, for tremendous assistance in the production of the Newsletter.

We would also like to use this occasion to thank Constance Berkley, Secretary of the SSA for many years of service. Connie was present at the beginning of the Association, and we look forward to seeing her at SSA meetings for another two decades!



Waiting for our Sudan Studies Association newsletter...

We would also like to take the opportunity to thank the York University conference organizers (especially Michelle Millard and Susan McGrath) for their super work at the 2005 SSA conference. Everyone agreed that the meetings were thunderously interesting, flooded with intelligence and sharp commentary (those who were there will recall the freak rainstorm!). The lunch panel celebrating and reflecting on the life and times of John Garang will be remembered by many as the kind of opportunity that only the SSA can provide. We were also so pleased to see so many new faces in the crowd, and look forward to continued research interest in Sudan Studies.

Included in this issue is an important announcement about the 2006 International conference hosted by Bergen University in Norway, in March 2006. Richard Lobban has graciously agreed to host a national SSA meeting possibly in August 2006 at Rhode Island College, and we hope to have an announcement of the date soon.

Finally, a word about volumes and numbers and issues. Unfortunately, SSA was not keeping good track of our Newsletter issues. The confusion started with the special issue on Darfur that had the cover listing Vol. 24, No.1, May 2004, but inside pages had date September 2004. That Darfur issue should have been Vol 23 No. 2, dated Sept. 2004. The next issue was correctly numbered as Vol. 23, No. 3, dated March 2005. This issue then sets the Newsletter back on the correct path, and is Vol. 24, No. 1, dated October. 2005. Vol. 24 will have two more issues, one to appear in January and the other in May.

Ali B. Ali Dinar Michael Kevane

“The Covenant of the People of Southern Sudan”: The South-South Dialogue and South Sudan’s Other Armed Groups

Matthew LeRiche
London, April 29, 2005

The eight commitments of “The Covenant of the People of Southern Sudan” concluded during the recent South-South Dialogue meetings held in Nairobi paint an encouraging picture of the process of southern peace, reconciliation and unification.

It was fitting that the Kenyan College of Communications Technology hosted the South-South Dialogue meetings intended to provide a forum for communication between individuals and groups amongst whom there has been much animosity. The meetings, which were coordinated by former Kenyan President Daniel Moi’s African Peace Institute, concluded April 21st with congratulations all around and the occasional quoting of the Bible by former President Moi and others.

The Covenant lays out eight points which, if used to guide the construction of the “New Sudan” (to use Garang’s terminology), could actually result in a stable, peaceful and prosperous future for Southern Sudanese. However, the road to peace remains a rocky one. Sudan’s history is rife with dishonored agreements and rhetorical statements of reconciliation and peace. The Covenant espouses a commitment to the “Unity of Southern Sudan”, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation” and “Good Governance”. These commitments are intended to “ensure consensus, accountability, inclusively, transparency, harmonious decentralization, gender equality and affirmative action, the respect of the rule of law, human rights” along with a raft of other idealism. As good as the Covenant sounds I



find it very difficult to determine the sincerity of such words coming from militants and political figures that have such an extensive history of deceit and stubborn animosity.

Unfortunately, it seems, events have made hypocrisy of the ideals of the Covenant. The fact that Paulino Matip (leader of the Nuer based, GoS allied group, called the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)) and Gabriel Tanginy refused to attend the Nairobi South-South meetings does not bode well for the inclusivity espoused by the Covenant. There is the risk that the process may suffer from a lack of sincerity.

More alarming than the non-appearance of Paulino Matip and Tanginya is the absence of Ishmael Konyi (leader of the Murle tribal militia), Clement Wani (leader of the Mundari militia based around Terakaka) and Tom Alnur (leader of the Fertit Militia) from the meetings in Nairobi. Despite their tactical decisions to jockey between alliances with the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese

People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) throughout the war, these groups have shown themselves to be very cohesive military organizations with, a reasonable amount of popular support. It is because these groups have shown staying power and unity, as well as some validity to their claim of representing segments of the Southern Sudanese population, which makes their inclusion essential for the success of the peace process. The peace forces of Abdel Baggi Ayii and groups who claim to represent the Nuba, Beja and Shilluk must also be engaged in the South-South process. The absence of all these groups from the meetings in Nairobi was a mystery to many. The reasons for these ‘other armed groups’ resisting the CPA or their particular grievances remain unknown, except for the typical thought that the GoS forbid them to attend.

A serious information gap seems to exist. Groups and individuals have few concrete or reliable notions of the thinking and motives of the groups

who are not a part of the SPLM. There has been some reporting about the SSDF's position by the press, but it amounts to inflammatory rhetoric and seems to contain little sincerity. There has also been a mention of Nuba feelings of betrayal due the concession of part of the Nuba Mountains made to the North by John Garang (leader of the SPLM) in the January 9th agreement on territorial boundaries. Unfortunately, this seems to be the extent of knowledge about the motives and thinking of the other armed and political groups of Southern Sudan remaining outside the peace process.

Most of the information about why certain persons or groups have not fully participated in the peace process is anecdotal and embedded with the suspicion and cynicism from years of war. The SSDF may be controlled indirectly by the GoS and it may be that it was GoS pressure that prevented Matip and others from attending the Nairobi South-South meetings, but there is likely more to the story. Without a fuller understanding of the position of these groups a truly inclusive process remains impossible. It is certainly understandable that Matip and others might worry that the old guard of the SPLA are dominating the process and would not allow their former enemies inclusion in the mechanisms of governance and security arrangements mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The "outsiders" or "spoilers", as they have been called, can also be forgiven for fearing marginalization and exclusion from financial and other personal benefits if they were to unite with the SPLM.

However, contrary to the possible fears mentioned above, many indicators point to a real attempt by the SPLM to redress old animosities. The positive experiences of some of those who have recently re-united/reconciled with the SPLM for the first time since 'the Split' in 1991 are particularly telling. The experiences described to me by several former members of the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF), the former South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and of the SPLA-United (described to me while on a recent research trip to Rumbek) indicate that they have been well received and have been engaged in important positions in the new administration. These experiences

point to the fact that those who are still outside the process would likely receive at least a lukewarm welcome from the SPLM.

Rather than engage with the process it seems the old tactics of tribal politics may prevail. Speaking about the South-South Dialogue to the Khartoum Monitor Paulino Matip commented that, "It was a Dinka-Dinka dialogue instead of a South-South dialogue". Comments such as these do little to assuage the potential of inter-factional or inter-tribal grievances that could cause serious problems for the CPA and peace in general. As much as such feelings probably do exist, arguments such as these seem to have little real foundation as indicated by the experiences of many Nuer, Nuba and others such as Equatorians mentioned above, who have recently joined or re-united with the SPLM. Inflammatory comments such as those quoted above cause one to wonder if those who espouse them are simply interested in maintaining disunity, factionalism and conflict.

Hopefully Matip's request for a meeting with the SPLM to discuss the SSDF's status (if they were to come into the CPA process) is a beginning. Maybe these discussions can lead to a resolution of some of the disagreements that continue to loom over the peace process.

When discussing the groups who remain outside of the process in Rumbek I was told by a junior SPLM member that, "If we are not careful about those guys we shall go back to war." A first step toward an inclusive New Sudan as proclaimed by The Covenant is getting rid of the suspicion and rhetoric such as that described above. Those who remain outside the process must be clear, sincere and honest with their worries, fears and expectations. They must take every opportunity to let all parties involved know their intent and thinking.

Peace is not a game. There is no room for brinkmanship, obstruction, posturing for gain, or tactical maneuver. These are the tools of war not peace.

**NEW REPORT:
Livelihoods Under Siege, Darfur
2005**

Feinstein International Famine Center,
Tufts University
Summary of report prepared by Helen Young

Research by the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University into the effects of the conflict and humanitarian crisis on the livelihoods of select communities in Darfur has shown that the systematic destruction of livelihoods of all groups, Arab and non Arab, continues. The study reviewed the impact of conflict on livelihood strategies, assets and goals of different tribes in six case-study areas in Darfur. To complement this, conflict analysis identified and traced the evolution of local, national and international processes contributing to the conflict in Darfur.

Never before in the history of Darfur has there been such a combination of factors causing the failure of livelihood strategies and loss of assets., including; systematic asset-stripping (as a result of the violent attacks on civilians), production failures, market failures, failures to access natural resources, and failure to transmit back remittances. Under these circumstances region wide famine appears inevitable. While food aid can partially redress the production failures, a much wider raft of interventions are needed to begin to address the other failures affecting all groups (Arab and non Arab). The principal cause of the failure of the five main groups of livelihood strategy (cultivation, livestock, collection of natural resources, labor migration and trade) is insecurity which restricts mobility and access.

In Darfur conflict and peoples livelihoods are inextricably linked. The study has shown how livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict, the impact of the conflict and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict. Similarly, the two greatest immediate challenges to protecting and supporting livelihoods in Darfur are first insecurity, and second the outstanding local grievances – including loss of lives, sexual violence and loss of livelihood - particularly the asset-stripping and major losses of livestock. There are also a range of deep-rooted grievances held by pro-government groups

which must be recognized. Because of these close connections between livelihoods and conflict, *wider processes of reconciliation must be linked with livelihood inputs & support.* Similarly, livelihood inputs that are isolated from broader processes of reconciliation, restitution and compensation will not be successful.

The report concludes that humanitarian access is not enough, and that security and protection must be extended to all aspects of daily life and livelihoods,



and must be addressed at all levels. This includes reaching a political solution to the conflict through the international processes of conflict resolution at Abuja. Any settlement must address those aspects of security that are seriously restricting livelihoods, including livestock migration routes, trade and transport routes (goods, remittances, livestock) and border issues. At the local level the participation of the tribal leadership and the relevant sections of civil society are needed to address conflict resolution and compensation and to support the decisions taken at Abuja.

The research includes extensive and detailed recommendations covering six broad areas; security, land, livestock, markets, labour migration and international humanitarian response. Finally the report recommends that a Livelihood Taskforce should be established to monitor those conditions that are currently hindering livelihoods, undertake relevant studies (e.g. land use), and prepare a medium/longer-term livelihood strategy for Darfur.

The report includes an Arabic translation of the summary and recommendations. For a full printed copy please contact either Helen Young at Tufts University (Helen.Young@Tufts.edu)

HIV/AIDS in South Sudan

Laura DeLuca and Omuu Abalu

Laura DeLuca (laura_m_deluca@yahoo.com) is a researcher with the Developing Areas Research and Teaching (DART) Program and an instructor for the Smith Hall International program at the University of Boulder-Colorado. Omuu Abalu is a Sudanese national, currently a junior at the University of Colorado where he is majoring in International Affairs.

HIV/AIDS is relatively "new" to south Sudan. The multiple civil wars that have occurred since independence have restricted labor migration, trade and travel, and to a certain extent contained the virus. As the country opens up with the official end of the North-South war, aid workers are predicting a surge in HIV infection, particularly in the chronically underdeveloped south.

All the ingredients for the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS are present: up to four million displaced people and refugees returning home, poverty, very low school enrollment especially for girls, rudimentary health care systems, gender inequity, combined with cultural practices such as female genital cutting, polygamy and widow inheritance (levirate). In addition, the large number of single male humanitarian workers and as many as 10,000 planned U.N. Peace keeping forces could contribute to the spread of sexually transmitted disease. (South Sudan is a non-family post for many humanitarian organizations and international non-governmental groups.)



As a result of recurring civil wars since independence, south Sudan has little infrastructure; roads are either non-existent or in poor shape. Paradoxically this relative isolation has protected Sudan from the kind of extreme HIV/AIDS affecting other sub-Saharan African countries.

UNAIDS estimates a 2.3 per cent infection rate; this means Sudan still has a relatively low national prevalence especially compared with other Sub-Saharan countries in Africa. Because Sudan is bordered on most sides by countries with high rates of HIV infection, there is likelihood increase of HIV/AIDS epidemic spreading through out the country.

HIV/AIDS does not recognize national borders, and the growing interaction among people living across national borders could intensify infection rates. During a trip to Rumbek, the administrative capital of south Sudan in July 2005, the authors observed an influx of bus drivers, service workers, and small business investors from Kenya and Uganda. Migration and mobility are known to contribute to spread of HIV/AIDS through their effect on family structure and social relations.

Violence and the resulting insecurity and vulnerability make affected populations more vulnerable to HIV transmission. Breakdown of social structures, lack of income, inability to meet basic needs will lead to spread of HIV.

According to a UNFPA newsletter for August, many of the returnees had heard about the disease, but access to information on prevention was not universal. While it is true that conflict affected populations and refugees are at greater risk for HIV infection because of sexual violence and disruption of health services, this does not necessarily

translate into higher infection rates. Return of refugees could be seen as an opportunity. Given the lack of information and well-functioning health services in south Sudan, the returning refugee population who has been educated about the risks of HIV/AIDS and some who have been trained as health-workers or nurses - might actually help to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS in South Sudan.

USAID education consultant Richard Kraft, who visited southern Sudan in April 2005, suggests that Zambian model of 'safe clubs' may be relevant for Sudan. The Safe Club concept's goal is to help young people to develop positive gender relations by providing a forum for girls and boys to talk about issues (reproductive health) that affect them. Safe Clubs prevent new infections by empowering vulnerable people with life skills that enable them to have safe and responsible sexual relationships. Sudan may benefit from adopting the "Safe Club" model.

UNICEF/OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan) is also focusing on youth in its development of Life Skills-Based Education for HIV/AIDS Prevention. Their modules have an information section with activities for the mentors and the learners, as well as a separate methodology booklet and set of posters. Though life skills-based education is not limited to a particular setting, their web-resource will focus on reaching children and young people through the school setting. The OLS site will concentrate on HIV/AIDS prevention to illustrate how to apply skills-based education to a specific issue. For example, the module for HIV/AIDS prevention incorporates information and activities on: Relationships; The facts about HIV/AIDS; Avoiding HIV; HIV, Gender and Culture; Violence and HIV; and Living with HIV and Caring for People with HIV and AIDS. (website: http://www.unicef.org/lifeskills/index_8400.html) The UNICEF multi-sectoral effort has much potential in southern Sudan. Their effectiveness will be enhanced if they are able to collaborate with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), southern Sudanese civil society and faith-based organizations as is their goal.

HIV/AIDS hinders human development because it causes loss of income and labor at all level of society including industry and education and in long run it creates generation of orphans. Sudan requires a multi-sectoral response with structural as well as individual intervention. Knowledge and understanding of AIDS will empower people to protect themselves, their families and other people: to demand and access treatment; to mobilize and raise awareness of the disease; and to influence and impact on the actions of governments and political leaders.

Based on our literature search we identify the following points of action:

- *address poverty since it is linked with the spread of HIV.*
- *develop culturally appropriate educational tools in local languages including Nuer, Dinka, Bari, Didinga, and others.*
- *include church leaders in the education process to improve access and the acceptability of the message.*
- *develop holistic HIV/AIDS programs, including life skills education.*
- *integrate local authorities, throughout the country, including developing their capacity to manage such interventions. plan interventions over time, with the communities, and adapt to their needs and concerns. Address issues of food insecurity, hunger; unequal distribution of material goods put women and girls at risk of exploitation and abuse, that if not addressed may lead men and women to engage in risky sexual behavior.*

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Sudan after John Garang

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban
Rhode Island College

The burial of Sudanese vice-president John Garang brought concern that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending two decades of civil war, might join him in the grave. The loss of Garang's charismatic diplomacy supports this view. The vast crowds that met Garang in Khartoum just weeks ago on his triumphal return mounted speculation that he could be elected president in elections mandated by the accords. With Garang's sudden and tragic death on 30 July 2005 this all came to an end.

However, there are reasons for cautious optimism. First of all, the spontaneous violence in Khartoum and other cities has abated with northern and southern victims. Salva Kiir Mayardit was appointed as his successor to make him both head of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the vice-president of all of Sudan as was Garang for three weeks. Kiir was co-founder of Garang's SPLA/SPLM rebel forces in 1983 and was his loyal deputy. Perhaps his commitment to the unity of Sudan is slightly less than Garang's, but rumors that Garang was about to sack him do not seem well founded given Kiir's intimate role in the peace negotiations in Navai-sha.

True, South-South politics can make the North-South relations look simple. Salva Kiir is deeply rooted in his branch of the Dinka in eastern Bahr al Ghazal province. His name ties him to the northerly Kiir River (Bahr al-Arab River, in Arabic). This is strategically close to the valuable Hegleig and Unity oil fields and to the sometimes tense border lands with Rizeigat and Missiriya sections of the Baggara cattle-herding Arabs as well as the Abyei region that is still unresolved by the CPA. Kiir played a critical role in negotiating with some of the southern movements that were opposed to Garang in the late 1990s and early 2000s. He is an experienced military commander and is politically sophisticated despite his relative lack of prominence because he is a team player rather than lacking diplomatic experience.

It is essential that an independent investigation of the

helicopter crash in the Imatong Mountains in Eastern Equatoria along the Sudano-Uganda borders must confirm that it was an accident of bad weather since foul play could have played a role. Garang had many detractors, not the least of which was Joseph Kony, the Acholi leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) whose movement Garang had promised to end only days before the crash. The LRA is based in this area and in past times had been supported by Khartoum. Kony's recently intensified war was equally against Garang and his ally and personal friend Ugandan President Museveni, in whose sophisticated, Russian-made military helicopter was Garang when he crashed.

The death of Garang changes the dynamics of Sudanese politics. The implementation of the peace agreement is not likely to be altered because there is simply too much international pressure on the government of Sudan from the African Union, the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union as well as neighboring African countries for the historic peace to be reversed. Sudan has run out of options short of the separation that is still possible with the CPA agenda. The opponents of the peace agreement such as Hassan al-Turabi's Islamist forces and the LRA are extremists. Southern sentiment in favor of separation runs high, so the first test of Kiir's leadership will be negotiating the rough CPA terrain of separation or unity to keep Garang's lonely mission alive. Already Shari'a Law is withdrawn from the south and from millions of non-Muslims in the north and the CPA survives with a new constitution already approved.



Garang's SPLA has considerable national appeal among marginalized Sudanese of Darfur, Kordofan, Nubia, and the East and there was, and is, a potential for the development of a national 'movement of the marginalized' that may be further sparked by Garang's death. Kiir's leadership to broaden the SPLM and expand Garang's political legacy into a national movement may have a long term effect in transforming Sudanese politics from chronic militarism. Conflicts rooted in marginality could be resolved by applying the model principles of the CPA as in the current Darfur peace negotiations at Abuja, Nigeria. So far, the transition of Salva Kiir has been smooth. The external forces unanimously favor the peace accords, as do most Sudanese, and the internal spoilers are presently too weak to undo the peace. Will the considerable oil reserves of perhaps a million barrels a day lubricate the peace or fuel further war in the tough days ahead?

Behind the Violence following the Death of John Garang

Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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The violence that erupted in several major cities in Sudan following the announced death Dr. John Garang, the First Vice President of the Sudan and the leader of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in a plane crash was sparked and fueled not only by anger, despair, and hopelessness of many Sudanese. This situation was later exacerbated by the government's reaction or lack of reaction beginning from the disappearance of the plane from the radar to the broadcast of the accident and the death of the country's new First Vice President in the official media. For many Sudanese, the Government's initial muffled response to the death of the newly installed vice-president triggered the outcry and violent reaction.

Although the plane left Uganda for its final destination inside Southern Sudan on Saturday, news about its disappearance was not broadcast until late Sunday, without any announced attempts from the government for rescue or recovery. The Sudanese heard about the fate of the missing plane from various news agencies long before the broadcast announcement from the government-controlled radio and TV.

Contrary to similar practices in announcing the death of an important figure, Garang's death was announced to the nation early Monday by an ordinary broadcaster, and not by the President, the Vice President, which is in contrast to past practices to similar situations. The broadcast that day of the meeting of the council of ministers headed by the President talking about Garang's death, showed a hurried assembly rather than being an appropriate medium for showing grief and sorrow. The announcement of 3-day mourning showed lack of sensitivity from the government toward the death of its First Vice President, and failure in reaching out to larger population whose lives were touched by John Garang.

All previous incidents have added to the build-up of anger, which turned to violence three days following the death of John Garang. In all, people reacted in reference to a tradition that they held on how the government should react in such situations. Moreover, Garang's plane crash opened the door widely for many Sudanese to treat it as a deliberate act by the government. This assertion was based upon two separate in-

cidents when a First Vice President, and a State Minister of Defense (his widow is now taken as the second wife by the President), both were killed in two plane crashes in Southern Sudan. Although the government ascribed the crashes to bad weather, popular rumors stress deliberate acts. Such suspicion of foul play has found its way for some on who is responsible for Garang's death. The ravage that occurred this week especially in Khartoum is completely unacceptable and condemnable. The government could do a better job in containing the instantaneous violence from the beginning, rather than letting civilians to take arms (sticks, bricks, knives, spades, etc) to defend themselves. In areas with sizeable southerners, and due to lack for government presence, there were calls from mosques for youth to assemble to defend their homeland and their religion against the "infidels," the mostly non-Muslim Southern Sudanese. In these events cars, shops and houses of northern Sudanese were destroyed as well as some southerners' lives and possessions.

Finally, after nearly three days, in reaction to the recent events which were televised, the President called for calm and appointed a committee for compensation. This official position is in direct contrast to the government reaction to the events in Darfur. This indicates that under the disguise of "protection" the government resorts each time to specific policy that serve its interest, and not necessarily its citizens'. While the government and through its controlled media is in denial to the genocide in Darfur; it allowed the broadcast of recent destruction in Khartoum. In Khartoum, the government deliberately omits references to destruction that affected southerners, and pitted the conflict as southerners attacking northerners.

The arrival of John Garang in Khartoum only a few weeks before, as well as his death, represent very important events in modern Sudanese history. He symbolizes hope for many Sudanese, inside the country and in the diaspora that a bright path to better future is a head of them. From the current events, the Sudanese government has succeeded in derailing the popular reception of Garang, to a situation in which SPLM leaders are now calling for calm as if the movement is behind the violence. Regardless of the current violence, I believe the government and the SPLM/A have no alternative but to implement the signed peace agreement, each for its own survival, and to do all possible to heal the wounds re-opened between different sections and religions of Sudan, the largest country in Africa.

Future of Foreign Investment in Sudan: A Working Paper Delivered by Abdel Rahim Hamdi, a Member of the National Congress Party (NCP) and an ex-Minister for Economy and Finance, Khartoum, 11-12 September 2005.



Translated by Abdullahi El-Tom.
Office of Strategic Planning and Training,
JEM Abuja, 10/10/2005.

***Translator's note: The following is an unauthorized translation intended for information purposes only. Abdel Rahim Hamdi was the longest serving Minister for National Economy and Finance in Al-bashir's government. He is now an influential member of NCP, the ruling Party and its main guru for economic affairs. An excellent and vicious critique of this work was published by the eminent Sudanese Economist Siddiq Umbaddi in Khartoum newspapers.*

Future of Foreign Investment in the Transitional Period

Investment objectives during the Transitional Period: As it is clear in the Peace Agreement and its related popular political literature, the aim of investment during the Transitional Period is to make unity of Sudan attractive - for all or parts of the country. Drastic increase in economic and service growth will entice many to retain the Peace Agreement and ensure continuation of new gains - after having received sizable political power.

Our mandate to talk about investment here is a Party matter and not a government or state affair. As such, the debate should address the following: Interest of the Party (NCP); How the Party could benefit from this investment during the Transitional Government; Use of investment to ensure continuation of the Party in power.

To address these issues, we should not waste time in futile debate. We must make sure that our work will not go in vain and must distinguish between Party and State work/interests. This paper addresses the following issues: - What type of investment do we - in the Party- need? What are the trends of investment which we require? In which area and location in the country?

What are the required policy changes that have to be effected to ensure realization of the two broad objectives which will become clear as I proceed in this submission.

Fundamental Hypotheses:

Hypothesis One: Investment is an important economic tool. It will however be useless if it is not backed by appropriate policies.

Hypothesis Two: Financial flows from Oslo Agreement and other International and Regional Institutions will be characterised by the following: They will be late; Will be far less than promised; They will be surrounded by rules and bureaucracy of the donors...Investment fund will go to areas that are already predetermined in the Peace Agreement; that is, to the geographical south with its defined borders, Nuba Mountains Southern Blue Nile. Moreover, these investment funds will be supervised by certain Commissions which ensure that they go to the specified zones only. Due to these facts, foreign investment will remain out of our hands and will not benefit the North much.

In a sharp contrast to that, Arab and Islamic investment, both official and private will go to the Geographical North - as before. With direction from the North, some of this investment can be channelled to limited zones in Darfur and south Sudan. As we in the North have personal and official connections with the investors in this category, we can influence it much more than our chances with Western/European investment (this category of investment refers to funds coming from the Arab Banks, Arab and Islamic Investors and Islamic Bank for Development and related institutions).

Huge investment funds in the oil sector are now going to the North (Blocks 8, 9, 15, and later 10 and 12). Some of the investors in this category do not shy from going south (Block 5 contracted to French, US and Kuwaiti companies - currently under dispute with the SPLM). Petromax Company now has a sizable share in Block A5 and B5... in the south of Su-

dan in Block 3 and 7. The Chinese also have sizable shares in these Blocks. As for most of petrol services i.e. downstream operations, they will go by necessity to the north – with its new Blocks.

The decisive voting block in the coming election resides in the geographical North – at least 25 million- in the Northern States, down to Sinnar/ Gezira and Blue Nile areas. Voters in this zone are election oriented, more educated and can be influenced. Due to their high level of education, they also have higher demand for services and employment opportunities. We must focus on this zone. Fortunately, this zone is nearer and well connected with transport networks – tarmac roads, communication facilities, etc. It is easier and faster to manage election campaigns in this zone.

Hypothesis Three: The geopolitical body which I referred to earlier as the North, and which I call henceforth Dongola - Sinnar + Kordofan Axis or the Northern Axis is very homogeneous. This Axis has carried the Arab Islamic flag for several centuries and throughout early Islamic kingdoms. For this, it is possible to incorporate this Axis into an Arab-Islamic political coalition. It is to be noted that this Northern Axis financed the Sudan throughout its Turkish, colonial and Independent eras. Even if the others have separated, this Axis can continue as a viable state. This is true in case of separation of the South and it is equally so though in a different way in case of separation of Darfur. The Northern Axis can maintain good economic relations with Darfur even if it moved away politically (the South is now lost economically but not politically through withdrawal of substantial resources from the Northern Axis).

Hypothesis Four: This is not a hypothesis but a reality that has happened in the South, and will repeat itself in Darfur and to a lesser degree in the East. The reality is: withdrawal of substantial resources from the Northern Axis. In today's calculations, the loss to the Northern Axis is in the region of 65% of public revenue resources and 25% of Gross National Products. If we are to win the populations of the Northern Axis and bring them into our political project, this

reality calls for urgent and dramatic development of the traditional resources of the Northern Axis.

Hypothesis Five: Broad and extensive policies can only bear fruit if their implementation is entrusted to a team that believes in the mission at hand. It is naive to think that policies realise their objectives by themselves. Hence, and if we are to be honest, we must be prepared to work out all necessary structural, human power, legal and financial changes. We should not take the formation of the present Transitional Government as sufficient to enable us realise our objectives.

Hypothesis Six: The unity of Sudan may not be voted for and we, therefore, must start working now for its alternatives. We must avoid taking attractiveness of the unity of Sudan for granted. If the unity is realised, we may still face another scenario. Influential foreign powers may resort to igniting secessionist fires, particularly if they fail to transform the unity of the country into certain desired mechanisms for their purpose. I mean those mechanisms that divide the Sudan and



place it under the rule of the non-Arab-Islamic minority. This will be a repeat of what they did in all countries of the Protective Belt against Islam, south of the Sahara (From Ethiopia, passing through Nigeria to Senegal).

What is required? One: What Type of investment do we need? It must be very big and very fast. For it to be so, investment must be characterised by high and attractive internal and external returns. We must not submit to current financial policy visions and we should avoid debating this issue within present policy parameters. Current financial policy vision gives supremacy to revenue size, distribution of local resources, expenditure and salaries. Rather, we must be radical for what is at stake is the preservation of the national entity and its identity and not simple structure of state resources.

Two: Fields/ Directions of Investment: (I) High return investment fields: This centres on promotion of

agricultural and animal resources that are amenable for quick development. These are: Animal resources in Kordofan, East of Sudan and the Blue Nile – for export and then for local consumption. Fruits and vegetables in all irrigated sectors, old and new – firstly for export and later for local consumption. Rain-fed cotton and oil seeds in the south of the Blue Nile area, Gadhariff and Kordofan. Wheat and beans in the Northern Region. These fields are well known and are available. All what is needed is huge investment so that they can return to their golden age and more. (II) Building and construction specifically in popular/low income as well as high economic margin housing and in an extensive way and in all cities of the Northern Axis. This type of investment forms the cornerstone in gaining popular/low income and middle-income sectors to our political project. (III) Creation of ample employment by all means as unemployment will become a big and explosive problem, particularly among the educated and among those who have been made jobless. (IV) Focussing on offering the following services free: Education, Health services, Creation and support of school feeding policy. Offering free breakfast at schools helps in the fight against hunger among poor families. Private/ commercial education and health services can continue but support of public venues is crucial. These services, coupled with public housing are what we need in the Capital cities as well as in all cities of the Northern Axis (Dongola- Sinnar + Kordofan).

Note: I did not mention foreign investment in oil operations because there is no difficulty in attracting it. Moreover, foreign investment has already reached and benefited the Northern Axis.

Three: What kind of investment do we need and in which geographical area in the country? I think the answer is very clear already. However, we have to preach and make efforts to boost foreign and also local investment in the specified areas. We focus here on foreign investment as it is bigger, more important and capable of meeting our objectives - but only if it is channelled into the following areas:

It must go to the Northern Axis (Dongola – Sinnar + Kordofan). This however does not mean that all investments end here. In the White Nile area which is partly included in this Axis, Kosti-Sinnar line is important. We can direct some investments to some other geographical areas. These areas include East of Sudan and Darfur when political stability is guaran-

teed, and of course the South of Sudan.

Investment Laws / Directives:

What are the policies that we must amend in order to take full advantage of investment during the Transitional Period and afterwards? What are the objectives of such investment? Below are the main features of these policies. Details can be left for discussion afterwards:

One: Investment laws:

In Investment Laws and Directives, decision-making for awards of patents and contracts must be simplified and concentrated in limited decision-making space. Patents and tax benefits must be clearly specified. This will prevent investors falling victims to personal whims of decision-makers.

Review of all legal aspects of investment incentives with the view to improving them and with the aim of attracting foreign investment – in a fast and sizable manner.

Commitment to the law, offering free land and abolition of incentive land price. The latter led to states wasting substantial funds to procure fallow land for investment.

Two: Export Encouragement:

Private foreign and local agricultural companies that work in the areas specified earlier should be encouraged through the following: a) Total tax exemption b) Allowing same privilege and tax incentives that are offered to public companies.

Economic financial support for production and export of meat, vegetables, beans and fruits (This is already enshrined in the Second Presidential Programme Policies).

Support/ subsidize production of wheat and its programme of indigenisation – in the Northern Region.

Three: Building and construction:

(1)- Real- 75% reduction of duties on cement, building metals and wood.

Support of production of building bricks and other building materials.

Support of construction of road network; service support for new and cheap housing estates - in replacement of otherwise unused but privately owned residential plots (owners of confiscated plots can be compensated in the new housing schemes; a similar policy was adopted in England during the last Government of the Conservative Party. Same government sold public apartments for 60% of their of cost and gained 13 years of office power)

Four: Financial, economic and institutional sector that allocates resources for programmes specified above:

Substantial increase of government financial bonds, their profit margins and their repayment period in order to finance the specified projects (subsidies to export, public housing, health and education services; the state and its banks are to be entrusted with operation costs).

Liberation of banks and financial sectors to encourage multiplication of financial institutions – with different sizes and different roles. This helps concen-

Reduction of government duties / taxes and limiting their number, especially for small investors.

Continuation of reduction of taxation and especially Profit Tax. State should limit itself to VAT. Tax target for investment and professional sector should stand at 10% only.

Reduction of tax in line with international agreements (COMICIA?, Arab Institutions and later WTO). Tax reform here should be tuned to benefit



Waiting for investment... (photo Teodoro Avigliano)

trate foreign and internal funds for small farming, handcrafts, cottage industry and financial bonds. Current policies are no good as they restrict growth of financial bonds to the Capital cities, limit returns and thus reduce incentive potentials.

Reorganisation of current War Injury Tax/ Stamp to be used for employment of university graduates and ex-soldiers.

Amendment of some institutional regulations: A) mining licences that are now saddled with prohibitive requirements and lack of incentives; b) Abolition of Capital Tax for newly established public and private companies and cancellation of accumulated arrears.

the public and not the wealthy minority, most of whom do not support our political project.

The aim of the policies specified above is to inject dramatic dynamism in the economy of the Northern Axis, in a short period and in an effective way. These ideas are not the end but the beginning of our project. Let us remember that what is required is to ensure that resources move from the state (currently under sword of separation) towards our target, i.e. the specified societies and entities. This resource move and in the manner specified will lead to changes that feed into the interests of the Northern Axis Sudan as well as our interest.

BOOK REVIEW

**Review of Gérard Prunier's
Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide
(Ithaca, Cornell University
Press, 2005)**


by

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For decades Darfur has been neglected by the forces of globalization and development. Few agricultural improvement projects ever made their way to the foothills of Jebel Marra. No sweatshops exported clothing to Walmart. Is there even a cybercafé in El Fasher, one wonders? Darfur has also been neglected in academia. There have been only a handful of books based on field or archival research in Darfur for the past twenty year. A trio of books was published in the late 1980s: Alex de Waal's Famine that Kills; Dennis Tully's Culture and Context in Sudan: The Process of Market Incorporation in Dar Masalit; and Lidwien Kapteijns' Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: History of Dar Masalit, 1870-1930. Karin Willemse's One Foot In Heaven: Narratives On Gender And Islam In Darfur, West-Sudan, based on her 2001 doctoral dissertation, should be published at some point, and is eagerly waited. A genocide or its equivalent has happened in the meantime, and three books and one forthcoming do not amount to much to provide the appropriate historical and sociological context.. Even if they are based on the amazing earlier work of R.S. O'Fahey (well, earlier by five years from the first group), and even if they are supplemented by the occasional journal article from the likes of Abdullahi Osman El-Tom.

The first of an expected bumper crop of books about Darfur is important. The generalist books, such as that of Gérard Prunier, currently researcher with the CNRS, and director of the Centre Français des Etudes Ethiopiennes, are aimed at a wide audience and cover a lot of ground. They attempt to provide master narratives, while acknowledging complexity. The goals of those that follow will vary. Some will

be aimed at exploring the military mechanics of the catastrophe. Some will analyze the international response. I am sure someday there will be a detailed mapping of rainfall patterns to village origins of SLA, JEM and *janjawid* fighters.



But for now we have the generalist books that offer broad overviews and interpretation rather than new research. Here is what happened according to Prunier. Darfur was a backwater with no development and little political influence in Khartoum for almost 100 years. In the 1980s, the area rather suddenly became an extended battleground for the Chad civil war and Libyan involvement in that war. Prunier is ambiguous about which effects of the 1980s were more important. He argues that the proxy extension of the Chad civil war into Darfur changed local attitudes about inter-ethnic relations, making people take sides, and organize ethnically in preparation for armed conflict. He also argues that government and traditional authorities were delegitimized in favor of the "power of the gun"; individuals were more likely to seek local, ethnic and violent solutions to conflict than to use national-level government institutions or even traditional tribal leadership institutions (p. 94). The area also became awash in weapons, making violence more lethal and retaliation quicker. Where before two or three persons might be knifed in a dispute, now automatic weapons might be used. Prunier further argues that two Libyan proxy groups, the *Failaka al-Islamiyya* and the *Tajammu al-Arabi*, were deliberately poisoning some of the wells from which they drank water by spreading a racist pro-Arab propaganda.

Into this mix followed a decade of generalized and diffuse insecurity. The insecurity started with the ill-fated attempt by Daud Bolad to open an SPLA front in Darfur. Throughout the 1990s the government in

Khartoum was preoccupied with a larger project of spreading Islamic revolution and containing the SPLA and American hostility until oil exports could flow. When the oil started flowing in 1999, the regime quickly fractured, with al-Beshir ousting al-Turabi. In retaliation, according to Prunier, al-Turabi ignited the Darfur civil war. The regime's response, of authorizing a scorched-earth policy by the *janjaweed*, was a predictable political maneuver by a clique intent on maintaining ideology, power and privilege. The result was mass killing and displacement.

There are two building blocks to Prunier's narrative: first, explaining how many people in Darfur were willing to resort to violence and willing to maintain structures of 'command and control' for violent confrontations; and second, explaining how events in Khartoum pushed those violent structures into total war.

On the first building block, notice that the mobilization of ethnicity for conflict and the promulgation of ethnic-based hatred are different things. Prunier does not sharply differentiate between the two, but much hinges on the relative assessment of the weight of each factor. To me this is the crux of the matter in understanding the Darfur conflict and mechanisms to promote resolution. Evidence is key here. Prunier asserts (p. 61): "the Darfuri were increasingly contaminated with the atmosphere of violence and ethnic hatred that the outside forces were deploying..." but as evidence gives in the next sentence the 1987 massacre, by Rizeigat, of Dinka displaced persons in Ed-Da'ien, an event that had little to do with the present conflict in Darfur, and then the next sentence after that is about the *Tajammu al-Arabi*, as if by association (by closeness in sentences) somehow they had been involved organizationally in the Ed Da'ien massacre, for which no evidence or source is presented. Prunier is lackadaisical about evidence of the sociology of the fighter because his narrative is not one of animus motivating people. He believes, instead, that there is plenty of evidence that *ethnic-based conflict organized by outside forces* was a constant feature of the 1980s and 1990s and is at the heart of the catastrophe. Prunier does a nice job of tracing through some of the major battles (though that is too strong a word), and showing how Chadian forces, Libya, and factions in Khartoum were playing out proxy fighting in Darfur.

On the second building block of the narrative Prunier is quite sharp on how events in Khartoum in 1999 began the process leading to the 2003 conflict. Prunier argues that when al-Turabi was ousted in 1999, there was a deliberate attempt by his faction to resort to armed conflict in Darfur to weaken the regime (pp. 86-88). The evidence here is from a "high-ranking SPLA cadre," and so non-connected regular academics apparently will have to wait 50 years until the spies and operatives write their memoirs before we learn more. Or it may be that the investigators of the International Criminal Court will shed some light on the origins of the weaponry of the SLA.

Prunier argues that the military actions by the SLA and JEM in early 2003 generated an exaggerated response by the regime: here was a real threat, unlike the perennial, containable and cooptable southern rebels. He writes (p. xi) of a sense of desperation in the regime in February 2003: "It suddenly felt that the Muslim family was splintering." I worry that Prunier presents little evidence that the SLA presented a real threat. In hindsight, the SLA disintegrated with amazing rapidity, in conditions that should have strengthened it. Its nominal supporters were subject to a vicious campaign, the use of proxy and disorganized militias meant there were plenty of opportunities to capture weapons, foreign powers and aid organizations provided resources to sustain the rebellion, and foreign intermediators quickly gave international standing to leaders and their supporters. If the SLA could not survive these conditions (when the Chad factions did), then the fear expressed by the regime seems, in retrospect, to have been a huge miscalculation.

Prunier does a nice job of setting up the background to the ruling elite in Khartoum that explains the exaggerated response. The *awlad al-beled*, the northerners who have dominated the government of Sudan through various Khartoum regimes, saw and see the country as "their" country. Factions within the group have repeatedly justified "any means necessary" to maintain their control over the seat of sovereignty. He is scathing on Sadiq al-Mahdi (e.g. pp. 52-55). Their actions have rarely drawn significant popular resistance from Khartoum and other urban centers with an educated population numbering in the millions. To that extent, one can speak of the regimes as a continuity of factions with a common thread of popular legitimacy. The regimes rule by consent, rather than by terror. Opposition figures cycle in and out of power and prison. Of course, there are numer-

ous principled opponents who have been imprisoned, tortured and executed, but the large mass of northern Sudanese has never been persuaded into sustained, clandestine, and subversive political action. There has been no insurgency or *intifada* in northern Sudan. The Americans in Iraq only hope for that kind of minimal consent. The ruling elites in Khartoum are relatively unchecked when it comes to what they do on the periphery of their rule.

An aside on semantics is relevant here. Prunier's dust jacket promises a correction to "generalizations and inaccuracies" that have portrayed the conflict "as an ethnic clash marked by Arab-on-African violence." It turns out that in Prunier's view the inaccuracy is that the Arab vs. African clash is not a *local* and *ethnic* one; it is a *national* and *racial* one. Prunier concludes the book with a discordant short chapter where he lays out this narrative for the Darfur conflict (p. 165): the "decision-makers" had decided on the course of "annihilation of a racial group" and so "Darfur was going to be yet another" genocide, following the South and the Nuba Mountains. He lays it on thick: the northern elite has been deepening its self-conception as a racial group, characterized by Arabness, rather than as a constellation of ethnic groups defined by tribal and geographic origins in Sudan or as the legitimate vessels of Sudanese nationhood (as Heather Sharkey argued for the generation of independence). Prunier unfortunately succumbs to some cheap but popular psychologizing about alienation and double alienation and paradoxes of identity (Arabs in Sudan but *'abid* in Saudi Arabia, etc.), and presents no evidence for this provocative thesis. Do regime members, by their words, actions, art, culture, etc. express more Arabism than earlier generations? Are they marrying Saudi Arabian princesses? Sending their children to boarding school in Kuwait? Adopting new forms of dress closer to their ideal of an Arab? Erecting air conditioned tents and hosting afternoon tea? Plenty of room for future research there, though my sense is that a sociology or anthropology graduate student may not feel the provocation worth the effort. I personally think that ethnicity (or the local and tribal variety) remains the organizing structure, rather than a new or stronger racial identity.

In any case, for Prunier the two building blocks that explain the catastrophe in Darfur are really one: outside forces have been manipulating local actors. This is a hopeful analysis in the midst of tragedy. If outside forces are responsible, then they can be con-

tained by other outside forces. It contrasts most strikingly with two other plausible candidates. The first is that structural but local conditions (especially changes in local ecology and growth of population) generate ethnic organizations that are unchecked by distant hegemony and so will likely continue to utilize violence on a large scale. Prunier has one mention of ecology (p. 47) and rightly, in my view, drops the idea. Every region of the Sahel from Mauritania to Eritrea has similar political ecology issues, and the catastrophe of Darfur cannot be explained by them. The second is that ideological messages coming from Arabist organizations and organizers have captured the hearts and minds of youth in the region, become self-reinforcing, and generate racial conflict inspired by hatred and loathing. Without insightful long-term ethnography and plenty of critical analysis of local discourses, this hypothesis can go nowhere. Prunier does a very bad job of this possibility. He insists on using "Arab" and "African" sometimes in quotes and sometimes not in quotes, and like almost all writers invariably uses the passive voice when discussing local manifestations of these meta-identities. He gives passing glances to the keyword *zurga*, but never comes down clear on how and why he thinks "Black Africans" is an appropriate gloss into English for *zurga*.

As a generalist book, aimed at a wide audience and covering a lot of ground, attempting to provide master narratives while acknowledging complexity, Prunier does a fair job. One has to do a fair amount of reading between the lines. The desire to tell the facts in chronological order means that various strands of argument are picked up and left off in odd places. Surprisingly, the summary of developments and linkages to Chad is confused, with no effort to get the novice reader a sense of proportion. Goukouni Oueddeï, for example, is only mentioned in one footnote, even though he ruled Chad for an important period for the roots of the crisis in Darfur. There is precious little mention of any relevant academic literature or findings, for example on the recruitment of child soldiers and strategies of rebel movements, the onset and prolongation of civil wars, the legal issues surrounding the Genocide Convention. The book is aimed squarely at the generalist interested in the particulars of Sudan and Darfur, rather than the academic putting Sudan in comparative perspective. The book will infuriate the bookophile by its sloppiness. Typos and grammatical mistakes are on practically every page. Cornell University Press and the editors of the series have some

serious penance to pay. Could not have passed the book over to an editor and delay publication by one day in order to have something that could be assigned without shame to undergraduates?

Finally, a concern that provoked some internal debate among my colleagues and acquaintances interested in Sudan and Africa. Should a book be judged by its cover? In Prunier's case, we have an unsavory image of a man praying over a desiccated corpse presumably found by chance on a desolate stretch of the Sahara. Sven Torfinn, a photographer based in Kenya, was there to take the picture. And his driver must have been with him. And the print journalist most likely accompanying him. And the man praying. All of them perhaps in a car, driving around in the hopes of finding stories and pictures to inform an audience, in lands far away, that was interested in reading and seeing. So what did the four of them say to each other after the picture was taken? Did they bury the corpse? Did the man have a name? Who decided to put the picture of this dead man on the cover of a book to be sold long after the desert winds and animals had left him a skeleton? I ask these questions because a book with the word genocide in the title, even if an ambiguous one, is a solemn and serious affair. The dead man deserves respect, and Prunier writes the book out of respect (on p. x in the introduction he explains his "respect for the dead"). But I believe that respecting the dead means not selling them, and I am afraid that in this case that is what has happened. A picture of a dead man has been sold to sell a book and to sell a story. I do not mean literally sold; even an academic book about a current genocide is unlikely to make very much money, and Torfinn probably gave the rights to the photograph for a token sum. I mean morally sold, in that an image of a dead man was subject to a calculus: Is the shock value worth the disrespect? If the cover compels people to read the book, should not that be justification enough? The photograph is not standing as a testimony itself, the way Gilles Peress's sad book of photographs was testimony for Rwanda. Here the photograph is being used for a purpose. The more I thought about it the less happy I was with Cornell University Press. I contacted the photographer, Sven Torfinn, and here is part of the story of the photo, from the article published in the Guardian by Jeevan Vasagar on Tuesday August 31, 2004:

A rebel soldier, Ahmed Yusuf Ibrahim, identified himself as the brother of one of

the victims. Mr Ibrahim, 45, said that at the time the government was destroying villages in the area, he and his younger brother, Mohammed Yusuf Ibrahim, were civilians. The market town in which they lived was attacked from the air and then on the ground by Sudanese soldiers in cars and Janjaweed on horseback. "I ran, and many women and children ran with me," Mr Ibrahim said. "I came to the summit of a hill, and I saw far away they captured many people. I ran further away, and I didn't know what had happened to my brother." Mr Ibrahim was taken to the scene and identified his 35-year-old brother from his jallabiya robe and his shoes. Questions remain about precisely who these men and boys were. Mr. Ibrahim is now a rebel fighter, and the rebels have much to gain from exploiting the sympathy of the West, but it is hard to fake the emotions he displays.



BOOK REVIEW

Book Title: The Downfall of the Civilizational Project 1 [Suggout Al-Mashru Al-Hadari]
Author: Dr. Haydar Ibrahim Ali
Publisher: Center for Sudanese Studies
Reviewed by: Dr. Hashim El-Tinay

Dr. Haydar Ibrahim Ali's book entitled the "Downfall of the Civilizational Project 1" is written in the Arabic language. It covers 399 pages of critical analysis, commentary and for the most part fact and data delivery based on public information on the

Sudanese Islamist Salvation (Inqaz) National Revolution experiment in the Sudan and 100 pages of useful annexes. It covers the period from the June 30, 1998 military Coup d'Etat engineered by the National Islamic Front (NIF) to June 2004.

The book is intended to complete the author's earlier book entitled "The Crisis of Political Islam: The Example of the National Islamic Front in Sudan" issued 2 years after the military take over. It was an intellectual and theoretical analysis of the Sudanese Islamic Movement from its inception until the 1980s.

Dr. Hayder in his introduction states that the book constitutes an intellectual trial examining to what extent the Sudanese Islamic Movement lived up in practice to its ideals. And given the apparent failure how can we interpret this monumental downfall? Is it the very idea of the Islamic project? Is it the weakness of analysis and theorization? Is it a failure of the individuals and the institutions? Or is it because of external pressures?

The author then goes on to say that the Sudanese Islamic Project took root in an imaginary, metaphysical and non historical ideology. This ideology presumes that time has stopped at a previous experiment that can be repeated indefinitely in the future of human history. The Sudanese Islamists failed to live up to the challenges they faced. Instead they barricaded themselves despite the fact that they benefited from the anarchy created by a new international order that was being born.

They failed, in the early 1990s to have good relations with the United States despite the lobby of their supporters within the American administration. The Islamists were eager to support a pro Sudan lobby in America. However they failed on this front as well as shown by their resorting to buying media announcements as the \$ 1,000,000 (one million dollar) one published by NEWSWEEK on December 21, 1992. This did not pre-empt the American missile strikes of the Shifa Pharmaceutical plant in August 1998.

The author says that the Sudanese Islamists also failed to justify their utter failure, despite a total and an exclusive monopoly of state power, while justifying their military take over citing their exclusion

from the last February 1989 "Democratic Government".

The Sudanese Islamists took upon themselves to establish a 20th century Islamic State. Islamists from around the world gathered in Khartoum, and especially those persecuted in their homeland, where Shaikh Hassan El-Turabi launched the Islamic Internationalist Movement (Sunni majority) as a forum for all the revolutionaries against imperialism.

But later, Carlos the Jackal was sacrificed for a deal between the Islamists and France and was handed to French security forces. They put an end to their hospitality of Osama Bin Laden who left behind a lot of his wealth, lost among unknown brothers. This strategy, argues Dr. Hayder, might have been the cause of the downfall and death of the Sudanese Islamist Civilizational project.

Some of its leaders, aware of the lack of popular legitimacy and support in the country, saw the solution in winning external media and financial support, so long as they can coerce and terrorize the local population. This is how the regime resorted to the external support of the Muslim Brothers who defended it, oftentimes being more royalist than the king.



In its initial years the regime's tactics was to play the card of being on the offence and an exporter of the "Revolution" into neighboring countries and not be in a defensive and a retreat position. A review of Sudanese foreign policy between 1989 and 1995 reflects

how, Shaikh Al-Turabi and his disciples tried to blackmail Egypt and Eritrea. Al-Turabi also thought that he will reap the fruits of Saddam's adventure in invading Kuwait. Hence his support of the invasion and by organizing visits of Islamic delegations and supportive statements and popular congresses in Baghdad.

However, the Islamic projects retreat started after the first Gulf war and the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. It is at that point that the regime started to talk about national reconciliation, the constitution and peace from within.

The proponents of the Sudanese Islamist project when speaking about their achievements no longer

talk about religion or the application of Shari'a. Rather the pride in having established SUDATEL and the new oil wells. This is not to belittle any material-economic achievement that the Sudan needs. Our point, says Dr. Hayder, is that this could have been achieved for a lower price by leaders of a secular coup d'Etat. And so the question becomes: what is the originality of the Sudanese Islamic Civilizational project that sets it apart from the Numeiri or About project?

This is where the downfall of the Sudanese Islamic Civilizational project starts. When it changed its rhetoric from defending the supreme religious values of justice, righteousness and the upholding the purity of intention and action to a competition over World Bank approval ratings for Third World countries according to classical development literature.

This grandiose name for the project was but a cover to a totalitarian regime that gradually moved to adopting a policy of openness does not reflect the true substance of neither the State nor the society it claims to represent. Hence the importance and the need to challenge it ideologically and intellectually so as to expose the truth of this experiment, lest it repeats itself in the Sudan or in any other Muslim country. And despite the continuous self-righteousness of its proponents that the project is alive and eternal, they utterly failed to presents their proofs.

Their project, writes Dr. Hayder, boiled down to a primitive struggle for power that reached the level of accusing a wing of the Movement to be traitor and subject to the death sentence-despite its sacrifice and pioneering spirit-.

The biggest achievement of the proponents of the project is their humiliation of the Sudanese people and the taking away of their dignity for the sake of safeguarding political power. Resorting to torture, repression and the dismissal from work, the flogging of women, unlawfully pursuing the students and the young, imposing dress restrictions, were all tools used to safeguard the regime but humiliated the citizenry. No person of faith or a humanist can accept a justification of practicing repression or disdain of man to man, no matter how sacred or noble the objective or the goal was.

Any regime has the right to protect itself as it can without humiliating the human beings who are God's

viceregents on earth. This project has introduced grim, perverse and foreign values to the Sudan, and regrettably linking that to religion. If we put all the realizations of the word on one side of the balance and put the humiliation of the citizenry on the other, these realizations will have lighter weight in the balance. This, says the author, is the essential reason that inspired the writing and the publication of his book.

Methodology: The author admits that he relied heavily on data and fact delivery by presenting and reporting events, public statements or declarations by Sudanese public officials covered by the news media and leaves it to the reader to make his or her own conclusions. He cited Egyptian writers Sun'Alla Ibrahim and Abdel Magid Ilaish who adopted that methodology. He also cited Dr. Mansur Khalid's book, "The Sudanese Elites' Addiction to Failure", and El-Haj Warrag's book, "Al-Turabi's Movement, Discourse and Practice".

Dr. Hayder contends that monitoring and analysis of daily newspapers materials is one of the good research means in an oral tradition society where writing and documentation is not the norm. However, this requires objectivity, foresight and how and where the material is to be put to use.

The writer admits that his book does not claim a complete coverage of his subject as he relied on qualitative indicators such as those used by the United Nations, which themselves rely on quantitative and statistical indicators. Hence, there could be many other proofs and examples that those who will come after us could pursue and add to, as they see fit. The author says in his introduction that the readers should bear in mind that this is the first of a trilogy with the hope to cover all aspect of the Civilizational Project.

Dr. Hayder states that this book is a humble effort for documentation so that the truth is not lost. Especially that the great Sudanese people have wasted many long years for nothing. While other people have moved forward, the Sudanese remained captive to a vicious circle and never started the journey yet. The author dedicated the book to the youth of Sudan. He thanked El-Tigani El-Tayeb and Mohamed Ahmed El-Filabi for revising and editing the book.

Dr. Hayder's first book on this important subject is a welcome addition to the documentation of the Suda-

nese Islamist experiment and an important contribution to the ongoing debate about it. It is an easy and an enjoyable read. We look forward to his two additional books on the subject that will hopefully complete the story.

Reviewer's Comment: Military coups, in the 1980s, were part of the reality of many Third World countries and especially so in the case of African and Arab countries. This can be explained in part by the infancy of the democratic cultures and the conceptual, organizational and material weakness of the political parties, the backbone of democratic governance and the fact that many so called "democratic governments" were "democratic" just in name. In Sudan, the perceived autocratic culture that governed the majority parties and the reverence to their religious leaders is perceived as incompatible with freedom of expression, vital to the exercise and practice of democracy. Political bickering, corruption, and the mediocrity of many politicians, always alienated the people, objectively creating a power vacuum that the army officers were too happy to fill.

So whenever the people heard military music early morning on the national radio, they would hope for that radical change that they were waiting for. Unfortunately, like Beckett's Godot who never materialized. Just like the so called democracies, military initiatives that promised real change ended up as yet another disappointment. So, in essence, the Sudanese people have been, since their technical independence in 1956 from Britain, like someone who was fleeing from burning sands into the flames of fire.

Despite the fact that I was imprisoned in the early 70s for the simple exercise of my freedom of expression, I could not help but do it again and share, after the coup became a reality, by writing a letter to President Omer Hassan El-Bashir dated October 2nd, 1989. The following quotation with respect to religion and Islam based on my own sociopolitical and spiritual perspective might shed some light as to the difference between me and Dr. Hayder vis-à-vis the Civilizational Project and might be of interest to the reader:

[The Sudanese should practice the call to Islam in the best and most civilized manner possible. Since its so called "independence" from the Anglo-Egyptian domination in 1956 until the opportunistic application of what they called Shari'a (Islamic Law), by the Nemeiri dictatorship in September 1983, the na-

tion has been victim of purposeless and aimless actions imposed on it by the sad reality and mediocrity of many of the Khartoum politicians.

This situation imposes on the "National Salvation Revolution" the necessity to address this sensitive issue in a daring, selfless and courageous manner. For example:

Flexibility should be adopted in dialoguing with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, SPLM.

If need be, the government should, for the sake of Peace, accept the principle of secular state.

In so doing, it should take into consideration the opinions of our neighbors in Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

The government should also consult with regional groups such as the Arab Maghreb Union (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania & Morocco); the Arab Cooperation Council (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan & Yemen); and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, & Bahrain).

By doing this, we will avoid the missteps of the defunct dictator Nemeiri. His extremely local and narrow calculations in using Islam and to stay in power, has insulted Islam, and the Sudan.

The realization of the dream of a radical solution to the issue of war and peace in the South is frankly long overdue. This is the key for stability and a comprehensive development of the country. This justifies the abrogation of the September Shari'a laws, an unfortunate result of an opportunistic behavior of the Nemeiri regime, that imposed them from above without consultation of the Sudanese people. No wonder then that this led to the peoples' revolt in March-April 1985 putting an end to that dictatorship.

Such a rectification will be welcome by the Sudanese people with appreciation and respect because they understand that the predominant objective and goal of such a policy is to create the objective conditions that can guarantee true security, prosperity, and justice; the necessary pre-requisites for its common good, prosperity and happiness.

The abrogation of the September 1983 laws, could become, from a nationalist perspective at this sensitive juncture, the best remedy and cure to the psychological and moral wounds that they inflicted on so many people in our country. These laws humiliated Sudanese men and women whereas Islam came to honor people and safeguard their dignity, not to humiliate them.

Also, the abrogation of these laws, from a religious perspective, could be the beginning of a true and genuine call to true Islam in the best and most polite manner and renew the country to be one filled with a spirit of fraternity and solidarity. A country led by educated, morally solid and enlightened young leaders who practice the principle of leadership by example. A leadership united with the people working together for the implementation of a clearly rallying national project based on equality of citizens in rights and duties. This project would be the result of dialogue with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement SPLM with the intention of resolving once and for all the issues of contention.

This is what is required for the salvation of the country. This is also what is required to achieve what has been historically desired, nationally, as well as from an Arab, African, Asian, American, and Russian perspective. The Salvation of Sudan resides in this: the birth of a New Sudan of Arab-African Culture endowed with a spiritual mission of pluralistic sources and origin, and a message of peace to the whole world.]

I never received a reply for this letter and judging by the policies that the new government pursued between 1989 until 2002, it is clear that President El-Bashir never saw it. How sad it is for the rulers in the African, Arab and Muslim worlds not to head the advice of their societies' writers, thinkers and intellectuals! And how shameful and regrettable for them to make so many people unnecessarily suffer so much and pay such a dear price for their mistakes, only to be corrected by the big stick of foreign governments and powers. What better proof of the downfall?

The Breakthrough of Sudan's Peace: The End of or a New Life for the Civilizational Project?!!

So much has happened between June 2004 when Dr. Hayder wrote his introduction and the writing of this book review in July 2005. On January 9th 2005 the Sudanese people and the whole World witnessed the

historic signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya. It was the outcome of serious negotiations between the two sides and a lot of help from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) partners and the IGAD friends including Norway, the UK, Italy, Germany and the United States.

Could the sincere commitment to and the strict and genuine implementation of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) mark a new day for the Sudan? Could the approval of the transitional constitution by most political parties signal a new page in Sudan's governance history is now open? Could the dissolution on July 9th, 2005 of the National Congress Party (NCP) government after 16 years of absolute authority, and the swearing in of a new troika composed of Omer Hassan El-Bashir, as President, Dr. John Garang as First Vice President and Ali Osman Taha as Second Vice President, mark the end of the dark, painful and self-destructive Sudanese night?

Could it open the way for resolving through negotiations the ongoing Darfur and Beja tragedies to become truly comprehensive? Could the constitution of a new government of national unity, inclusive of all stakeholders, political parties and civil society organizations that genuinely implements the CPA, finally mark the beginning of a new dawn for the justice, peace, genuine democracy, respect of human rights and the rule of law that the Sudanese people have been yearning for and deserve?

Could this success be claimed by the proponents of the Civilizational Project, like Sudan's oil, as a beginning for the success of their project? For that I suppose the reader will have to wait for Dr. Hayder's second and third volumes on the subject.

Until then, and for now, all energies should be focused on the successful implementation of the Sudanese CPA and the emergence of a new Sudan which is just, peaceful, democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. A new Sudan where the youth for whom Dr. Hayder has dedicated this first volume on the Downfall of the Civilizational Project, could finally start their long journey toward authentic spiritual and material well being, reconstruction, socio-economic development and prosperity that they deserve, and finally realize their great promise.



*** *Announcement* ***

Forced Migration Review 24: Pros- pects for peace in Sudan



The November 2005 issue of FMR will provide an opportunity for reflection and debate on the protection, return and reintegration of displaced Sudanese and the opportunities for building a new Sudan.

Two key actors in the peace process have assisted the editors: Professor Francis Deng (former Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and from 1992 to 2004 the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons) and Jon Bennett, UN Team Leader, Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Sudan.

The special issue – the longest ever issue of our magazine - will present 36 articles written by Northern and Southern representatives of the Government of National Unity, the UN, World Bank, Sudanese and international NGOs and representatives of diaspora communities. Supported by key Sudanese and international policymakers, the project will inform a wider audience - in Sudan, the diaspora, the humanitarian and donor communities and the general public - of the mechanisms by which reconciliation has been promoted, the implications of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and challenges for the six-year transitional period.

Financial support from the [US Institute of Peace](#), [UNDP Sudan](#) and [UNICEF Sudan](#) will enable many thousands of additional copies to be distributed, in Arabic and in English, inside Sudan. On 30 November there will be simultaneous launch events in Khartoum (hosted by UNDP), in Juba (hosted by the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) and in the House of Commons, London (hosted by the UK Sudan parliamentary group). The full text of all articles will go online on 30 November.

The Editors require assistance to ensure effective dissemination of this important collection of perspectives on the prospects for rebuilding Sudan. If you live or work in Sudan and are able to undertake to distribute copies in Arabic and in English – or would like to attend one of the Sudan launch events - we would like to urgently hear from you. Telephone: + 44 1865 280700. Email: fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk

***** Announcement *****

7th International Sudan Studies Conference 2006

6th - 8th April 2006

University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

"Fifty Years After Independence: Sudan's Quest for Peace, Stability and Identity"

Organised by: [SMI](#) - University of Bergen, [SSA](#) and [SSSUK](#)

Throughout most of its fifty years of independence, Sudan has faced continuous wars caused by a multitude of reasons ranging from religious and ethnic differences to economic marginalisation. As the current peace process may give hope to the South, the people of Darfur and Eastern Sudan continue to suffer. Addressing the historic root causes of the conflict is an ongoing process. The recently negotiated peace agreement for the South has far-reaching implications for the future. Sudanese and foreigners interested in Sudan are continually seeking ways to understand the issues involved, their complex relations, catalysts for improvement, and conditions for peaceful co-existence.

The organisers of the 7th International Sudan Studies Conference seek proposals that address various issues related to the quest for peace, stability, reconstruction and the identity of the peoples of Sudan in both contemporary and historical perspective. The role of an independent judicial system, individual liberties, democracy and free press in making and safeguarding peace are some of the themes the conference wishes to address.

Papers addressing issues such as the role of women, environment, education, health services, AIDS, history, archaeology, cultural diversity, Sudanese arts, Sudanese religions, Sudanese languages, and their interaction with peace and stability are especially welcome. Also papers addressing the role of the international community and donors in preserving peace and rebuilding Southern Sudan and other war-ravaged parts of the country are encouraged. Papers are welcome from both Sudanese and non-Sudanese whether they are academics or non-academics. The conference language is English and all papers are expected to be delivered in English.

With unprecedented response and more than 150 abstracts and panel proposals submitted, the conference promises to be a lively event with contributions by Sudanists from all over the world. A healthy expression of interest by many graduate students doing research in the field of Sudan studies is an encouraging sign for the future. Since the late 1960s, scholars at the University of Bergen have conducted research in the Sudan, and benefited greatly from academic exchange and cooperation with colleagues from the Sudan and elsewhere. Several dissertations and publications relating to the Sudan have been produced in Bergen over the years and there is more active research in progress. In light of this history, the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (University of Bergen) is very pleased to host the 2006 International Sudan Studies Conference. Conference facilities will be provided by the University free of charge. All facilities are located in the main building of the Faculty of Law. Bergen Airport is located to the south of the city, about 25 minutes by the airport bus that leaves at 15 minute intervals. One way ticket costs NOK 65.

For more information, visit the conference website: <http://www.sudan2006.org/>. Fax to: Prof Anders Bjørkelo on 00 47 55 58 98 91 Post to: Prof Anders Bjørkelo, Historisk institutt, HF-bygget, Sydnespl. 7, 5007 Bergen, Norway.

Note: The deadline for submitting abstracts has passed. The Editors regret the delay in the appearance of this Newsletter. The announcement for the conference was circulated on the sudanstudies@yahoo.com email.

*** *Announcement* ***

A Cry for Madiom

A documentary film (63 min.)

* *roduced, directed, filmed and edited by Erez T Yanuv Barzilay*

© 2004, Erez T Yanuv Barzilay, Shai Lah Productions

www.SahiLahProductions.com



It is a *unique* documentary. It's a powerful and dreadful *experience*. A rare insight into an isle of desperate hope in the ocean of misery called "South Sudan". A *testimony*, to the lives of some of the most unfortunate victims of Africa's longest war and the few Westerners that came to their aid. Former Israeli television journalist Erez T Yanuv Barzilay witnessed the horrific situation in southern Sudan during two visits in 1993 and 1998. "These immense scenes of human suffering are haunting me to this day. Especially knowing not much has changed during the past 50 years. The misfortune has only spread to the adjacent Darfur region, a bit further north," writes Erez in the non-narrated film's closing remarks. Erez' camera focuses on the fate of 5 years old Madiom Madiok and follows other starving victims as they try to get assistance from international humanitarian aid agencies.

The camera also portrays Canadian nurse Christine Nadori in her impossible task of determining the most malnutrition affected children and infants to get into the emergency feeding program. Erez hopes that the attention recently granted to the Darfur region will generate some positive actions to stop the unbelievable suffering of the civilian population in the whole of southern Sudan. "We simply can't let this opportunity slip away," says Erez in Vancouver, BC., "I really think that the brave people that will make the effort to view this film will be prompted to act, not just talk about it." Erez completed his training in television and video production in Vancouver in the early 90s and recently returned to Vancouver after more than ten years of covering mostly Africa for Israeli television channels. A short feature report from this particular visit to Ajiap, Bahr el Ghazal, a few kilometres south of today's troubled Darfur, was broadcast in August 1998 on Israel's Channel 2 Television and CNN International.

For more information contact:

Peter Davis
Villon Films
4040 Ontario Street
VANCOUVER, BC
V5V 3G5 Canada

10 Research Scholarships University of Bremen, Germany

Governance and Social

Action in Sudan after the Peace Agreement of 2005: local, national, and regional dimensions

(the first round deadline for these has passed; the Editors apologize for the delay. Nevertheless, some may be interested in establishing ties with the project)

Building up governance structures is increasingly considered as a means to counter state decay and deal constructively with internal conflicts. Sudan is a case in point where the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army have agreed on wealth and power sharing, institutionalised by an interim Government of South Sudan and transitional governments in the federal states. The aim is to build infrastructure and deliver social services while holding revenues subject to public accountability.

An actor-oriented perspective will be applied to investigate the dynamics of state-society relations and ways of establishing legitimacy of rule in areas which are shaped by complex conflict patterns. The research sites in Sudan will be in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states and in South Kordofan. Regional dimensions will be covered by analyzing spill-over effects to Gambella across the Ethiopian border and influences on governance structures from the Sudanese diaspora in Kenya at sites in Turkana, settlements in the Rift Valley and some quarters in Nairobi.

The project will be carried out in the framework of academic cooperation between the University of Bremen, the University of Khartoum, the Ahfad University of Women, the University of Juba, the Addis Ababa University and the University of Nairobi. Graduate and postgraduate students as well as young scholars from Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia will have opportunities to get academic qualifications under inter-national guidance.

The grant offers:

A- 3 postgraduate research scholarships and 2 postgraduate research positions for social scientists (political sciences, sociology, social anthropology, human geography, public administration, development studies, gender studies etc.) for a duration of three years

B- 1 postgraduate research scholarship for a political scientist with focus on International Relations for three

years,

C- 1 postgraduate research scholarship for an economist for three years,

D- 3 graduate research scholarships for social scientists for one year.

Applicants should come from Sudan, Ethiopia or Kenya. Preference will go to Southern Sudanese women, if they have the required qualifications.

General Requirements for Application

Eligibility

Applicants must be university graduates. Those for the scholarships and positions in A, B and C need at least a class II M.A. or M.Sc. degree in one of the above subjects, applicants for D must have a B.A. or B.Sc. degree.

Own Research Proposals

Applicants have to submit their own research proposal which should be drafted within the framework of the general project the full text of which is accessible at www.iwim.uni-bremen.de.

The proposal for groups A, B, C should comprise between 15 and 20 pages and include

- an abstract of not more than 150 words
- the aims of the particular research project
- a literature review
- the intended methodological approach
- previous expertise of the applicant.

The proposal for Group D should comprise 10 to 15 pages.

Background information on the project, which is sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation, is available at the homepage of the Institute of World Economics and International Management, University of Bremen, Germany:

http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/forsch_grawert.htm,

or:

<http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/africa/Sudan.Drittmittel/proposal05.pdf>.

On request, we will fax the proposal to applicants who have no e-mail access.

Applications with research proposals should be sent to:

Dr Elke Grawert, University of Bremen, Germany,

by e-mail: iwim@uni-bremen.de

or by fax: +49-421-218-4550

and arrive here not later than the 1st of September 2005.

details at www.iwim.uni-bremen.de

**FINANCIAL BALANCES OF THE SSA,
1999-2005**

SSA Check Book Balance at Citizen's Bank

<u>To Date</u>	<u>Balance</u>
1999	
Richard Lobban becomes SSA Executive Director	
10 November	\$6,742.91
28 December	\$7,232.91
2000	
10 January	\$7,522.91
10 April	\$10,424.60
2000 SSA Conference	
10 June	\$6,289.98
12 September	\$5,952.83
11 December	\$6,367.35
2001	
10 January	\$6,787.35
10 April	\$20,923.85
9 May	\$20,923.85
11 June	\$18,171.43
2001 SSA Conference	
11 July	\$17,841.10
12 September	\$18,011.10
10 October	\$6,011.10
\$12,000 withdrawn to start TIAA/CREF Account	
11 December	\$5,539.41
2002	
10 January	\$5,515.68
NOTE: Separate Record for the TIAA/CREF Account	
11 February	\$7,405.68
9 May	\$8,301.52
11 June	\$3,500.99
2002 SSA Conference	
11 September	\$4,121.70
10 December	\$4,308.84
2003	
10 January	\$4,453.84
10 June	\$4,558.94
Taking in funds for Rooms, Meals, Rents, and Security for SSA 2003 Meetings, Georgetown University	
10 September	\$15,335.45
9 December	\$15,765.45
2004	
12 January	\$14,135.45
Resolve bill with Georgetown University, \$13,000.00	
10 February	\$1,735.45
9 March	\$1,935.45
9 June	\$3,495.10

SSA 2004, Santa Clara University, 28-30 May

10 September	\$1,496.92
9 December	\$1,049.92

2005

11 January	\$1,121.92
10 May	\$2,217.10
12 July	\$4,973.99

SSA 2005, Toronto Meeting, 18-20 August

**TIAA/CREF Account for the
Sudan Studies Association**

<u>Date</u>	<u>Net Asset Value</u>
12/31/2002	\$12,749.91
3/31/2003	\$12,879.47
9/30/2003	\$13,068.29
12/31/2003	\$13,097.09
6/30/2004	\$13,134.53
9/30/2004	\$13,366.33
12/31/2004	\$13,462.77
3/31/2005	\$13,458.89
6/30/2005	\$13,718.67
+++++	

TOTAL Assets as of 31 July 2005,

Checkbook	\$4,973.99
<u>TIAA/CREF Account</u>	<u>\$13,718.67</u>
	\$18,692.66

Major Expenses:

About \$1,000 per issue of the Newsletter, printing and postage (3 times per year). For conferences: P a s s - through funds on Meals, Grants to Graduate Students, Honoraria to Lunch and Banquet Speakers, Cultural and Art Programs, Conference Logistic Charges, Coffee Breaks. For Operating Costs, have Website fees, Postage, Incorporation Fees.

Major Income:

Membership Dues about \$4,000/year
 Donations about \$500-1000/year
 Use of Mailing List about \$300-500/year
 Conference Registrations, \$1,500-2,000 per conference

Prepared by:

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Happy to see the new issue of the SSA Newsletter, but a little skeptical.... (photo: Teodoro Avigliano)

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