


**SSA**

# Newsletter


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نشرة جمعية الدراسات السودانية



Volume 18, No. 5 (December 1999)

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## **Sudan Studies Association**

*Founded in 1981*

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The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, the Middle East and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Newsletter, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of Higher Education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

**Membership:** Membership is for each academic calendar year which entitles the subscriber to receive all the issues of the SSA Newsletter, and to discounted registration rates for attending the annual meetings of the Association.

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## **SSA Newsletter Volume 18, No.5 (December 1999)**

### **Table of Contents**

	Page
From the Editor	3
"Some Obstacles to Peace..." (Saifalyazal S. Omar)	4
Books Donation	9
Dinka-Nuer Peace	10
Sudan Archive at Durham	12
"Garang at Stockholm" (Endre Stiansen]	13
About SUDIA	15
Recent Dissertations	16
Recent Journal Articles	19
Book Reviews	25

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SEASONS  
GREETINGS

**From the Sudan Studies  
Association**

**From the Editor:**

*This is the last issue of the SSA Newsletter for this millennium. It focuses on Sudan political and ethnic conflicts where it features a major article outlining possible reasons for the political conflict between the North and the South as unique entities. Also included are case reports that shed some light on the roots of these conflicts which belong to greater unresolved issues in the Sudanese historical and cultural landscapes, such as the questions of identity, governance, equal distribution of power and economic development, and national unity. Not represented in this publication apart from some examples from the South, are comparable studies from other regions of the Sudan where similar situations do exist. Also missing are examples from other regions where inter-ethnic conflicts are fueled by covert support from the central government in backing one ethnic group against another, as is the case in Western Sudan.*

*Unlike other places (Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia), the military struggle against the central government in the Sudan has started earlier, and is getting complex where more political parties have opted for arms as an alternative to bring about political change. Real peace and prosperity for the whole Sudan could only be a reality when the core issues of war and ethnic conflicts are addressed boldly and openly by all parties involved.*

*Happy Holidays to all,*

*Ali Dinar*

# Some Obstacles to Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Sudan

*Saifalyazal S. Omar*

The Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences  
Department of Development Studies

The Sudan has been torn by civil conflict since 1955, with only a decade of precarious peace from 1972 to 1983. Since hostilities resumed in 1983, numerous peace initiatives have been undertaken by various mediators from the African continent and the international community, all of which have ended with no appreciable success. Why have previous efforts at negotiating peace consistently ended in deadlock? The aim of this article is to identify, study and analyze the reasons underlining the failure to achieve a sustainable peace in the Sudan.

Mistrust and lack of confidence among Northern and Southern politicians at one level and among Northern and Southern people at another level have been persistent barriers to a sustainable peace. Various agreements, coalitions, promises and peace charters have been abrogated and dishonored repeatedly by the different political actors in the conflict, mainly by the Northern ruling elite. As a consequence, hatred, dissension and unrest have characterized the relationship among the actors. In 1947, before the Sudan's independence from Britain, the Southern Sudan was promised a federal system of governance. However, after independence Khartoum politicians proved unable to achieve federation, ignoring their stated commitment to the South. The exclusion of Southerners from the Sudanization (nationalization) of public posts was another great disappointment. Only four minor posts out of eight hundred were delegated to Southerners. The Khartoum elite's indifference to Southern protests over the policy of Sudanization not only fuelled suspicion but also contributed to the so-called Torit mutiny. In addition, in September 1956, Southerners were almost excluded from the national committee formed by the government to draft a constitution. Khartoum politicians' ignorance of Southerners' concerns and their subordination of Southern representation, especially but not limited to issues of deep concern to the South, made Southerners suspicious toward any policy concerning the South that was adopted in the North.

As noted, Southern suspicion of Northern domination was exacerbated on the eve of independence due to exclusive politics and policies, like Sudanization. However, the Sudanization policy was not an initial anomaly, but rather reflects a typical behavioral pattern that continues to the present. The Khartoum elite's perception of national issues and of the country remains, more often than not, reactive, biased, self-interested, fragmented and therefore limited. In consequence, the political relationship between Northerners and Southerners has continued to deteriorate, not improve, after independence (Oduho and Deng

1963, 25). The persistence of the Northern elite's misperception, the string of its dishonored promises and the series of tragic actions and reactions on both sides have led to the intensification of the war. An important component of the Northern elite's myopia is its undying tendency to blame the crisis of confidence, if not the entire conflict, on the British colonial "Southern Policy". Yet, if the Northern elite really had been so acutely aware of and concerned about the divisive role of colonialism, why did it not introduce confidence building measures after independence? For example, during the Sudanization of the bureaucracy, the government could have parceled out a more equitable distribution of public posts among the regions.

Although the 1972 Addis Agreement ensured partial development of the Southern Sudan, the violation of this agreement in 1983 by the Nimeiri regime, particularly the re-division of the united Southern region into three regions and the introduction of the Shari'a law, led to the eruption of a new resistance movement in the same year. The applauded agreement proved to be ineffective in achieving a sustainable peace under an authoritarian regime. It has been claimed that the Islamists and their allies were very suspicious about the Addis Ababa agreement, and were certain that it had secret clauses of an anti-Islamic character (El-Affandi 1990, 371). Immediately after the agreement was dismantled, an Islamization program was declared in the whole country including the Christian and animist South. The program gave the people of Southern Sudan more justification for the resumption of hostilities against the government (Deng, 1995).

Peace negotiations that were conducted between April 1985 and June 1989 between the Southern opposition as represented predominantly by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the parliamentary government in the North failed repeatedly due to mutual suspicion and mistrust. The Alliance of the Political Parties and Trade Unions (APPTU) tried to narrow the gap between the government and the SPLM/A. However, both the traditional parties and the National Islamic Front (NIF) viewed the APPTU's role as a mediator and a facilitator with great suspicion and mistrust. It is for this reason that the so-called democratic government was unable to achieve a peace agreement with the Southern opposition. Though the leader of the SPLM/A, John Garang, had signed separate agreements with the leaders of the traditional parties – Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma party) and Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani (Democratic Unionist Party, DUP) – those agreements were dishonored and poorly respected since they implicated the historical rivalry and the rifts between those parties. A few days before the coup of June 1989, John Garang declared his mistrust of the government in an interview with the *New African* (1989), saying that he had no confidence in Sadiq al-Mahdi, the current Prime Minister. Therefore the realization of a sustainable peace seemed a remote possibility even before the NIF coup.

The war in the South and the failure to resolve this conflict drove

both the military governments of 1958 and 1969 out of power. The parliamentary democracies have suffered the same fate. Although the Sudanese people had always hoped for a peaceful settlement, the attitude of the political leaders during the parliamentary periods has been a great disappointment for them. Immediately after the elections were won, any hopes for peace were dashed, as yet again the old-style politicians resorted to a combination of showy and dishonest "peace" formulas, self-contradictory and ultimately self-defeating promises of an Islamic constitution, and brutal prosecution of an illusory military solution in the South (Daly 1993, 23).

The practical result of this political attitude was a weak and disintegrated relationship and a lack of confidence between the sectarian parties (Umma and DUP) and the SPLM/A. This tenuous relationship among the opposition has effectively paralyzed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in opposing the ruling power in Khartoum. Strangely enough, even though both of the sectarian parties and the SPLM/A have become partners in struggle against the NIF, they have never discussed nor negotiated a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the framework of the former agreements between them. If that had happened, it might have provided a theoretical framework for a peaceful settlement to this chronic conflict. Apart from hollow statements made in the declaration of principles about the South's right to self-determination, freedom of religion, etc., no serious attempt has made to address questions of deep concern in this conflict such as the national identity, the role of religion in the state and the right of citizenship (which implies an equal right of participation in governance and in society as a whole). The declaration of principles in itself is an attempt to build confidence among the different opposition parties. This confirms the sentiment of mistrust between Northern and Southern politicians of the Sudan.

By looking at the positions of the sectarian parties and that of the SPLM/A before and after June 1989, the following two observations emerge: First, the sectarian political parties and the SPLM/A are in a critical and difficult situation in dealing with peace and conflict resolution. However, they find this crisis to be of minor importance compared to their goal of ousting the NIF regime in Khartoum. Second, neither the sectarian parties nor the SPLM/A, who are driven by mistrust and lack of confidence, are in favor of any commitment that aims to settle the conflict peacefully. Questions of identity, equal citizenship rights, religion and the state and participation in governance are still far from being answered and no consensus has been reached upon them before or after 1989.

The settlement of the war in southern Sudan through the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 (see Beshir, 1967, 1975) is not necessarily a model to follow today, although it has been cited by Mitchell (1989) and Sylvester (1977) as a model for how violent civil wars could be ended. Not surprisingly, the Addis Ababa model has not been adopted. The failure of a series of

different peace initiatives taken to resolve the conflict has shown clearly the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement paradigm as a means to resolve the conflict. More than 25 years have passed since the Addis Ababa agreement was signed. The peace agenda today is radically different from the peace agenda of the Addis Ababa negotiations. Ostensibly, the issues have changed, since the SPLM/A is now demanding a more democratic political system throughout the Sudan as a whole rather than secession (Atlas and Likelier, 1999). A number of factors, which are different from those that prevailed before 1972 and which eliminate the utility of the Addis Ababa model, should be taken into account. I mention three of these factors here:

(1) The growing democratization process in African states in the context of an increasing globalization and internationalization of world affairs demands democratic political participation of the people with more emphasis on equitable access and sustainable management of natural resources. Consequently, the conflict over the Sudan's natural resources (oil, water and land) and the nature and the role of the state (secular or religious, allocation of power, and democracy) must be settled through collective action rather than through the decree of a bilateral agreement between an authoritarian state and a single opposition party.

(2) The insertion of a religious dimension into the conflict and its consequences have shifted attention away from addressing the main causes of the conflict – underdevelopment, allocation of power, and exploitation of natural resources – to a holy war over religious identity. The issues of Shari'a law, Arabization, Islamization and christianisation must be re-negotiated in a broader context under a democratic system of governance.

(3) The conflict in the Sudan is not only a South-North conflict that can be solved by an agreement similar to the Addis Agreement between Southern and Northern politicians. New social and political forces are emerging and are demanding a radical change of the political structure and the establishment of a new structure built on the basis of social justice and the respect for human rights. Therefore, the question of national identity and what it implies for race, religion, language and culture cannot be addressed only by the NIF and the SPLM/A, since neither party fully represents the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Sudan. It is this diversity which necessitates the participation of all Sudanese at the grass-roots level in building a sustainable peace.

For the preceding reasons, a settlement of the conflict in a way similar to that of Addis Ababa is unlikely to be successful. They are the same reasons for the failure of all peace initiatives after 1983. The SPLM/A rejected the model of the Addis Ababa agreement during its negotiations with the transitional government of 1985. In the words of John Garang, SPLM/A leader, the Addis

Ababa agreement had its time, played its role, made its historical contribution, but it is dead (Ndege, 1986). The lesson that can be drawn from the Addis agreement is that any attempt to reach a peaceful settlement under an authoritarian power will be unsustainable. In March 1986 the SPLM/A and the APPTU, which includes all the Sudanese political parties with the notable exception of the NIF and the DUP, met in Koka-Dam. All parties agreed on the importance of peace and the convening of a National Constitutional Conference to draw the political future of the country. However, the Umma-DUP coalition government that assumed power in 1986 showed a very reluctant attitude toward peace. Both the khatniya sect leader (Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani) and the Ansar sect leader (Sadiq al-Mahdi) have repeatedly jeopardized the future of peace in their pursuit of self-interest. Mansour Khalid has summarized the reasons for the failure of these agreements as follows: "...not only were the objectives of the two parties discrepant, but their premises were antiethical and their personalities irreconcilable as well." The situation was aggravated by Sadiq's own leadership disposition.

Furthermore, both of the attempted peace initiatives between the SPLM/A and the NIF regime – Abuja (I, II and III) and the ongoing Inter-Governmental Authority for Development – have so far failed due to the limiting circumstances and nature of each forum. Regarding Abuja, the underlying assumption that the Sudan's conflict is similar to Nigeria's was not enough to reach a settlement similar to Nigeria's. An important factor contributing to the collapse of the Abuja negotiations was the authoritarian nature of the Nigerian state, like that of the NIF regime. In addition, as an organization of neighboring African countries that are directly affected by the conflict in the Sudan, the IGAD's neutrality is questionable.

Most important, however, has been the failure of all the attempts at peace negotiations to inform and involve the local people at all levels of the process. For millions of people in the Sudan, therefore, the successive agreements have meant nothing.

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# Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace Council Communication

The 30th of September, 1999  
Yirol, Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan

The Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace Council, established by the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference in March, 1999, met in special session in Yirol, Sudan, from the 25th to the 30th of September, 1999. The meeting was facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and hosted by the local community of Yirol County. The Wunlit Conference had charged the Peace Council with the responsibility to see that the Covenant and Resolutions of Wunlit are fully implemented.

Twenty-three Council Members, gathered representing nine of the eleven counties and provinces along the border areas of Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile regions. In addition, radio operators from the areas attended for intensive training in the use of radios. This is in preparation for the establishment of the border posts that are a key part of the implementation of the Wunlit Resolutions.

Extensive story telling revealed the achievements of the People-to-People Peace Process just six months after the Covenant was signed by more than three hundred delegates at Wunlit. The narratives revealed the significance of the work underway and highlighted the direct benefits of peace.

## Specific Achievements:

- Return of 148 abductees
- Return of 141 cattle not covered in the amnesty
- Finalizing of 5 proper marriages involving abductees
- Arrest & arraignment of leaders of the one identified violation
- Extensive trading routes opened
- Peaceful reception of thousands of displaced Nuer, entering Dinka areas as a result of Government of Sudan sponsored fighting in Western Upper Nile
- Sharing of toich grazing areas and fishing sites
- Extension of the reconciliation process to the East Bank of the Nile among Nilotic and Equatorian people

## Benefits of the Peace:

- Freedom of movement: "We are all free and visiting each others' places."
- Refuge in Time of War: "If it were not for Wunlit, we would have been annihilated. The Dinka have given us refuge when the Government of Sudan attacked us."
- Breaking the Culture of Silence: "Since Wunlit we are free to discuss all

- issues, debate anything freely, and talk with anyone without raising suspicions."
- Security in Unity: "We have moved from being enemies to brothers and sisters. Now our unity strengthens the security for both Dinka and Nuer."
- Transforming Communities: "We are living together and even civil administration is being adjusted to include all people. Now we can work together to reclaim the abandoned places and rebuild the relationships of neighbors."
- Expanding the Peace: "This is no longer a Dinka and Nuer peace. It is the way to unite the whole south and bring peace to all of Sudan. Those who fought against their neighbors are now joining the peace. Everyone is welcome."

Working groups focused on careful review of the Wunlit Resolutions and set priorities for immediate and longer term plans for implementation.

## Immediate and Longer Term Plans:

- Designation of two sites for emergency response and resettlement of Nuer people who have been displaced by the Government of Sudan sponsored fighting in Western Upper Nile.
- Designation of six high priority locations for rebuilding communities and resettlement of Dinka and Nuer people displaced by the seven and a half years of conflict between the communities. Priorities were set for services needed such as provision of bore holes, health, schools, and initial humanitarian assistance for relocation.
- Location of nine border posts for placement of HF radios to facilitate communications between the communities and strengthen security.
- Establishment of a process for final resolution in the tracing missing persons, the return of abducted people, and in retrieving of cattle which did not fall under the amnesty provisions.

The Peace Council extends its special appreciation to the New Sudan Council of Churches and two of its partners, Christian Aid UK and DanChurch Aid of Denmark, for providing the funds and facilitation for this meeting and the provision of the first five radio communication sets. Thanks also go to UNICEF for providing a trainer of radio operators. We also appreciate the presence of Paul McDermott of USAID. Rev. Marc Nikkel of CMS again served with great diligence in helping record all the proceedings and actions of the Council.

Additional thanks go to the SRRA, the County Commissioner, and the Executive Secretary of Yirol for all their work to host the Council. The Commissioner of Rumbek County, the Executive Director of Tonj County, the Commissioner of Jikany, and the Acting Commissioners of Bul, Jagai and Leer all participated in the deliberations of the Council.

## Garang Speaks in Stockholm

(by: Endre Stiansen)

None of the work of the Council could be accomplished without the SPLM/A and UDSF/SSDF who have given their full blessing to this People-to-People peace process and the facilitating role of NSCC.

Finally, the Peace Council urgently urges the UN/OLS, all International NGOs and Indigenous NGOs, and the International Community to study carefully the full decisions of the Council and participate as partners in the implementation of the Wunlit Resolutions.

(Copies of the Council documents are available from the NSCC. Nairobi telephone: 254 2 446 966; 448 141 / 2; e mail: [Peacedesk@Swifkenya.com](mailto:Peacedesk@Swifkenya.com))

### Sudan Archive at Durham University Library

The Sudan Archive was begun in 1957 to receive and preserve the records of those connected with the Sudan Condominium.

The Archive contains official, semi-official and private papers which document in considerable detail the Sudan under Mahdist and Condominium rule for the period 1883-1916 and in less detail for the 1920's and 1930's. From the Second World War onwards, coverage becomes more detailed again. The Archive holds some 300 Mahdist documents in Arabic and also contains substantial numbers of papers relating to Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and African states bordering on the Sudan.

The collection includes the papers of General Sir Reginald Wingate (1861-1953), Sir Rudolf Baron Slatin (1875-1932), Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert Clayton (1875-1929), Sir Harold MacMichael (1882-1969), the Sudan papers of Sir James Robertson (1899-1983) and the papers of the Gordon Memorial College Trust Fund together with over 200 smaller collections, many of which are the papers of former Sudan Political Service officials.

Enquiries should be addressed to: Assistant Keeper, Sudan Archive, Durham University Library, Palace Green Section, Palace Green, Durham DH1 3RN.

Internet Address:

<http://flumbard.dur.ac.uk:6336/dynaweb/handlist/sad/sudan/>

(..We want a democratic and secular Sudan. Our history demonstrates that a state that does not reflect the diversity of the people will not be stable, and the civil war will continue until the present regime has been replaced with a new political system. To reach a peaceful solution, the people of the southern Sudan pursue three tracks. First, we are continuously engaged in negotiations with the government in Khartoum. Second, we want to consolidate the National Democratic Alliance (headquartered in Asmara, Eritrea) as a credible alternative to the National Islamic Front. Third, in liberated areas we establish civil administrations and encourage popular participation in local governance..)

Dr. John Garang, Chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), spoke clearly at a public meeting organised by The Nordic Africa Institute and the Swedish Development Forum (FUF) in Stockholm in late August. The visit to Sweden was part of a larger tour of the Nordic countries.

Given the importance of religion to the conflict in the Sudan, Dr. Garang went to some length to contrast the position of his own movement and that of the NIF (National Islamic Front) regime. (..The SPLM/A wants religion and politics to be constitutionally separated, and to us it does not make sense to say that the state has a religion. Does the state go to church on Sundays, or to the mosque on Fridays? Religion is a private matter between each man or woman and his or her God. The NIF, on the other hand, wants an Islamic state and effectively the new constitution (promulgated the 1st January this year) established a theocracy in the Sudan. But in fact Hassan al-Turabi and his supporters are only using religion for economic and political ends..)

Dr. Garang also addressed the question of ethnicity and the state. (..Even though most Sudanese do not regard themselves to be Arabs, the government is claiming an Arab identity for the state and this excludes people like myself. Sudanism is my ideology, and the new Sudan should be a commonwealth where all Sudanese are equal shareholders. It is impossible to expect the Sudan to remain one state if the government continues to favour the Arab heritage and Islam because this exposes the people of the south to a form of apartheid..)

While Dr. Garang did not go into details with regard to the recent negotiations in Nairobi between the SPLA and the NIF government, he did elaborate on his movement's vision for the future Sudan. (..Ideally our aim for the new Sudan is to establish a secular and democratic system of government for the whole country. However, in a transition period, we will accept a confederation under which the north is governed by the NIF according to Islamic law and the south is governed by the SPLA as secular democracy. Free movement



of people and goods between the two parts of the country must be part of this arrangement, and after an agreed period the people in the south should decide if they want autonomy or remain within one state. We will respect the will of the people whatever they decide, but the present state, which marginalise all non-Muslims and non-Arabs, is not a viable alternative..)

Questions for the audiences led to elaborations of a few key issues. One concerned the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Asked whether or not the NDA really represents a serious and coherent alternative to the NIF regime, Garang answered that the SPLM/A is working to transform the alliance. (..In 1995, some argued in favour of excluding the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party from the NDA but we we stood against that. Pragmatic considerations influenced our position: we could have formed an alliance with the so-called progressive forces, but they do not represent many people while the two parties command a great deal of support inside the country. Moreover, we prefer to have the Umma Party and the DUP in an alliance with us, rather than that they join the NIF against us! ..)

To a question regarding how the people in the southern Sudan, after years of deception and sixteen years of war, can trust politicians from the northern part of the country, Dr. Garang gave a very frank answer. (..There is no reason why the southerners should trust politicians from the north; trust is something that has to be earned and today, if measured on a scale from zero to one hundred, the people of the south's trust for northern politicians is close to zero. But this should not deter us from participating in the political process, and in any case we do not accept that anybody can give us our democratic and human rights. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 demonstrates the danger of relying on others. The agreement brought the first civil war to an end, but it did not ensure lasting peace since Nimayri took away what he had given. There is no easy way to freedom, and we cannot trust anybody to guarantee our rights..)

Finally, one question drew attention to the contrast between the international community's intense engagement in Kosovo and the neglect of the crisis in the Sudan. Contrary to what could have been expected, Dr. Garang did not criticise the West for failing to come to the assistance of the people of the Sudan (he did, however, comment that people in the West should ask their own governments why they are not doing more), but answered with characteristic frankness: (..We have resolved to take destiny in our own hands, and we do not accept that anybody can give us freedom. Our hope is that the SPLM/A will serve as a vehicle for the people to determine their own future..)



## Sudanese Development Initiative Abroad (SUDIA)

Established in Cairo in 1996, SUDIA works to enhance the ability of Sudanese organizations and communities to actively participate in the Sudanese development process. SUDIA provides training and technical assistance that enables Sudanese organizations and community groups - in Egypt and the Sudan - to formulate and carry out their own development initiatives. SUDIA is non-political, non-partisan, and non-sectarian. Staff are from different geographic regions of the Sudan. SUDIA's program has evolved as a direct response to the needs expressed by some of the Sudanese institutions and community groups operating in Egypt and the Sudan. Today the program is structured around three areas:

### *(1) Capacity Building for Organizations*

The building of social capital and the emergence of a strong civil society are essential ingredients in achieving long term, sustainable development at the national level. Enhancing the capacity of indigenous community groups and organizations through operational cooperation may well generate a development impact, which surpasses immediate project goals.

### *(2) Information and Networking*

SUDIA's initiative works to encourage and vitalize information sharing and networking amongst Sudanese organizations and community groups. Keeping in stride with the times, whether developing a series of web pages on the Internet, or orchestrating an audiovisual presentation using computer software, SUDIA continues to stay on top of this rapidly changing communications revolution.

### *(3) Community Support - Sustainable Support for Community Initiatives*

SUDIA's ability in providing short term financial support for community initiatives remains a necessary component in reinstilling hope in this dependant and bankrupt sector of our society. Support for cultural activities, women and child health and the environment remains at the forefront of this crucial component of the program.

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## Recent Dissertations and Theses

December , 1999

*(compiled by Michael Kevane from Dissertations Abstracts Online)*

### **Ambiguous Ethnicity: Propriety (Adab) as a Situational Boundary Marker For Northern Sudanese in Cairo**

Fabos, Anita Hausermann 1999 Boston University Dai, Vol. 60-06a, Page 2108, 00240 Pages

Abstract: This study is an analysis of the social construction of ethnicity among two groups of Muslim Arab Sudanese in modern-day Cairo: long term expatriates who immigrated to Egypt in the 1940s and recently arrived exiles fleeing political and economic upheaval in Sudan. The study is based on ethnographic fieldwork of 26 months' duration. It utilizes formal and informal interviews with over 200 members of Sudanese communities, content analysis of Sudanese publications in Cairo, and participation in two Sudanese non-governmental organizations in Egypt. Sudanese expatriates and exiles in Cairo share broad cultural similarities with Egyptians, who officially assert that Sudanese are their brothers in a unified Nile Valley. Yet in fact Sudanese nationals are not able to attain Egyptian citizenship and, since the 1990s, have lost many of their previous legal and political privileges due to deteriorating relations between Egypt and Sudan. These negative experiences, which call into question the state rhetoric of Sudanese-Egyptian unity, have led Sudanese expatriates and immigrants to use the cultural concept of *adab*, or propriety; a concept shared by their Egyptian hosts—to construct an ambiguous ethnicity that allows them to assert both unity with and difference from the Egyptian mainstream according to circumstances. Of special import in this discourse are notions of proper gender relations and the enactment of "traditional" values such as hospitality, modesty, and generosity. The study traces the *adab* discourse in a number of different arenas, including Sudanese NGOs, finding that both conservative and transformative rhetoric stem from changes in gender norms. The thesis also explores some of the ways in which interpretations of *adab* are used as differentiating markers inside the two Sudanese communities. The dissertation demonstrates that by using *adab* as an ethnic boundary marker, the Sudanese can voice their frustrations with their deteriorating situation and make claims for their own uniqueness and moral superiority while simultaneously publicly acknowledging the identity that they share with the dominant Egyptian community. The dissertation challenges theories of ethnic differentiation that draw sharp boundaries between peoples, arguing instead that values held in common may be the source of far more ambiguous and flexible constructions of identity.

### **Studies on the Etiology of Endemic Goiter in the Sudan: The Role of Pearl Millet (Thyroiditis)**

Elnour, Abdelsalam 1998 Uppsala Universitet (Sweden) Dai, Vol. 60-03c, Page 0604, 00051 Pages

Abstract: Endemic thyroid disorders (ETD) are major health problems worldwide. Although the major role of iodine deficiency in the etiology of ETD is well founded, other factors have been shown to contribute to its etiology as well. The objectives were to investigate factors other than iodine deficiency which contribute to the etiology of endemic goiter in Sudan with special reference to the suggested potential goitrogenicity of pearl millet using both a classical goiter survey and animal feeding studies. The prevalence of goiter in preschool children from a population subsisting on sorghum and pearl millet was found to be 22.3% despite normal median urinary iodine excretion. Mean serum thyroxine (T4) and triiodothyronine (T3) levels were found to be in the normal ranges and median serum thyrotropin (TSH) and mean urinary thiocyanate levels were found to be high. When two different pearl millet cultivars were fed to rats, only one of them induced a significant increase in the weight of the thyroid gland compared to feeding a casein control or wheat reference diets and feeding the fermented form of this cultivar induced a further increase and an increase in serum T3 as well. Feeding of the fermented form of the other cultivar induced a significant increase in both serum T4 and T3. Concomitantly the fermentation procedure reduced the ash contents of pearl millet and removed considerable amounts of Mg. Mean serum selenium levels were found to be high in rats fed the unfermented millet and even higher in those fed the fermented millet diets than in rats fed control or reference diets. Among nine different millet cultivars (3 brown, 3 yellow and 3 gray) only feeding of the gray seeded millet cultivars induced significant increases in the weight of the thyroid gland in rats. When the thyroid glands of rats fed four millet cultivars (unfermented and fermented) were evaluated microscopically, small thyroid follicles with decreased follicular lumen and cubic or cylindrical thyrocytes were observed in all of these rats. Infiltration of the thyroid gland with lymphocytes was observed mostly in rats fed fermented millet diets. Heat treatment was found to have marked qualitative and quantitative effects on the flavonoid profile in pearl millet. The main conclusions from these studies are that endemic goiter might exist even in the absence of iodine deficiency, that in rats not all pearl millet cultivars are goitrogenic, that traditional fermentation and heat treatment might augment the goitrogenicity of pearl millet and that feeding of pearl millet might induce thyroiditis in rats.

### **The Political Influence of Sufi Brotherhoods in The Sudan and China: a Study of the Khatmiyya, Mahdiyya And Naqsbandiyya (Islam)**

Degorge, Barbara T. 1999 St. John's University (New York) Dai, Vol. 60-05a, Page 1617, 00141 Pages

Abstract: Islam is thought of as a religion that hinders any type of development, creating a government based solely on religious philosophy. This premise is quite false. Inherent in Islam are modernizing elements, especially within the political sphere. One of the earliest issues to confront the Islamic community was the organization of government after the death of Muhammed. Because this was a very central issue among Muslims, different vehicles for expressing political activism arose in the Islamic community. One response came from Sufi brotherhoods. Sufi brotherhoods evolved from their initial essence of a closer union with God to one that incorporated political activism and sectarianism. Because of their politically active nature, brotherhoods have been able to speak for their communities, and in many cases have turned into viable political parties. This has been noted many times by those who study Sufism, but the reasons why such a transformation has occurred has been rarely examined. This study traces the transformation of the Sufi brotherhoods in the Sudan and China and seeks to identify the underlying causes in order to explain why they have been able to become a modern political force, expressing the goals of their followers. A study of this type is important since Western stereotypes of Islam, especially with the resurgence of Islamic activism, are basically inaccurate. There is a fundamental misunderstanding between the West and Islamic world in regards to political thought and action. The West is unable to comprehend that Islam is able to transform from within to meet the changes occurring in the modern world. It is inconceivable that Islam, especially Sufism, has the innate ability to adapt itself Sufi brotherhoods, however, are excellent examples of how Islam is able to change from traditional religious affiliations into modern secular ones, exercising power in the political arena. By use of primary sources, the Qur'an and writing of those such as Al-Ghazali, in addition to secondary sources, this study analyzes the evolution of the Sufi brotherhoods in the Sudan and China to explain why they transformed into vehicles of modern political response.

**Islamic Fundamentalism and the Sudanese Ruling Bloc: an Interpretation**  
**Omer, Hassan A. M.a. 1999 Queen's University at Kingston (Canada)**  
**Mai, Vol. 37-06, Page 1695, 00258 Pages**

Abstract: The study uses the Gramscian concept of hegemony and hegemonic crisis to understand the nature of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan. It argues Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan as the organic hegemonic ideology of the Sudanese ruling bloc. Arabism as well as orthodox Sunni Islam had historically provided the main articulatory principals of this ideology. This was in contrast to African culture and genealogy and the predominantly Sufi nature of Islam in the country. The emergence and development of modern organized Islamic fundamentalism is viewed by the study as a direct response to the hegemonic crisis. It represent a calculated political and ideological attempt by an important section of Sudanese bourgeoisie intellectuals to articulate an alternative

hegemonic-project of dominance that superceded but not transcending the existing one. The Sudanese Islamic Fundamentalists, accordingly, were and still, the self-appointed political and moral leadership of the Sudanese ruling bloc, and its political and ideological high command. They emerged from the beginning as the main defenders of the Sudanese ruling bloc established dominance and against the growing social and political struggle of the Sudanese masses.



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December, 1999

*(compiled by Michael Kevane)*

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## Book Review

Peter Adwok Nyaba. **The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View.** Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1997.

*Politics of Liberation* is the first and perhaps only book of its kind. In this succinct yet substantive book, Dr. Peter Nyaba gives us a detailed insider's view of events from the inception of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983 to the dramatic split in its ranks in 1991 and the aftermath. Throughout, Dr. Nyaba's honesty, integrity and commitment to the cause of the southern Sudanese people are evident. In fact, the book reads somewhat as atonement for his regrettable personal participation in the events that led to the 1991 split within the Movement.

Dr. Nyaba's aim is not, as one might expect, to whitewash the image of the SPLM/A. Refreshingly to the contrary, he is highly critical of both the ideological and the methodological shortcomings of the Movement. By exposing these internal flaws, he hopes to contribute to the creation of a truly representative and democratic liberation movement. Importantly, for Dr. Nyaba, liberation means the establishment of a separate southern state as opposed to the united, democratic "New Sudan" framework espoused by Dr. John Garang. His support for secession appears to be the product of his deep distrust of the traditional northern political elite, a personal view that has not been ameliorated by the existence of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which includes the SPLM/A.

### **The SPLM/A's Internal Contradictions**

The 1991 split within the SPLM/A ranks came about due to both internal and external pressures. According to Dr. Nyaba, however, the internal contradictions within the Movement were more important than the external forces. He writes that from its inception in 1983 until the split in 1991, there was very little tolerance for difference of opinion or criticism within the SPLM/A, and the movement "became obsessed with real or imaginary enemies of the revolution among its membership, especially the politicians and the intellectuals" (p.49).

The SPLM/A leadership was virtually unaccountable for its mistakes and abuses of power, a culture of fear having developed around it. In addition, the manner in which SPLA recruits were trained was woefully deficient in terms of creating a politically educated following. The necessary levels of political education and ideological enlightenment were lacking in the SPLA/M's training program, which emphasized rigorous, often brutal, physical training. As a result, according to Dr. Nyaba, SPLA soldiers were de-revolutionized, a phenomenon that implied excessive militarization and the unleashing of brutality

against civilian populations (pp.35-37). To counter this tendency, Dr. Nyaba argues that the SPLM/A should have placed more emphasis on non-military functions of the Movement. In particular, after the liberation of a particular area,

what should have happened was the institution of democratic reforms: a popular justice system, a new system of education, health and veterinary services. It would have given the SPLM the opportunity to prove itself to the people and to the world and, therefore, to build a solid popular power base making the SPLM/A the authentic representative of the people...the 'New Sudan' would have been born in the physical and objective reality of the people, allowing the SPLM/A to acquire political sovereignty and diplomatic recognition (p.51).

Instead, the SPLM/A often "degenerated into an agent of plunder, pillage and destructive conquest" (p.52). This could have been mitigated, according to Dr. Nyaba, if soldiers had been given the proper "political training and education". Unfortunately, however, he does not give too much detail about what the content of such education should be.

These were some of the major internal factors that contributed to the 1991 split. However, as Dr. Nyaba points out, external forces also played a role. Included among these were the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime's desire to divide and weaken the Movement, the hostility toward a strong SPLM/A from some elements of the NDA and Egypt, and various foreign elements and individuals allied with the NIF (e.g., British financier Tiny Rowlands). The SPLM/A could have withstood these external pressures, however, had it not been beset by so many internal contradictions. Even so, most SPLM/A rank and file remained loyal due to the greater and primary contradictions between the NIF and the South, according to Dr. Nyaba.

### **The 1991 Nasir "Coup" and Lessons Learned**

Dr. Nyaba's personal involvement in the split within the SPLM/A ranks in 1991 was motivated by what he confesses was his naive trust in the stated desire of Lam Akol and Riek Machar to press for "democratisation of the Movement." He claims to have had no idea that they would stage a "coup" against Dr. Garang rather than press for internal reforms. However, a coup is exactly what they announced in the Nasir Declaration of August 28, 1991. Riek Machar broadcast the declaration via a radio message "addressed to all units of the SPLA," and on the BBC. According to Dr. Nyaba, it "was a political and military manoeuvre carefully calculated to snatch the leadership from Dr John Garang" (p.74). This, along with their subsequent collaboration with the NIF regime, revealed to him the depths of Lam Akol's and Riek Machar's desire for personal power even if it meant weakening the liberation struggle.

The "coup" led to the creation of SPLM/A-United faction (later renamed

the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army, SSIM/A). Most unfortunately, the split precipitated one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent South Sudan history, as the factions engaged in internecine fighting. It also helped the NIF regime to regain strategic towns in the South, notably the oil rich areas. The inevitable (due to the absence of overwhelming southern support for the coup) collaboration with and military support from the NIF regime created both moral and military setbacks in the war of liberation. Furthermore, it led to a southernization of the war, a development that benefited the NIF and other enemies of the South. And, most ironically, it led to the recreation within the SPLM/A-United (SSIM/A) of the internal contradictions that had plagued the SPLM/A and that Lam Akol and Riek Machar had claimed were the reason for their "coup". Not surprisingly, SPLM/A-United (SSIM/A) soon degenerated into more "tribal or region-based splinter groups."

The ultimate "result has been what the NIF government had set out to achieve ... dividing the liberation movement" and sabotaging the IGADD process with its dubious "peace from within" program (p.130). According to Dr. Nyaba, the only advantage of the split was that it forced the SPLM/A's leadership to reflect critically upon some of its mistakes:

"..the coup...was probably a 'blessing in disguise' in that it helped to bring about the qualitative transformation of the SPLM/A....[It,] ironically, stimulated renewal of the SPLM through the first National Convention in 1994, the SPLA senior officers' conference, October 1995, the conference on humanitarian issues in November 1995, the conference on civil society and civil authority in 1996. The emergence of the SPLM/A United, and later SSIM/A helped to cleanse SPLM/A of opportunism and irresponsible ambition."(p.162)

Perhaps the greatest lesson learned is that, "[n]o war of liberation can be executed without the people. Nor are the people liberated. They must participate in the liberation process through their own conscientisation" (p.52). Had SPLM/A gotten this point early on, perhaps the split would not have occurred.

### **The Problematic National Democratic Alliance: A Prophetic Account?**

Politics of Liberation concludes on a rather gloomy note regarding the ability of the NDA (which includes the SPLM/A) to resolve the Sudanese conflict. Dr. Nyaba highlights the fragility of the alliance and stresses that southerners should not pin too much hope on the sincerity of the northern opposition, given their past (and continuing) record on the South. Moreover, the fact that the NIF "grew out of the bosom of the sectarian parties," a fact which they never openly acknowledge, is another reason to be wary (p.173). Furthermore, the northern opposition still tends to dismiss the role of the SPLM/A

in overthrowing the NIF, despite the fact that it is the latter which has committed itself militarily while the traditional parties have been reluctant to do so.

In short, Dr. Nyaba's view of the NDA is radically different from the northern opposition's view of it. He regards "the NDA not as a bridge to the formation of one secular democratic Sudan, but as a convenient forum for a peaceful dismemberment of the Sudan, and the formation of two separate, independent and sovereign entities" (p.174). This view stems from his belief that an "NDA government in Khartoum, following the demise of the NIF, will not bring about secularism immediately...the sectarian parties may not accept the complete destruction of the system based on Islam and Arabism in the Sudan" (p.180). Before dismissing this assessment outright, however, the reader should pose the following question. Is it not somehow prophetic in light of the recent expressed interest of certain major opposition figures and parties in "reconciling" with the NIF regime, as well as their recent apparent backtracking on the Declaration of Principles that is evidenced by their growing hostility to the IGADD process and their search for alternative venues that exclude these principles?

Overall, the book was an informative read from an undoubtedly committed and sincere individual. However, the publishers could have done a better editing job. Moreover, Dr. Nyaba might have provided the reader with more detailed information about the substantive internal changes to the SPLM/A that have been made since the 1991 split. For example, what specific measures have been taken to strengthen civil society and the respect for human rights by members of the Movement, and what degree of success have these measures accomplished? Also missing, in my opinion, was an account of the role of the so-called "modern forces" (notably, SAF) of the North, which have committed themselves alongside SPLM/A, to armed liberation. What has been the nature of the relationship between these forces and SPLM/A? Has it been more promising than that with the traditional sectarian parties, or "business as usual"? These are questions to which Dr. Nyaba's answers would have been both interesting and instructive.

Laura N. Beny, November 1999

#### Call for Papers: 2000 SSA Meeting

The 19th annual conference of the Sudan Studies Association, with the theme: "Africa's Sudanic Core at the Millenium", will be held at the African Studies Center, Vassar College, April 6-8, 2000. Proposals for papers and panels should be sent by February 15th, 2000 to: Dr. Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, History Dept., University of Missouri-Columbia, 101 Read Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, (Tel: 575-882-9492, E-mail: ibrahima@missouri.edu)

## Book Review

Donald Petterson. **Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe.** Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. xi & 209 pp.

Probably nothing better illustrates the impasse in US-Sudanese relations than the August 1998 bombing of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. Open wrangling was for a moment interrupted with a big bang, but when the dust settled very little if anything had changed. Ambassador Donald Petterson's book provides important background to understand how the attack was a predictable outcome of one decade of failure to establish a meaningful dialogue between the US and Sudanese governments, and why the destruction for all matters and purposes was not followed by new US initiatives, whether covert or overt for opposition groups. To be blunt: the book demonstrates that the US does not have a Sudan policy. (The other side of the coin, of course, is that the Sudan does not have a realistic policy to deal with the US government, and hopefully one day key Sudanese officials will bring out complementary accounts.)

Ambassador Petterson served in the Sudan from August 1992 to July 1995. When looking back, he is remarkably frank about the lack of a clear vision in the formulation of Washington's day-to-day "policy" towards the Sudan, he writes:

"..In all the policy-related materials I read and the briefings I received before I went to [the] Sudan, and in the communications that came from Washington after I got to Khartoum, none contained a consolidated, historical explanation accounting for the current U.S. policy toward [the] Sudan. In thinking it through, I saw that it was an aggregation of events and actions by the Bashir regime that, taken as a whole, put [the] Sudan in such a bad light with the U.S. government." (p.135).

Briefly, the main points that contributed to the US government's attitude were a) the 1989 coup (which by law led to the cession of all US aid, except humanitarian assistance), b) the persistent human rights violations committed by the government, c) the failure to establish a free and fair democratic institutions, d) the conduct of the civil war in the South (it is important to note that the US has been extremely critical of both the Khartoum government and the SPLA/M, e) the abuse suffered by displaced people living in the Khartoum area, f) the Sudan's support for Iraq during the Gulf War, and finally g) the Bashir regime's support for international terrorism (p. 136).

With one exception, the absence of real national interests meant that the Ambassador in large measure acted according to an agenda determined by



moral indignation. Thus he kept a careful eye on human rights issues (reporting violations whenever they occurred), took an active role in co-ordinating aid and humanitarian assistance (sometimes chairing a committee made up of the most important donor countries), visited camps for displaced people, and repeatedly travelled to SPLA/M controlled areas to see first hand the plight of the people of the southern Sudan. The Ambassador also sought to stimulate negotiations between the different sides in the civil war. Nowhere in the book is there any suggestion that economic considerations in any way influenced US attitudes to the Sudan.

Only with regards to the Sudan's perceived support for international terrorism did national (strategic and domestic) concerns decide policy considerations. Two factors were particularly important. First, Washington regarded Khartoum as a safe harbour for known terrorists, and believed support from the NIF dominated regime could assist radical Islamic groups in destabilising neighbouring countries (mainly Egypt, Eritrea and Ethiopia), thus harming broader US interests. Second, Sudanese nationals (even embassy personnel) had been implicated in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, and thereby represented a threat to the well-being of Americans at home. In August 1993, after a "systematic review", the US Government "decided to designate Sudan a state sponsor of international terrorism" (p. 70); until and unless the Sudan Government proved that it had changed its way, there was no possibility of improved relations.

Secretary of State Christopher's decision brought the already frozen US-Sudanese relations to a new low. At the time, any form of military intervention does not seem to have been contemplated, but of course some form of direct action would be the logical next step if the Sudan was not seen to change. On this point, it is interesting that Ambassador Petterson prior to Washington's announcement did not believe there was sufficient evidence to place the Sudan on the list of governments supporting terrorism (p. 69), even though subsequently he seems to have become supportive of the decision. (Equally interesting is his comment that the State Department (up to the present?) did not present "conclusive" (his own emphasis) that the al-Shifa factory in fact played a role in the manufacturing of deadly chemical weapons (p. 188).)

Ambassador Petterson is in pain to stress that neither he nor the US government were guided by anti-Islamic feelings when criticising the Sudan government, and he even approvingly refers to John Esposito's dictum that "political Islam need not be in and of itself repressive or contrary to Western interests." (p. 28) Some comments may be called for. While this reviewer could not find any evidence of anti-Islamic rhetoric, it is also the case that the Ambassador does not demonstrate more than a passing knowledge of Islamic history and Islam as a comprehensive system of beliefs and practices. Moreover, his grasp of Sudanese history appears to be limited (and better editing should have weeded out unnecessary mistakes). Perhaps this is as could be expected

by a career diplomat, but undoubtedly a more thorough understanding of the processes at play in the Sudan in the 1990s would have been an advantage for the most important member of the diplomatic corps in Khartoum. Probably a better background would have helped the Ambassador in acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of his own role. For instance, at one time he, accompanied by a few senior US officials, attended a sufi (Sammaniyya) ceremony in Omdurman apparently convinced their presence would not send a political message to the government.

While naive about how his movements would be interpreted, Ambassador Petterson's was clearly exacerbated with the NIF cadre's inability to understand both the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. Time and time again, he felt called upon to correct misunderstandings and wishful thinking among senior officials and politicians. One recurrent theme was Khartoum's perception of a cleavage between the State Department, which they saw as strongly anti-Islamic, and the White House, which was seen as much more understanding of the Sudan's aspirations. At times such misunderstandings were of little consequence, but at other times, for instance when President Clinton ("for domestic political considerations", according to the Ambassador), appointed a Special Envoy to the Sudan (p. 119), it was necessary to make an extra effort to explain how US foreign policy is formulated and executed.

To set the record straight, but also as part of his normal functions, he held many and long meetings with the most senior Sudanese officials. Fortunately the book includes many summaries of conversations (he conveys the impression that "debates" and "quarrels" are better designations) that took place behind closed doors. Often poignant pen-portraits accompany these summaries, and *Inside Sudan* is therefore a rich source for all interested in the personae of Hassan al-Turabi and Omar al-Bashir. By and large the Ambassador seemed to have found the former an interesting adversary even though regarded many of his views as totally repugnant, and he does not dismiss the latter as a mere pawn in the hands of al-Turabi but as a man with his own opinions that happens to be in accordance with the NIF.

Ambassador Petterson's comments on the opposition, and in particular the SPLA/M, are noteworthy. The National Democratic Alliance (it is only mentioned in the epilogue) is dismissed as "an ineffectual coalition of northern exiles opposed to the government" (p. 184), and there is no mention whatsoever of important events such as the signing of the Asmara Declaration (June 1995). Even though he gets credit for being the most effective challenger to the sitting government, the Ambassador does not seem to have had much time for John Garang, at one point even relating the view of the presidents of Eritrea and Ethiopia that "SPLA's depredations against southern Sudanese civilians [was] nothing short of idiocy" (p. 128). Throughout the text, his account of the army atrocities in the South are balanced by the SPLA/M looting of emergency convoys, and he is at pains to point out that neither he nor the government were

favouring either party in the conflict. Rather the US was fully behind the regional IGAD peace initiative.

When Ambassador Petterson ended his tour of duty, the US and the Sudanese governments were as far apart as ever, and the failure to establish a meaningful dialogue became apparent for all to see when Washington in February 1996 decided to evacuate all embassy personnel from Khartoum. In 1997 the retired Ambassador took part in a private Sudanese-American initiative designed to establish a basis for improved relations, but the missile attack of August 1998 effectively killed follow-up initiatives. As indicated, Ambassador Petterson may not have agreed with the decision to fire the missile at al-Shifa, but at the same time he does not seem to have much faith in the possibility of a dialogue. Plainly at present the distance between Washington and Khartoum is too large, and he puts the blame squarely with the Sudan government. In a remarkable statement that may well sum up the essence of his experience from 1992 and to September 1998 (when the manuscript was completed), he writes:

“...the Sudanese experience gives credence to the thesis that any government based on religious fundamentalism and intent on propagating its religious beliefs will by its nature be tyrannical, intolerant of dissent, and prepared to use any means, including violence against its own people, to maintain itself in power.” (p. xi).

These are uncompromising words, and probably many in Washington agree. Hence it is difficult to see how it can be possible to start a dialogue between the US and the Sudan government. Ambassador Petterson's book should, however, be essential reading for all who walk the corridors of power in Khartoum because it is unlikely any other source will give them a better idea of US attitudes (private as well as official) to the Sudan. It should also be mentioned that those waiting to occupy the same corridors of power also should study Inside Sudan. In opposition they need to find the ways and means to be taken seriously by the Washington establishment, and if they succeed in replacing the sitting regime they face the task of restoring the Sudan's image.

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