

BULLETIN

SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

نشرة جمعية الدراسات السودانية

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Our Purpose

The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum and works collaboratively with the Sudan Studies Society of the UK. The SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Bulletin, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

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The SSA is legally incorporated as a non-profit making organization. Thus all contributions and other donations are tax exempt. Your gift is appreciated.

Please note, after years of no change, our membership charges have increased according to the recommendation of the SSA Board and their acceptance by the members present at the 28th annual meeting at Michigan State University, May 23, 2009.

Electronic Distribution of SSA Bulletin

Beginning with this issue the SSA Bulletin will be mailed electronically on an experimental selective basis to those members who indicated that they are willing and interested to receive the Bulletin by email in order to save on the expense of printing and mailing the Bulletin. Libraries and members who prefer to receive the traditional hard copy will continue to receive it as usual. Please state your preference through an email to the Executive Director at rlobban@ric.edu.

Your feedback on this new distribution process along with your support and contributions to the Bulletin are appreciated. Please support the SSA and the Bulletin by membership renewal, articles and reviews, and financial contributions.

Visit our website: www.sudanstudies.org

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From the Editor

by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban*

Dear SSA Bulletin Readers,

The SSA Bulletin is entering its 32nd year as the major means of communication and dissemination of scholarly articles with our membership. With this issue the SSA Bulletin enters a new era, beginning the eventual shift to mainly online distribution of the Bulletin. The SSA leadership is still discussing the best ways and means of accomplishing this goal that will save the organization hundreds of dollars per year and thousands of dollars in subsequent years. This issue begins the period of this transition and we ask you to bear with us as we experiment with different formats and methods of online publication. This needs to be coordinated with paid memberships as well as the preferences of the many libraries that receive the Bulletin.

We are grateful that our new home institution of the SSA, Arizona State University, has generously offered assistance with production, graphics, distribution, and personnel. We thank both the ASU production team and our colleagues President-Elect Abdullahi Gallab and Board member Souad T. Ali who have worked tirelessly on our behalf.

Please remember that the SSA Bulletin is dedicated to all phases of scholarship of the two Sudans and that we welcome contributions on all subjects relating to the study of the Sudans, as well as information on our own and other academic conferences and related activities in Sudanese studies.

Thank you for your past support and looking forward to your continuing contributions to the health and success of the SSA Bulletin.

**Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, PhD*

Professor Emerita of Anthropology & Joint Doctoral Program in Education, Rhode Island College Adjunct Professor of African Studies at Naval War College, Newport Editor, Sudan Studies Association Bulletin Secretary and Newsletter Editor, RI Beekeepers' Association cfluehr@ric.edu

All submissions and communication about the bulletin should be directed to the editor, Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban.
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SSA 2013 Conference Program Draft

FRIDAY, MAY 24, 2013

8:00-12:00 **Open Registration**

9:00-9:45 **Welcome&Opening Remarks**

Dr. Randall Fegely, SSA President

Dr. Abdullahi Gallab, Program Chair

Dr. Ali Ali-Dinar, Local Host

10:00-11:30 **Honoring a Lifetime of Distinguished Scholarship: Dr. Sondra Hale**

Running Out of Poems? An Autoethnography of Sudan, Part 1

Chair: Dr. Souad Ali, Arizona State University

11:30-12:45 **Lunch**

1:00-2:30 **CONCURRENT SESSION 1**

**Panel 1: South Sudan's Economy, Eternal Relations, and
Prospects for the Future**

Chair: Dr. Benaiah Yongo-Bure, Kettering University (Michigan)

Presenters:

Dr. Laura N. Beny, University of Michigan Law School,

South Sudan and the EAC – Implications for Sudan-South Sudan Relations

Dr. Ayok Chol, University of Juba (South Sudan), *The Management of the Financial and Material*

Resources of South Sudan: A Case Study of Oil/Customs Revenues and Equitable Land Use

Dr. Lako Tongun, Pitzer College (California),

Political Economy of Oil and Frontier Capitalism in South Sudan

Panel 2: Sufism, Saints and Shrines

Chair: Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Rhode Island College

Presenters:

Dr. Neil McHugh, Fort Lewis College (Colorado), *Metropolitan Scholar: al-Amin al-Darir*

Katie J. Hickerson, University of Pennsylvania,

Saintly Shrines and Statues: Martyrdom and Monumentation in Sudan

Daisuke Maruyama, Kyoto University (Japan),

Between the Principle and the Practice: The External Policy of Sufism in Contemporary Sudan

Panel 3: Identity, Diaspora and War

Chair: Dr. Jay O'Brien, Purdue University (Indiana)

Presenters:

Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, University of Pennsylvania, *Incarnating an "Arab", "Abbasid" and "J'aali" Identity:
Captivity in Omdurman and its Impact on Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, 1894-1916*

Dr. Adam Mahamat, University of Maroua (Cameroon),

Sudanese Diasporas in Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria: Settlements, Activities and Government Supports
Aly Verjee, Senior Researcher at Rift Valley Institute,
Yellow Fever in Darfur: An Assessment of the 2012 Outbreak

2:45-4:15

Panel 4: TBA

Chair: Dr. Nureldin Satti

Presenters:

Azza Satti, *Sudan at the Referendum*

Dr. Khalid Kodi, Boston College

Abdullahi ElTayib

4:30-6:00

Board Meeting

SATURDAY, MAY 25, 2013

8:00-9:30

CONCURRENT SESSION 2

Panel 5: The Roots of Conflict in the Sudans

Chair: TBA

Presenters:

Marc J. Cohen, Oxfam America/Johns Hopkins University (Maryland) and Abdal Monium K. Osman, Tufts University (Massachusetts), *Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Darfur*

Noah Gottschalk, Oxfam America, *Cattle Raids and AK-47s: How an International Arms Trade Treaty Can Help Reduce Violence in South Sudan*

Omayma Gutbi, Oxfam America, *Gender, Displacement, and Livelihoods in Darfur*

Gordon Lam, Oxfam Great Britain, *Reforming the Security System in South Sudan*

Panel 6: Violence, Security, Nation, and State Building

Chair: Dr. Lako Tongun, Pitzer College (California)

Presenters:

Dr. Christopher Zambakari, Northeastern University, Boston,

Political Violence, Citizenship, and Democratic Nation-Building in South Sudan

Michelle Legassicke, University of Waterloo (Canada),

Cyclical Violence in Jonglei State: The Deadly Shift in the Practice of Cattle Raiding

Naomi Pendle, London School of Economics (United Kingdom), *"They are now Community Police and not titweng": Contesting The Legitimacy to Use Violence in South Sudan Through The Renegotiation of*

Identity of Non-State Security Providers

Panel 7: Using Organizational Risk Assessment (ORA) Software to Study Sudan Networks and Conflicts

Chair: Aly Verjee, Senior Researcher at Rift Valley Institute

Presenters:

Dr. Kevin DeJesus, Rhode Island College and MURI Project, *Al-Qaeda in Darfur: Dynamic Network Analysis and the Exploration of an Under-explained Presence of Shadowy Terror Networks in Darfur*

Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Rhode Island College and MURI Project,

Islamist Networks in Sudan: International Connections from the Maghreb to Malaysia

Dr. Richard Lobban, Rhode Island College and MURI Project,

Using ORA Modeling to Understand the Intersection of Conflicts in Sudan and Across the Sahel
Chuck Galli, Temple University (Pennsylvania) and MURI Project, *Islamism and Conflict in the Sahel: How Networks, Ideologies, and Interests Can Create and Diffuse Violence*

9:45-11:15 **CONCURRENT SESSION 3**

Panel 8: Politics of Violence and Torture

Chair: Dr. Sondra Hale, University of California, Los Angeles

Presenters:

Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim, Scholars at Risk, New York University,
Truth Medicines: One Option to Stop Torture?
Al-Shafie Mohamed

Panel 9: Imagining of a New Nation: How Identity and Daily Practices are Renegotiated and Recreated

Chair: Dr. Ellen Gruenbaum, Purdue University (Indiana)

Presenters:

MaryBeth Chrostowsky, University of Kentucky, *Asylum's Role in the Future of South Sudan: Tensions Between Formal Education, Pastoralism, and Agricultural Production.*
Christian Oyat Doll, University of California, Davis,
"Then We Will Benefit": Utopic Imaginings and the Enactment of Sovereignty in Ramciel, South Sudan
Brendan Tuttle, Temple University of Kentucky,
Don't Let the Leader Touch the Ground: Childhood and the Heaviness of Rule in Bor, South Sudan.
Sheila D. Vinton, University of Kentucky, *Food and Transnationalism in the Sudanese Diaspora*

Panel 10: Gender Relations, Healthcare, and Humanitarian Aid

Chair: Dr. Christopher Zambakari, Northeastern University, Boston

Presenters:

Dr. Nada Mustafa Ali, Clark University, *Borders, Bridges and Cross Roads: Interrogating 'Outstanding Post-Referendum Issues' Between Sudan and South Sudan from a Women and Gender's Perspective*
Jane Abucha, IASIS Healthcare (Arizona),
The Effects of War on the Two Sudan's: Unintended Outcome on Women and Children
Soledad Herrero, John Hopkins University (Maryland),
Humanitarian Aid in Sudan: For Better or for Worse?

11:30-12:45 **Lunch**

1:00-2:30 **Panel 11: Meet the Author: Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban**

Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan: Conflict, Law and Social Transformation

Chair: Dr. Ismail H. Abdalla, College of William and Mary (Virginia)

2:45-4:15 **CONCURRENT SESSION 4**

Panel 12: Darfur, 10 Years On: News and Views

Chair: TBA

Presenters:

Dr. Anne Barlett, University of San Francisco, *Darfur 10 Years On: A Changing Landscape of Conflict?*
Ahmed H. Adam, Columbia University, *Darfur Peace Processes: What Went Wrong? A View of an Insider*
Mohamed H. Elkareem, University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates), *TV News Coverage of the Conflict and Crisis in Darfur: A Comparative Content Analysis of ALJAZEERA, CNN, and SUDAN TV.*

Panel 13: Mutual Coexistence and Border Relations

Chair: Dr. Laura N. Beny, University of Michigan Law School

Presenters:

Dr. Benaiah Yongo-Bure, Kettering University (Michigan),
Abyei and Border Settlements and Future Relations between the Two Sudans
William Pay Tuoy-Giel, Sudanese Community Association of Arizona,
The Need for Peaceful Co-existence Between the Two Sudans "A Citizen Perspective"
Sara de Simone, Università degli Studi di Napoli l'Orientale (Italy),
Internal Borders and Community Disputes Among Unity State Counties

Panel 14: Secularism, Shari'a and Social Movements

Chair: Dr. Ali Ali-Dinar, University of Pennsylvania

Presenters:

Dr. Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud, Tennessee State University,
Secularism and Shari'a Challenges Before a Crossroads Sudan
Dr. Jay O'Brien and Dr. Ellen Gruenbaum, Purdue University (Indiana),
Stories of Sudan: Why Narratives Matter
Yuko Tobinai, Sophia University (Japan),
A Study of the Revival Movement in Greater Sudan: From the Perspective of the Kuku's Migration

4:15-4:45 **Break**

5:00-7:30 **Panel 15: Keynote Address by Jonathan Temin, United States Institute of Peace, and Dinner Banquet**

Chair: Dr. Randall Fegley, Pennsylvania State University

SUNDAY, MAY, 26, 2013

8:00-9:30 **CONCURRENT SESSION 5**

Panel 16: Elite, Jallaba and the State

Chair: Dr. Bakry Eljack, University of Delaware

Presenters:

Dr. Hafiz Ahmed Abdalla Ibrahim, *Economic Elites and Financial Networks in a Globalized World: Interplay of Social, Political and Financial Influence in Sudan's Modern Economy*
Dr. Abdu Mukhtar Musa, Omdurman Islamic University (Sudan),
Post-conflict State Building: The Case of Sudan(s)
Terence Walz, Independent Scholar, *Asyut and the Darfur Jallaba*

Panel 17: Sudan and its Neighbors

Chair: Dr. Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud, Tennessee State University

Presenters:

Dr. Mohamed Yasin Khalifa, Harvard University,
ICC Languages Policy: Indigenous Indiscipline in Darfur Case
Dr. Belete Belachew Yihun, Jimma University (Ethiopia),
A Relation Shrouded in Mistrust: What the Future Holds for Ethiopia and Sudan?
Lourdes Patricia Iñiguez-Torres, El Colegio de México (Mexico),
Republic of Sudan and Egypt on the Nile: National Challenges in the Context of the Arab Spring

Panel 18: New Discoveries in Sudanese Archaeology, Dr. Richard Lobban

10:00-11:30

CONCURRENT SESSION 6

Panel 19: TBA

Panel 20: Development, its Debates and Consequences

Chair: TBA

Presenters:

Tarig Mustafa M. Ali, Gender and Peace Program Manager Norwegian Church Aid - Sudan,
Facilitating Social Change Through the Use of (Community Capacity Enhancement - Through Community Conversation)
Nisrin Elamin, Stanford University (California), *Agricultural Dreams and Denials: Examining the Rhetoric and Politics of Large-scale Land Acquisitions in Sudan*
Tamer Abd Elkreem, University of Bayreuth (Germany),
Demistifying the Dams' Regime in Sudan: Sudan Needs to Build Trust Before Building a Dam

Panel 21: Past and Contemporary Aspects of Gender and Ethnicity

Chair: Dr. Abdel Rahman Ibrahim, Boston Ideological Institute

Presenters:

Dr. Ismail H. Abdalla, College of William and Mary (Virginia),
Concept of time Among the Hamar people of Western Kordofan
Dr. Souad T. Ali, Arizona State University,
The Complexity of Sudanese Identity in Buthaina Khidr Mekki's Writing: A Study of Hujul Min Shawk
Mohamed K. Khalil, Freelance Linguist, Nubian Language Society (NLS) and Shadia Abdo Rabo,
Archeologist and Curator, *Archaeological Evidence of Feminine ornaments and Their Continuation in the Contemporary Nubian Cultures of Today*

11:30-1:00

Panel 22: Keynote Speech by Ismail Kushkush, New York Times, and Lunch Banquet

Chair: Dr. Abdullahi Gallab, Arizona State University

1:15-2:45

CONCURRENT SESSION 7

Panel 23: Political Ideologies, Dictatorship, and State Institutions

Chair: Dr. Abdel Magid Bob, Independent Scholar

Presenters:

Dr. Izzeldin Bakhit, Strayer University (Virginia),
The Sudanese Political Predicament and the Lack of Evolution of Political Institutions in Sudan

Dr. Mohamed Elmahdi Bushra, University of Khartoum (Sudan),

The Contemporary Novel: A Chronicle of Collapse

Dr. Abdul Rahman Ibrahim, Boston Ideological Institute, *Use of Ideological Analysis to*

Understand Underdevelopment and Dictatorship in the Sudan

Panel 24: On Liberation

Chair: Dr. Anne Bartlett, University of San Francisco

Presenters:

Dr. Bakry Eljack, University of Delaware,

What Lessons could Sudanese Activists Learn from the Arab Spring?

Dr. Anita Fábos, Clark University (Massachusetts),

Mapping Identity Through Sound: Sudanese Music in the Diaspora

Dr. Ellen Gruenbaum, Purdue University (Indiana), *Silence and Non-silence on Female*

Circumcision: Sondra Hale's 'Ethnographic Residuals' and Feminist Struggles

Panel 25: Self-determination, Liberation Struggle, and Collective Memories

Chair: William Pay Tuoy-Giel, Sudanese Community Association of Arizona

Presenters:

Dr. Christopher Tounsel, University of Michigan, *'Ye are a Chosen People': Biblical Rhetoric and National Liberation in Southern Sudan, 1955-1967*

Tarnjeet Kaur Kang, Univeristy of Illinois,

A Proposal for a Community Self- Determination Framework in South Sudan

Margret Otto, *"Two Countries – Two Memories?" Constructions of Individual and Collective Memories in Sudan and South Sudan New Border – New Countries?*

3:00-4:45

Break

4:45-6:15

Sudan: Wither (Roundtable in Arabic)

Chair: Hashim M. Salih

Presenters:

Dr. Ahmed Abbas, Discussion Leader

Sidiq Abdelhadi

Ahmed Adam

Salwa Al-Shiwaya

Salah Shuaayb

6:30-8:00

Business Meeting

8:30-Open

Sudanese Musical Night, Organized by Philadelphia Community

*Art Exhibits by Dr. Khalid Kodi, Abdulla El Tayib, and Al-Shafie Mohamid will be available for viewing throughout the duration of the Conference

IN MEMORIAM

Katherine Payne Moseley

by Rosemary Galli

Katherine Payne Moseley (KP Moseley) passed away peacefully on 4 October 2012. She was the Public Affairs Officer for the US Embassy in Khartoum and helped American researchers and attended SSA meetings. She often cited work with Immanuel Wallerstein on pre-capitalist social structures initiated a long list of studies and publications on the Trans-Saharan trade, the political economy of West Africa including Sierra Leone and Nigeria, and most recently the economic and social history of the larger oasis band of the northern Saharan edge including Morocco and Mauritania. Kay also actively promoted water and other environmental issues as represented by her paper entitled “Development or Ecocide? Dilemmas of Water Exploitation in the Sahara.” A PhD in Sociology from Columbia University, she did her fieldwork in Dahomey and taught at Fourah Bay College (Sierra Leone) and at the University of Port Harcourt (Nigeria), as well as at Vanderbilt, Brooklyn College, the University of Connecticut (Storrs), and several other American universities.

At Port Harcourt during the 1980s, she is remembered for her contribution to building the Sociology Department, alongside Claude Ake, Pade Badru and Teresa Turner. Many of the current faculty are her former students. She is also renowned for her kindness to students. As Pade recalls: “While Kate was assigned the duty of building our graduate program, Teresa and I were to develop the Center for Energy Studies. Kate stayed away from the fractious politics of the department and focused her energy on teaching and developing our graduate program and financially supporting several local students who could not afford to pay their tuition. I was soon to discover Kate’s love of the local culture and people especially the Ijaw minority ethnic group of south eastern Nigeria. Kate made friends from all the various sections of the university community especially our creole colleagues from Sierra Leone, many of whom she had met while she was teaching at Fourah Bay College. Many visiting foreign professors, especially from Europe and America, would spend several days at Kate’s house before going to other parts of the country where they had been hired to teach. Her door was always open to everyone, and the arrival of a new visitor would often be followed by an elaborate party for that weekend. Almost every weekend, Kate would organize parties. Kate’s favorite music at these parties was Igbo Highlife music from popular musicians like Eddie Okonta, Osita Osadebey, and younger generation of Igbo musicians. And of

course, Kate would make sure that she danced with every single person attending the party. In the end, she became our unofficial social secretary, and we would come up with any reason to get her to bring everyone together at her house, which she often left unlocked for friends and neighbors. As the military repression of academic freedom grew worse, I told Kate that it was time for us to leave Port Harcourt but she refused telling me that she could not summon the courage to leave her students behind for a comfortable life in the States. At that time, Kate's house had been turned into some kind of 'bush' canteen where poor or low income students could come to have a meal." She returned to the United States in the late 1980s.

In the 1990s, Kay was a visiting professor at several U.S. universities punctuated by a two-year Fulbright Research Fellowship in Morocco at the Institut des Etudes Africaines, Rabat, where she studied Trans-Saharan aspects of commerce and exchange, formal and informal, past and present, continuing work begun in Mali and Niger. This resulted in the paper, "The Moroccan South, Oasis Social Structures, and the Trans-Saharan Trade," presented at the 1994 African Studies Association and "Sharecroppers, Serfs, and Notables: Variations in the Traditional Status of the Haratin," presented at al-Akhawayn University in 2000.

From 2000-2006 she worked as a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. State Department and served in Sudan, Mauritania, and Chad. She continually returned to Mauritania to study the structures and sustainability of oasis societies whose water sources are under threat. As one close friend described it: "Kay loved the research itself: traveling on her own to a small desert town and spending a few days with the people who lived there, asking questions and taking copious notes as she listened. Despite the heat, food, or any thing else that most people might find a reason to complain about, I never once heard Kay complain about these logistical challenges. Although she was always thoroughly exhausted, Kay came back to Nouakchott ready to head to the library to continue her research or schedule meetings with various professors and academics to get their perspectives on her findings." Underlying Kay's research was a sense of urgency.

Family and friends will always remember her warmth, sense of fun, wit, love of jazz and African rhythms, and music in general, generosity, hospitality, openness and elegance. A colleague's vivid recollection sums up our feelings: "I will never forget my first year in Mauritania when I first saw Kay dancing Sabar at an Embassy 4th of July party. I went to get a drink and came back to see an enormous circle around Kay as she leapt, kicked, and danced her way into the hearts of everyone present. Kay was 70 going on 25 years of age. I knew at that moment that I wanted to be just like her."

The Role of Women in the Nation and State Building Projects in South Sudan

by Chrstopher Zambakari*

It has been close to eight months since the Republic of South Sudan became independent. The process of state and nation-building is well underway. On March 7th, South Sudan's President, Salva Kiir, issued four decrees announcing ninety ambassadors to be deployed throughout the world in various diplomatic and foreign services posts. Presidential Decree No. 18/2012,¹ No. 19/2012,² No. 20/2012,³ and No. 21/2012⁴ appointed 10 Grade (1), 43 Grade (2), and 37 Grade (3) ambassadors. Out of the total of ninety ambassadors, nine were women: three from Grade (2) and six from Grade (3). This only represents a ten percent representation for women among ambassadors, most of whom come from Grade (3). The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS)⁵ stipulates that at least twenty-five percent of the seats and positions in each legislative and each executive organ of the state⁶ needs to be allocated to women as part of Affirmative Action designed to redress historical injustices created by history, customs and traditions.⁷ This is not confined to legislative and executive organs but also extends to judiciary,⁸ Council of Ministers,⁹ to Independent Institutions and Commissions.¹⁰

The move by the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) has already come under criticism from Ambassador Sitona Abdella Osman, who pointed out that there is a great imbalance in the appointment of ambassadors and demanded that the current Constitution be revised to solve the imbalance. While the reaction from Ambassador Osman is understandable, the problem does not rest in the current Constitution which is very clear about the representation of women in various organs of government. The problem arises from its implementation. The current breakdown shows that the minimum of twenty-five percent that is required by the Constitution has not been met. It points less towards the Constitution but more towards the political will to implement the provisions already included in the TCRSS. Amending the Constitution will not solve the problem raised by Ambassador Osman. Only a prolonged political struggle for the rights of women can ensure that the imbalance is redressed. Political rights are an outcome of a political struggle and not a gift from above. To think of fundamental rights as a handout of seats in various organs of government is to reduce the struggles and gains made politically by women throughout South Sudan to a mere allocation of positions. It ultimately defeats the purpose of a political struggle for rights.

In light of this development this article reviews the mandated Affirmative Action embedded in the current Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan and discusses whether South Sudan has lived up to its constitutional requirement and the fulfillment of its Affirmative Action provision towards women. This article further argues that the new Republic in the South cannot achieve its political, economic, and social objectives without a successful integration of women into the nation and state building projects.

The Transitional Constitution and Gender Equality

The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS), promulgated right before the declaration of independence on July 9th, 2011, is a very comprehensive document that covers a broad range of rights for all South Sudanese and specifically includes an Affirmative Action Clause for women. It provides rights to women, as well as the right to have access to health care and education for all South Sudanese. More importantly, it does away with the legal ethnic distinction that is a common feature of many African Constitutions.¹¹ The challenge in South Sudan is less in the provisions of the constitution but more in the implementation of the rights provided for at the state and local levels. It is in the former where the success of the reform of the colonial state can best be observed.

When the Transitional Constitution was promulgated shortly before South Sudan declared independence, it took stoke of the plight of women in South Sudan. The TCRSS set out to rectify historical injustices that have affected women. To do so it included an Affirmative Action Clause designed to increase the number of women in key positions throughout institutions of governance. Part II of the TCRSS (The Bill of Rights), Section 16 (1-5) provides for several rights for women, one of which is “the right to participate equally with men in public life.”¹² Section 16(4) mandates that all government institutions must promote the following: “women participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least twenty-five percent as an Affirmative Action to redress imbalances created by history, customs, and traditions.”¹³ Other rights include “equal pay for equal work”¹⁴, provision for “maternity and childcare, medical care for pregnant women”¹⁵, and “right for women to own property and share in the estates of deceased husbands.”¹⁶ Part IX, Ch. II, Sec. 142(3) provides that the National Government ensures that twenty-five percent of the seats on Independent Institutions and Commissions shall be allocated to women.¹⁷ Part VI, Ch. III, Sec. 108(3) deals with the National Council of Ministers and requires that the President shall ensure that at least “twenty-five percent of members of the Council of Ministers are women.”¹⁸

South Sudan has ten states and ten governors.¹⁹ Of the ten only one state has a female governor, Warrap State.²⁰ There are currently seven Presidential Advisor’s positions. Six advisors are males and one is female. Out of twenty-nine Ministerial Portfolios, five positions are occupied by women.²¹ There are fifteen members on the Austerity Measures Committee established by the President.²² No woman sits on that committee.

There are currently ten Grade 1 Ambassadors. All ten positions have gone to male ambassadors and none to women. There are twenty-seven Undersecretaries and only four are women. Other organs of government²³ show a similar pattern, all failing to reach the twenty-five percent mark, most of which don't even attain half of the required quota. There is a wide discrepancy between the professed ideal, the constitutional mandate and the reality on the ground.

To make sense of this discrepancy, it is instructive to look at one of South Sudan's neighbors and how it dealt with a similar historical injustice. The country is Uganda and from one of its leading scholars, Mahmood Mamdani,²⁴ we learn that when the National Resistance Movement (N.R.M.) took power in 1986 it introduced a reform in a "broad coalition of government by allocating a number of seats in the new legislative body" for groups that have been historically disenfranchised: women, youth, and workers.²⁵ Given the tendency to see rights simply as a gift from above, new members of the legislature were captured by the ruling power. For the representative of youth and women's groups, they felt "so thankful and beholden to the ruling power" they functioned less as representatives of the disfranchised groups who have won political rights through a political struggle and acted more "as the regime's 'representatives' to women and youth!"²⁶ This was however not the case with the Trade Unions which objected to the ruling party's tendency to capture, divide and conquer. The outcome was a concession resulting in rights "extended in response to a definite struggle."²⁷ The success of Trade Unions lied in their organizational capability and tenacity to stand up to the ruling power without conceding ground. The lesson of Uganda is that:

"Rights acquires the most significance where the issue of state power appears to be clearly settled, most notably as the result of a protracted armed struggle, itself evidence of both the limited development and organisational weakness of the so-called 'civil society' or non-state sectors. However, such an outcome is likely to exacerbate this contradiction, because to have been successful, the armed struggle has almost certainly been supported by many civilian activists, and yet upon victory the new regime proceeds to reorganise the state, and only from that standpoint to develop an agenda for social change. If this is combined with a hegemonic perspective that sees in the growing insistence on greater democracy nothing but a demand for 'bourgeois' rights, nothing but fresh evidence of 'counter-revolution' rearing its ugly head under new conditions, the danger is that civil society is likely to be left even weaker than before!"²⁸

While Trade Unions successfully defended their autonomy, youth and women's representatives were incorporated into the ruling power, thereby neutralizing their ability to self-organize, mobilize and maintain autonomy in the face of a central power that sought to deny the right to self-organization of various group interests.²⁹ The tendency of postcolonial régimes in the region has been with monopolizing of power that goes hand in hand with a preoccupation with capturing organized political entities and subsequently incorporating them into the ruling party. The tendency to effect a democratic change from above has not produced qualitative benefits in the African

context. Such an attempt in South Sudan should be actively discouraged and resisted by members of the civil society organizations. This technology of rule has a tendency to paralyze and ultimately neutralize the ability of civil society organizations to self-organize in order to keep the ruling structures of power in check.

Women, State and Nation Building In South Sudan

In discussing the role of women in the nation-building project in South Sudan, a good place to start is the statistics on the referendum, which according to Ms. Lula Riziq, Director of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network, showed that of the total number of registered voters in South Sudan, 52 percent were women.³⁰ Today women make up 65 percent of South Sudan's total population.³¹ For South Sudan to optimize its full potential it will need to integrate the mass by straddling both the urban and rural population into the nation and state building projects. For a durable peace and sustainable development, these projects will need to include women and youth. The reason is simple: the youth make up the majority of the population of South Sudan with 72 percent under the age of 30.³² In short, South Sudan will need to invest in developing its human capital.

The blood that was shed during the civil war, the suffering inflicted on people as a direct consequence of war, affected both men and women. Sudanese women, specifically in the south, played a significant role in the war, fighting and supporting the multiple armed movements. According to experts, women also suffered sexual violence throughout the struggle.³³ Sudanese women play a central role in Sudanese society, in physical and psychological welfare as well as conflict prevention and peace-building. Today, their post-conflict status is among the lowest of all groups in South Sudan, regardless of ethnic background. As a member of the Sudanese Community in the United States, I have seen the efforts that Sudanese women put into building strong, vibrant, and healthy communities. From Boston, to Phoenix, Portland to Washington, Sudanese women play a role in shaping community life, engaging in conflict resolution, assisting with fundraising when a member is in need, nurturing healthy families, raising future generations, and providing for family needs all over North and South Sudan.

The success of the referendum also bears testimony to the role of women in the political process in South Sudan. South Sudanese women were mobilized around the world to educate community members about the referendum in addition to leading voting centers in registering and making sure the election was transparent, fair, and credible. However, the recognition of these roles has been slow to arise. Today, much is demanded from the South Sudanese women and yet little legal, economic and political recognition is given to what these women are already doing to make South Sudan a healthy state. A sustainable policy will also require the education of men in Sudanese communities alongside their female counterparts. Without the incorporation of men, the reform can only be partially successful. It requires the integrated work of men and women to make the South a stronger, healthy, and prosperous place to call home. Given that South Sudanese women are affected by both the political and

economic forces, a constructive effort must engage women in the Post-CPA era for building the new nation in the south. In regions plagued by conflict, such as Southern Sudan, Eastern and Western Sudan, women have been subjects to some of the worst marginalization, oppression, and violence perpetrated by various groups within and outside the region. These various crises have inevitably transformed women into heads of households without granting them the legal status, political power and other social, symbolic and cultural benefits.

Conclusion

The development in the new Republic thus far as it relates to gender equality and the redress of historical injustice is inconsistent with the tenets of the Conceptual Framework of the New Sudan. When the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) convened for the First Convention in 1994, Dr. John Garang, the late Chairman and Commander in Chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), identified the challenges facing women throughout Sudan (North, South, East, and West) and acknowledged that "women were the marginalized of the marginalized."³⁴ So if males were marginalized in the Old Sudan, then females, in both North and South Sudan, were doubly marginalized and faced a challenge that their male counterparts did not. Given that that Old Sudan and the New Sudan were mutually exclusive political projects,³⁵ the only solution was to bring forth the New Sudan. This model recognized multiple histories, identities, diversity of religions and races, in a plural society.³⁶ It promised justice and equality for all stakeholders "irrespective of their religion, race, tribe or gender."³⁷ It was this framework that inspired the framing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)³⁸ and later the Constitution in South Sudan.³⁹


The new Republic in the South cannot achieve its political, economic, and social objectives without a successful integration of women into the nation-building project. Progress in the South will depend to a larger extent on how the state integrates the mass into the nation-building project. The success of the Republic hinges on its ability to democratize the nation-building process by integrating and educating its population with a special emphasis on women and the youth, the groups that make up the majority of the population in South Sudan.

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This book is the result of his longstanding interest in influential literary fiction, literary criticism, the philosophy and sociology of religion and other belief systems, military history and combat studies, Africa and African people, and the most destructive social problems in contemporary human societies.

He lives in Rhode Island with his family.

South Sudan Reconsidered: 1899-2012

by Gabriel Warburg*

South Sudan is in the process of becoming an independent Republic, following half a century of civil wars. This paper was written in 2011-12, at a time when it was unclear whether South Sudan would survive as an independent Republic. Given that Sudan's conflicts have survived for more than six decades, whereas its independence is just over a year, a brief historical survey will serve as an introduction.

Introduction

Sudan's independence from colonial rule, in January 1956, was questionable, since it was uncertain in 1955 whether Sudan would become part of a united Nile valley, joining its northern neighbor Egypt, or become an independent state. Professor Amir Idris questioned Sudan's ability at the time to deal with the problems it was facing. He wrote to his colleague Ali Nada, on 21 May 2010, a note titled: "Making the separation of Sudan thinkable," [Published in "*Sudan Tribune*"], he stated: "I am struck by the lack of a sense of history ... and political memory in much of the current public discourse. Very little effort has been made to make the unthinkable thinkable." Following a brief discussion whether the south was capable of creating an independent and stable state, Prof. Idris wondered whether the process of southern Sudanese having a state of their own, could make the process of separation a peaceful and meaningful exercise for all Sudanese. He went on to state: "After all, the separation of the South might not be the last time territorial unity is challenged if the same circumstances that are pushing the South to make the choice between unity and separation continue to exist in other parts of the country, such as Darfur."¹

To return briefly to the 19th century, when Sudan was under Mahdist rule, European colonial powers viewed the Mahdi as a barrier against their potential competitors. Britain with its "Cape to Cairo" plan feared the penetration of France into the Nile Valley, while France was planning its penetration from West Africa into the Nile Valley, so as to arrive at the Nile prior to Great Britain. France's plan materialized in 1898 when its forces, under Colonel Marchand met the British on the Nile in Fashoda. General Kitchener, who commanded the Anglo-Egyptian forces, claimed that Fashoda belonged to Egypt and ordered Marchand to retreat. In 1898, following "the defeat of

Khalifa Abdullahi [the Mahdi's successor]... on the plains of Karari ... and the final collapse of the Mahdist State,"² Mansour Khalid, a onetime minister of foreign affairs, wrote in the "*Sudan Handbook*" a chapter titled "*The Long Road to Independence*", in which he claimed that "From the day the Condominium rule began in 1899 until the beginning of the Second World War, colonial policy in Sudan aimed at creating two separate and distinct entities: an Arabicized, Muslim North and a Christian, African South."³

In the conclusion to his book, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, Professor R. O. Collins wrote about British conquests in southern provinces: "The British occupied only as much as was required, to be administered with as few men and as little money as possible. The [few] local British Officers were expected above all to maintain order, collect taxes and build a few roads. That was the extent of administration in those early years and it was patently inadequate to keep peace."⁴

It took several decades for Southern Policy to be more clearly defined. Douglas H. Johnson, a scholar of Sudan's history and politics, with special interest in the South, writes in a recently updated book, that it was in 1930, that Sudan's Civil Secretary [a kind of minister of internal affairs] made a statement in which he declared that "the South was to be developed along 'African' rather than 'Arab' lines, and that the future of the southern Sudan might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa [namely Kenya, Uganda, etc.] rather than with the Middle East."⁵ In the southern regions, "Islam was confined mainly to towns; its influence on rural communities remained limited."⁶ Although, well defined, Southern Policy was not really implemented.

Independence

In January 1956, Sudan became Britain's first dependency in Africa, to achieve independence, following the outbreak of hostilities in the South in 1955 – "The alternative to evacuation was military force, and Britain lacked both the funds and the will to withstand the prevailing anti-colonial mood in the international arena."⁷ In the introduction to Oduhu & Deng's, "*The Problem of Southern Sudan*", (OUP, 1963), Richard Gray wrote as follows: "One would have thought that the 1955 disturbance, though regrettable, would play a role in bringing Northerners and Southerners together ... This unfortunately has not been the case and the situation continued to worsen."⁸

Warburg, in his book, "*Islam, Sectarianism and politics in Sudan*", quoted the 1956 census of Sudan (1955-6), and stated that "Great Britain and Egypt, the co-dominion of Sudan, did their utmost to gain the upper hand among the Sudanese. They failed primarily, because Sudan was divided religiously and politically, along sectarian lines, with Sudanese graduates seeking the patronage of either Egypt, or one of the "two Sayyids", heads of the two large sects: the Khatmiyya or the Ansar".⁹

According to Johnson, the fact that Egypt and Britain competed for the support of the northern Sudanese, "helps to explain why the nationalists themselves felt under no pressure to reach a genuine accommodation with southern Sudanese."¹⁰ Hostilities

in the South started in 1955, as a result of an uprising of Southern Equatorial corps in Torit, and “ended only after 261 Northerners and seventy five Southerners had lost their lives”¹¹. This was the beginning of the longest civil war in Africa, between North & South Sudan, which had so far caused over two million casualties, and which lasted with brief interruptions until the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” [CPA], was signed in 2005.

Abel Alier Kwai’s book, *“Southern Sudan, Too Many Agreements Dishonored”*, was published two decades later, (Exeter: Ithaca press, 1990). Alier was born in the early 1930s in the Upper Nile Province, having received his education at Wad Saidna and Rumbeck in Northern Sudan, as was customary among Southern graduates, he continued on at the University of Khartoum where he studied Law. He later received an Advanced Legal Studies degree from Yale University and subsequently filled several central roles, both in government and opposition. Following the Addis-Ababa Agreement, in the 1972 peace agreement, he was appointed President of the Interim High Executive Council. It was an important appointment, though, Alier had to face and solve “the inevitable problems [which] were arising from the implementation of the agreement.”¹² One of the most problematic issues was internal security. “Neither side had confidence in the other ... It was therefore not surprising that the vital process of absorbing Anya-Nya (southern fighters) personnel into the national army, was the most difficult task.”¹³ Several armed conflicts along this process made it near impossible and many of those not absorbed, “made efforts to go back to the Bush ... Experience of the integration process suggests that a similar situation in the future would require more time than five years.”¹⁴

Horace Campbell, in his paper on *“The Republic of South Sudan and the Meaning of Independence”*¹⁵, compares Sudan to Eritrea, which had previously been part of Ethiopia. Campbell writes: “Twenty years after its independence the peoples of Eritrea are now fighting against the government that was supposed to be a leading force for liberation.” Instead, Eritrea and Ethiopia have been fighting (1988-2000) “senselessly over strips of land.”

Greg Cameron, in his paper, *“The Eritrean State in Comparative Perspective,”*¹⁶ sounds rather pessimistic: “Caught between a rock, [Ethiopia] ... and a hard place ... [Eritrea], life in Eritrea has become acutely difficult.”¹⁷ Magnus Treiber, in his paper *“Trapped in Adolescence”*, published in the same volume, “emphasizes the role of Isayas Afeworki’s military and political training in China [on Eritrea] which strongly influenced the EPLF’s organization propaganda and identity formation.”¹⁸ Eritrea’s leader, Isayas Afeworki, is in absolute control of his country as a military dictator, and “has recently replaced any person ... who can challenge his power with individuals loyal to him”.¹⁹ He has picked conflicts with most of his neighbors and has even chosen to collaborate with Muslim radicals in Somalia.

Further on, in the paper quoted above, Campbell enumerates new Southern Sudan’s wealth and points out that water is one of the most important: “... the management of this source can be a foundation for cooperation or conflict with their neighbors to the north, both the Sudan and Egypt.” He ends by stating that “the complete liberation of

the people of South Sudan . . . would be accomplished if its leaders put the dignity, well being and peaceful coexistence of the people above everything else.”²⁰

If we consider Eritrea, Sudan’s neighbor and the country which broke away from Ethiopia to become independent, we find that in both cases colonial powers created them. In Sudan, as we have seen, it was the British, whereas in Ethiopia the Italians, during their occupation helped to create an Eritrean identity. Whereas Ethiopia helped the southern Sudanese, fight the Muslim north-Sudanese.

Numayri’s division of the South into three regions on fifth June 1983 “in fact abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement and returned powers to central government.”²¹ It was a preparation for the endorsement of Numayri’s ‘Islamic Path’, a month later. In a sub-chapter titled “*Nimeiri’s After Thoughts*”, Alier mentions Nimeiri’s last attempt to come to terms with the South, in March 1985. However, it was too late, according to Abel Alier “President Nimeiri seemed to probe only for ways of prolonging his own hold on power.”²² As is well known, it was in the same month that Nimeiri undertook his last presidential trip to the United States, believing mistakenly that he could rely on his army and the security forces. While in the States, a coup in Sudan deposed Numayri from power, he sought asylum in Cairo and all his future plans for Sudan were aborted.

In 1978 oil was struck by Chevron Oil in Bentiu, which until then was manned by Southern troops under the command of SPLA commander Salva Kiir, [now president of South Sudan]. “It seemed an issue of no substance when viewed in isolation of North-South politico-economic perspective.”²³ After lengthy debates, the well was finally christened ‘Unity Well’, however, “oil had emerged as the economic aspect of an internationalized North-South conflict.”²⁴ Instead of realizing, that the discovery of oil meant that territorial-financial arrangements had to be made and agreed upon, central government “changed boundaries so that oil fields in the South would fall within the Northern regions, locate refineries outside the Southern regions to avoid paying revenues from it to regional governments.”²⁵ In the years that followed and especially in the 1990s: “Oil has been the country’s main commodity and Sudan’s main source of income”, according to Irit Back from the Dayan Center. Yet, during the negotiations leading to the CPA, “It became evident that many of the oil fields were located in the future southern state . . . which depends on [North] Sudan’s pipeline infrastructure to export its oil to Port Sudan” which in fact meant that Southern Sudan’s revenues from oil would be fully dependent on Khartoum. Military clashes would likely follow and would most probably lead to deleterious effects on oil production, likely to be devastating for South Sudan. “Recently [2011?], Khartoum threatened to impose a unilateral fee of \$36 per barrel on South Sudan’s oil . . . In response Juba, Capital of the Southern Republic, announced that it would consider suspending its oil production”.²⁶

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005 And The Southern Referendum Leading To Independence, 2011

The 2005 elections, leading to the CPA, which were followed by the referendum in southern Sudan, brought about an overwhelming decision by southerners to form their

own independent state. It would therefore seem that the co-option of the south and Darfur, into the Turku-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in the 19th Century, was a grave mistake. The breakdown of the Addis Ababa agreement and the renewal of civil war in 1983, were the result, this war hopefully came to an end in 2005, with the signing of the CPA.

Robert O. Collins's, edited a book composed of his own papers titled: "*Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan*".²⁷ In his paper: "*The Blood of Experience*" [307-320], Collins retells the story of Sudan's civil wars since 1955. Arriving at the Islamist coup in June 1989 and the Establishment of the Government of National Salvation later that year, he stated that in the numerous negotiations that occurred since that coup, the northerners refused to consider "the participation of the Southern Sudanese in any political process to determine their future"[312]. More recently, however, they had agreed in 1996 to the Declaration of Principles, to include self-determination, "So defined as to vitiate its purpose and reduce the principle to a cheap debating point." According to Robert Collins, the negotiators of this Charter agreed "to a referendum in the South" after "the full establishment of peace and stability" and a reasonable level of social development. "This pious pronouncement deftly precludes the participation by the Southern Sudanese in any political process to determine their future." According to Collins, "those who will decide whether peace, stability and social order have been achieved, are the northern Islamists, who have every incentive to discourage the acquisition of either qualification."²⁸ However, the ultimate test, as in any such agreement, was its implementation.

According to Martin Daly, "although the prospects of implementation of the agreement ... are slim, its comprehensive nature renders it a likely reference to all subsequent attempts at settlement ... for a long time to come"²⁹. The DPA called for the creation of a transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which would be chaired by the senior assistant to the president, nominated by the rebels, and include the governors of the three states which make up present-day Darfur. However, the political implications for the whole Sudan are so far-reaching that they are unlikely to be implemented under Sudan's present government. But like the 2005 CPA, the 2006 DPA agreement might, even if repudiated, form a common benchmark on which democrats might build in the future. It has remained undecided whether Darfur would remain divided into three states or reunited into a single province.³⁰ Nonetheless, brutality and violence are the fact, reported recently the *New York Times*, and the Arab tribes in Darfur, who were previously blamed for the genocide of their African neighbors, are now roaming freely in Darfur and slaughtering each other, "in a battle over the spoils of war that is killing hundreds of people and displacing tens of thousands". This slaughter is neither religious nor ethnic; it is inter-tribal warfare pure and simple and is reminiscent of similar wars of previous centuries.³¹

We the Ngok Dinka of Abyei Area mark the one-year anniversary of our lost referendum - a referendum guaranteed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement but never delivered by the Government of Sudan (GoS) because of the obstacles it continuously placed in its way. Instead the Government of Sudan brutally attacked us killed some

of us ... displaced us, occupied our lands ... and settled others in our homeland.³²

Matters did not improve and on February 18th “Ali Mahmood, the Sudanese Minister of Finance ... told journalists that the United States ... would cancel Sudan’s \$2.4 billion debt, contingent upon full implementation of the CPA ... which would mean holding a referendum in Abyei to allow residents to decide on the territory’s future.” With the Sudan insisting that the Missiriya be allowed to vote a demand rejected by the SPLA, the two sides seemed to be deadlocked.³³ However, the Missiriya have agreed to a joint Security Committee “to resolve conflicts between Missiriya migrants and Ngok Dinka returnees. UNISFA has also held meetings with the Ngok Dinka, to ensure safe passage of the Missiriya.”³⁴ The situation in Abyei remained unresolved and border demarcation was not agreed upon, and thus on 15 March 2012, President Salva Kiir announced that border demarcation would not proceed as long as contested areas, including Abyei were not included in the Southern Sudan. Matters did not improve, when the Legislative Assembly of the South included Abyei in the South without waiting for the border demarcation to be agreed upon.³⁵ However, in mid-June the Abyei conflict had not been solved and will, according to Khartoum, never be solved by outside intervention, it is “in the hands of the Missiriya and Dinka Ngok.”³⁶

Douglas Johnson states that “the US had used the threat of maintaining the Sudan on its list of ‘terrorist states’ as a means of extracting further intelligence.” Former Senator John Danforth, who came to Sudan as a special envoy of President Obama, was mainly concerned with terrorism³⁷ and later reassured the Europeans “that the US no longer seeks the overthrow of the Bashir Government.” It was realized by the US and others that “Self-determination could not be dismissed so lightly. Southerners, even within the SPLA, increasingly wanted the South to go it alone and take their self-determination while they could.”³⁸ Finally he proposed “to extend that agreement in principle to areas previously unconsidered (Darfur, Abyei, Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile), in order to avoid the fudge of the Addis Ababa Agreement.”³⁹ According to the U.S. State Department:

By August 2004 at least 400 villages in Darfur had been destroyed, 200,000 refugees had crossed into eastern Chad, and some 1.2 million ‘internally displaced persons’ ... remained in the western Sudan. Most of these had fled to the main towns ... where they were relegated to camps on the outskirts ... Women and girls foraging or collecting firewood were picked off and raped or murdered by roaming Janjawid.⁴⁰

On 28 June 2011 the government of Sudan and the SPLM, signed an agreement in Addis Ababa on “Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States”. Among its main resolutions it stated that the “remaining provisions of the CPA, will be implemented so as to resolve the conflicts in the two states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The Joint Security Committee will establish a joint Command Mechanism ... for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile which will be responsible for coordination, command and dispute resolution”. Refugees had been fleeing into “South Sudan’s Unity State. The UN office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is estimating that it expects 10,000 refugees in Unity State, by mid-September.” Summing up this updated report on 15 September 2011, the author states that “there is diplomatic

fatigue among western nations given the unending stream of Sudanese crises, which already include Darfur, the acrimonious relations ... between Sudan and South Sudan, and the conflict in Abyei.”⁴¹ The New Year started with an attack by the Lou Nuer on the Murle tribes in the Jongelei State. Other areas affected by intertribal warfare, included Darfur, Abyei, South Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains, Kassala and the Red Sea.

In a Press Release published by the **Nuba Survival Foundation** on 19 June 2011, it announced that the “**Nuba of Sudan were facing ethnic cleansing by Sudanese Armed Forces**”⁴² Ahmed Mohammed Haroun, the man behind the crimes committed ... against the Nuba in the 1990s. Fighting began in Kadugli, in the Nuba Mountains, “and spread rapidly to engulf the entire Nuba Mountains region. The man is here now to complete the unfinished job and to ethnically cleanse the Nuba People and to bring in the Arabs to take over their lands.”⁴³

Matters did not improve and tensions came to new heights during the first week of February 2012, when President Muhammad ‘Umar Bashir declared that Sudan and its southern neighbor were now nearer to war than peace. According to Bashir unless border issues were settled, as well as the conflict in Darfur, the chance of the CPA being achieved seemed rather slim.⁴⁴

On 16 March 2012, it was reported in the press, that the famous film star George Clooney, appeared in the American Senate and demonstrated the ethnic crimes in the Nuba Mountains, by showing scenes from his latest film containing torture and dead children, lying on road sides. He asked the US Senate to find ways together with China (which has vested interests in the Sudan’s oil production) to put an end to this bloodshed. Later that night, both Clooney and several others demonstrated in front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington and were arrested for disorderly behavior.⁴⁵

On 17 March, [al-Jazeera](#) reported of troubles and displacements in southern Kordofan on ethnic grounds. When President Bashir was accused for his responsibility, he blamed the SPLA. Troubles along the borders were reported by the BBC on March the 26th leading, it was feared, to the postponement of a summit bringing Umar al-Bashir to Juba the capital of the South.

On 11 April 2012, North Sudan withdrew from negotiations, accusing the south of border violation in Heglig concerning oil fields [BBC World Service]. According to southern sources the area was bombarded on the following day, by the northern air force. Throughout April matters seemed to worsen and on 18th April Omar al-Bashir declared that the Sudanese army would liberate the South from the SPLA rebels who were violating the borders of the North.

On May 7th, [Time](#) published an article on Sudan, mainly on the Nuba Mountains. It claimed that after years in which North Sudanese forces had suppressed and massacred the Nuba – the Nuba in cooperation with other opposition groups, from Darfur, the Blue Nile, and Kordofan, had gained control of some 80% of the Mountains.

In mid-July a new publication was published, titled: “Forgotten Darfur, Old Tactics New Players” in which the authors Claudio Gramizzi and Jerome Tubiana spell out the

wider ramifications of conflict, claiming that Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and other regions of the southern provinces are constantly violated by the northern Sudanese militias as well as by regular troops and the air force⁴⁶.

Relations between the Southern Sudanese Republic and Israel

The hatred between North and South Sudan existed long before independence and is unlikely to be forgotten or forgiven. Ever since independence was declared, the new Sudanese republic has sought help to rebuild its infrastructure from whoever was prepared to offer it. Among those who were prepared to come and help, were experts from a variety of states and continents, including China and Israel, though none of them committed money.

Some of the Israelis, who have had long-term experiences with southern Sudan dating back to the 1960s, were willing to share their insights with me.⁴⁷ As in most countries of Africa, they point out that tribal conflicts have prevailed in the South long before independence and unless they are overcome, they may destroy the weak republic. One of the main problems facing the new republic, involved the Southern refugees (over 700,000) who had initially fled to the North, and subsequently returned to the South, following independence and had to be reabsorbed. In addition, thousands of southern refugees had fled from intertribal wars in southern Kordofan and were absorbed in temporary camps. In Juba [the capital], which had been a rather small town with primitive one-story huts or houses, following the independence and the influx of returnees, multi-story houses were built with running water. Moreover, houses had to be built to accommodate the many orphans, who had lost their parents and remained on their own, while modern orphanages were being constructed.

There was no mechanism to control Sudanese borders, and thus one could meet on the streets of Juba: Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis and other Africans. However, border control was of prime importance following independence, because of the influx of many unemployed southern returnees. These conditions enabled arm smuggling across the border, which is very popular in Africa, to flourish in Sudan (though I have no direct evidence of Israeli involvement).

In a "Working- Paper" covering the past two years, John A. Snowden, deals with the difficulties facing the Southern Republic and concludes that: "external and internal security challenges, currently preclude the possibility of robust security reform"⁴⁸. However, he continues, "high level decision making continues to take place ... The appointment of a minister of national security in August 2011 has spurred security policy planning."

In a report dealing primarily with Darfur, the authors claim that despite all efforts the war in that region continues and "it signals the failure of the international community's efforts to end the Darfur conflict."⁴⁹ Though attention has shifted to conflicts in Kordofan, the Blue Nile and other border regions, such as the Nuba Mountains, war in Darfur continues between non Arab militias, deployed against the Zaghawa, whilst the Sudan air force continues to bomb Darfur and supply it with arms.

On 2nd July, 2012 it was reported on Sudanese state owned radio that its embassy in London was vandalized by elements “supported by a Zionist organization. Sudanese ambassador to UK Abdallah al-Azraq broke the news.”

In my interviews with Israelis who visited Sudan in the past few months, I was particularly impressed with the compliments President Salva Kiir received for his ability to decide on matters crucial to his country, even when it seemed dangerous to outsiders. For example, Kiir has proven to be both wise and courageous enough to stop weapons imports, despite them being essential for his cause, when its sources seemed suspicious. Another proof for Kiir’s willingness to make tough decisions was provided by the recent closure of the oil pump in Heglig, which meant the loss of income not just to the North but also to the South. International news, seemed to report that war was imminent but according to my interviewees, the warnings of President Bashir, including cross border shootings, were meant to warn the world, but would probably not evolve into full scale war.

Despite the seemingly vast distance between the two states, a problem involving illegal migrant workers entering Israel on a daily basis has put some stress on the relations between Israel and the Southern Republic. Mr. Eli Yishai, the leader of the orthodox Sephardi Jewish Party and the Minister of Internal Affairs, has been propagating their expulsion for several months. On June 10th, the Israeli government started expelling the illegal migrant workers, transporting them back to their country of origin. What evolved was rather absurd; Israel sent planeloads of Sudanese back to their homeland; some of them went voluntarily and without having their wages paid while several thousands of their brethren continued infiltrating daily and thus their numbers have increased despite their expulsion. A refugee tent town has been built in southern Israel to house some twenty thousand, illegal infiltrators. Most of them are from South Sudan, others from Darfur, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somali, and other African countries. Southern Sudanese were chosen as pioneers of the expulsion project, because Israel has diplomatic relations with their homeland. Furthermore, many of the returnees are returning of their own free will and a citizen of South Sudan named Samuel, told a correspondent of the Hebrew daily newspaper *Haaretz*, “South Sudan is a state, which has no borders”.⁵⁰ The idea of setting up a tent city in the south has been received with a fair amount of criticism. The head of the Negev municipal council complained that housing the masses of illegal Africans, who continue to flow through the border on a daily basis, in tents in the desert, made absolutely no sense whatsoever. When assured that this was only a temporary solution, he responded that in “Israel all the temporary solutions remained permanent”.⁵¹ Others have complained that the insufficient public services such as health and sanitation could not be adequately provided at such short notice. A delegation from the South is expected in Israel during June to coordinate matters with the Israeli authorities.

On 9 July, the Israeli daily paper *Haaretz* dedicated a main page to the festivities in South Sudan, which was celebrating its first year since independence. Yishai Helper, one of its writers, reported on the festivities which included an interview of Prof. Galia Zabar, Chair of the interdisciplinary African Studies at Tel-Aviv University, who

claimed that the main problem facing the South is ethnic differences between several tribes, rather than the struggle with the North over oil supplies.⁵² The Sudanese community in Israel, did not celebrate the first year of independence, for two reasons, firstly because many of its members, were about to be expelled from Israel; and secondly, not only did they face expulsion, but they also faced loss of their very poor salaries. Moreover, as reported by Vered Lee, their kids, mostly born in Israel hate to leave their schools or kindergartens where Hebrew is their only language. Furthermore, they hear from friends and relatives who have returned that the situation in the South is rather hopeless. Ending in an optimistic manner, Vered tells us that southern Sudanese, from as far as Canada, are returning home from as far as Canada since at long last they have a country which they know is their home.⁵³

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Notes

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29. Ibid, 301-2
30. Ibid, 303,307
31. Ibid, 380
32. Press Release Ngok Dinka, 9-Jan-2012: Sudanstudies@Yahoogroups
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45. Ha-Aretz & BBC World Service, 16 March 2012 (Hebrew)
46. SMALL ARMS SURVEY, July 2012
47. My interviews with them occurred in April 24, 2012 and they asked to remain anonymous.
48. .Small Arms Survey, June 2012
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Sudan: A Cartographic History, Part II

by Richard Lobban*

Introduction

The last article (*Sudan Studies Association Bulletin*, Volume 30, Number 2, pages 19-23) took a look at the ancient and late medieval traditions of map-making and the nomenclature of Africa, the Nile valley and Kush or Nubia. This article turns to the same area but picks up the story of regional cartography from the Enlightenment period to the age of Exploration. Article 3 will cover the colonial and post-colonial times. Some of these earlier maps were made for the commerce in decorative maps, or for reasons of European nationalism, or for efforts to reconcile the Bible with places names in the Old World. The later maps grew out of the rise of the printing press itself and had the goals of either mass consumption or, for the highly decorated maps, for conspicuous consumption or status symbols of the elite and nobility in the form of impressive globes and atlases.

Cartographic Problems to Overcome

The new age of cartography was now focused on information collection from explorers and mariners as the global world of sail opened up all four corners of the earth for serious exploration, conquest and colonization. When the Spanish Armada crashed on British shores in 1588 it was, in part, because they did not have accurate maritime maps and the problem of knowing one's precise longitude was imprecise. Not knowing where you were when sailing along unknown shores with unknown hazards or in deep water where a precise fix was hard to determine had fatal and historic results.

The use of astrolabes, quadrants, sextants, octants, solar back staffs, and compasses could resolve latitudes with good accuracy since they could be well oriented and visualize the angle of the sun that varied by latitude, but longitude required universal lineal measures and an arbitrary reference point about which all agreed. And as one went east or west, precise chronometers that worked in rolling oceans were not yet available to calculate the time of noon that varied by every degree one traveled around the northern or southern hemispheres. These same problems existed whether on land or at sea. Determining coordinates was an ancient problem addressed by Eratosthenes, Ptolemy, and Strabo, but it was still not solved with acceptable precision. The best

mariners could do was dead reckoning estimates of speed and general direction, or on land the best that could be done was how many days or hours it took to go from place to place.

As early as 1656, the Dutchman Christian Huygens made a clock that worked to some extent but only in the best of conditions not in a rolling sea. Without a better clock one could simply not be sure of how many degrees east or west of a given longitude you had traveled. Without an advanced education, the Englishman John Harrison (b. 1693) addressed the same problem of “accounting accurately for longitude at sea”. Seeing the importance of this solution the British Parliament authorized a huge prize of £20,000 in 1714. While the principles of triangulation were long known for either distance or elevation with transits or theodolites, only when really precise intersecting points of longitude and latitude could be accurately known this was going to be rather sloppy. The search for clocks went on. Harrison came up with his first clock in 1735; his second in 1737, and third in 1746 and finally a 4th in 1759 that he determined to have made a clock that would resist the problems of motion and heat. The English Board of Longitude accepted his clock on 9 February 1765 and it was properly published in 1767. A fifth clock was made in 1771 that set the prime meridian at Portsmouth England and at long last the default to dead reckoning was over and a precise identification of any location on land or sea was available down to 1/10th of second per day or the corresponding longitude.

Now survey plane tables and compasses could accurately triangulate points in heights and distances. However other problems remained. Where shall all nations and scientific communities agree to place the prime meridian? Many nations competed for this reference point and indeed it was not until 1875 that it was universally agreed to make this meridian and set Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) at the Greenwich Observatory in England. Other problems existed to determine which unit of scale should be used such as various measures of miles, leagues, *stadia*, *toise*, or meters should be employed not to mention highly variable toponyms and spelling systems before the world could have a common geographical vocabulary and measurement system.

Expanding Geographical Knowledge of Sudan

All of these factors retarded the accurate cartography of Sudan in the 16th century as you can see in this *Africae Tabula Nova* map of the Nile by Ortelius in 1584. This map has lake ‘Gaoga’ which may be Wadi Howar as well as a Latin notation about Christian Nubia in which ‘Danagla’ (Dongola) is recognized. ‘Barnagasso’ is noted on the east of the Nile which is understood to be Ben Naga or the Butana region of the Ja’aliyin (Arabized Nubians). A large ‘Island of Meroe’ is drawn but does not, in fact, exist since the true Island of Meroë is the Butana between the Atbara and Blue Nile rivers. The confusion expands when a river with many tributaries wander down from the Abyssinian highland that one might image to be the Atbara, but the Atbara defines the region downstream of the Island of Meroë not upstream as indicated. Further south, the Nile just gets more and more inaccurate and finally reaches the lands below the Equator we get to ‘Fvngi’ which must be the Funj Sultanates but they are above on the Blue Nile and not below the Equator. Clearly traveling in the area with this map



MAP 1, ORTELIUS, 1584

would guarantee confusion and error.

By 1710, Herman Moll improved on the understanding of the Nile valley in his map of 'Abissina and Anian' (basically Nubia, Ethiopia and the Horn). The Nile finally has a bit of a curve in Upper Nubia. There is a 'Nubia River' indicated that does not exist unless it is describing Wadi Howar? The Atbara is properly located and the incorrect 'Island of Meroe' is removed. The Nile properly splits at Khartoum and the Blue Nile correctly descends from Lake Tana. To the west of the Nile we learn of the 'Ethiopian vagabonds called Schankala' and 'Sennar'. Naturally the real Sennar is on the Blue Nile and the Beni Shangul are east of the Nile in the Ethiopian borderlands. The feeble White Nile heads south and then disappears since it was not known where it went and in the lower left corner it says honestly that "This Country is wholly Unknown to Europeans". The region is known as 'Nubia as a part of Ethiopia. There is no reference to "Sudan"



MAP 2, MOLL, 1710

The French cartography of the royal map-maker Guillaume de l'Isle (1675-1726) stepped forward a bit with the curve in the Nubian Nile getting more realistic and such real places as Argo, Corti, and Dongola are cited. The Blue Nile continues to accurately drain from Lake Tana and towns such as Harbaghe, Sennar, and el Hessa are noted along with Dender and Changla in the borderlands on some versions. Near the confluence of two Niles De l'Isle noted *Helfaia*, *Guerri* and *Toutti* for the first times. The White Nile (*Riviere Blanche*) more accurately branches at the confluence but quickly disappears and wanders to the southeast as little further exploration had taken place and the Great Lakes (Mountains of the Moon) of East Africa remain unknown at this time. De l'Isle's maps were published in his life time reprinted thereafter from the 1720's to 1740's at least. They were at the contemporary 'state of the art.'

Little by little, travelers to Sudan improved the geographical knowledge so the Scot, James Bruce (1730-1798) explored the Blue Nile on his way to Axum and his quest for the Ark of the Covenant. His reported visits to Sennar and Shendi in 1771 give us early ideas of these towns long before the founding of Khartoum and Omdurman.

During Ottoman times the Sudan was militarily conquered by Turco-Egyptians in 1821 and they remained in colonial occupation until 1885 when driven out by the rising Mahdist movement and the death of George "Chinese" Gordon who was then serving the Turks. At these times the Turco-Egyptians tried to explore and modernize the new colonial domain in Sudanese (Nubia). So in due course he was followed by the Frenchman Frédéric Cailliaud (1787-1869) who traveled in Sudan in 1822 and his remarkable publications from 1823-1829 that we among the earliest to document Sudanese antiquities not to mention Mohamed Ali Pashas' major interests in slave, ivory and gold above Sennar on the Blue Nile.

Contemporary work appears with the work of James Hamilton Young's 1830 map of Africa (below) the lands referenced to "Sudan" still rest in West Africa and what we now know as Sudan (North and South) is composed of Nubia, *Darfoor* (Darfur), and Abyssinia. Close inspection reveals such Sudanese towns as *Shandy* (Shendi), *Gherri* (Gerri), and *Harbagi* (Arbagi). The White Nile finally curves to the southwest as it

does in reality, not to the southeast as it was shown earlier. The southern Sudan, south of the 'Mountains of the Moon' has the unopened doors to the vast unexplored regions of Central Africa and the Congo Basin.


These reports, maps and diagrams probably helped to stimulate the curiosity of the Italian archaeological looter, Giuseppe Ferlini in 1834 who preferred to "excavate" Sudanese antiquities by dynamite more than trowels and shovels.



MAP 3, YOUNG, 1830

Salim Qapudan, a Turkish naval officer, explored up to the area of Gondokoro in 1839. Under license of the German king, Karl Richard Lepsius was another prominent and sophisticated archaeological traveler in Sudan in 1844. This was parallel to the German traveler Heinrich Barth (1821-1865) who did pass through Sudan but focused more on West Africa and the central Sahara in the 1840s and 1850s. In the mid 1850's the Frenchman Pierre Trémaux added more detail to the cartography, geology, ethnography and natural history of the Blue Nile not to mention exposing the violence and extent of the Turco-Egyptian slave raids.

The 1860's were a particularly dynamic cartographic period in the Turco-Egyptian history with Samuel Baker's (1821-1893) exploration of the White Nile in 1862 and extensive travels and administration in the south Sudan (1869-1873). An unusual chapter was also written in this period after the conclusion of the American Civil War when Confederate and Union officers were hired by the Turco-Egyptians to map the Sudan, serve as administrators and train the Khedival military. This is really a whole history in itself but prominent American names for the time and region are Charles Chaillé-Long (1842-1917), and William Wing Loring (1818-1886).



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SHARI'A AND ISLAMISM IN SUDAN

Conflict, Law and Social Transformation

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

After the 1989 Islamist coup in Sudan, the National Islamic Front under General Omar al-Bashir and Dr. Hasan Turabi attempted to institutionalise, codify and implement Sharia law throughout the country. However, by 2005, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending 22 years of civil war, the government agreed to halt its policy of Islamisation in the South. *Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan* explores how Sudanese society has been transformed by this period of implementation of Islamic Law, and furthermore asks, what are the continuing effects of this policy? And what are the implications of the Peace Agreement for the future of Islamist politics in Sudan and of the country? With data drawn from Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban's most recent research in the region, this book is a vital and unique examination of the nature of the Sudanese state and society, offering invaluable insight for all those interested in the politics, society, and the future of Sudan and the nature of political Islam.

'This book is a must read for all those concerned with the past, present and prospective future of Sudan.' – Dr Francis M. Deng, Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and former Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

'...a penetrating and comprehensive study of this unique situation.' – Dr Abdullahi A. Galleh, Assistant Professor, Africa and African-American Studies, Arkansas State University


'...an invaluable addition to dialogue on the future of Sudan during a critical time in

the country's history.' – Jon Turin, Senior Program Officer and Sudan Team Lead, United States Institute of Peace

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban is Professor Emerita of Anthropology and Joint Doctoral Program in Education at Rhode Island College and Adjunct Professor of African Studies at Naval War College. Her research topics cover Islamic law and society, women's social and legal status in the Muslim world, human rights and cultural relativism, ethics and anthropology and comparative studies in law and society.

A Review of
Pádraig Carmody's
*Globalization in Africa:
Recolonization or Renaissance?*

by Oscar H. Blayton*



GLOBALIZATION IN AFRICA: RECOLONIZATION OR RENAISSANCE?, PÁDRAIG CARMODY. BOULDER, CO: LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS, 2010. 196 PAGES. \$55.00.

Globalization significantly impacts all nations of the world. But it impacts on all nations differently according to their role in the global economy. This is the central point of Pádraig Carmody's "Globalization in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?"

This small, but densely-packed and well-structured book guides the reader to several vantage points from which to observe and consider Africa's interface with globalization. [While it is usually unwise to speak of Africa as an undifferentiated body politic, Carmody treats Africa as an economic region, where nations are subject to similar geopolitical and socioeconomic forces. And for this reason, his broad reference to "Africa" seems, to this reviewer to be appropriate.]

In Chapter One, Carmody invites the reader to look beyond the two dominant discourses on development in Africa: 1. That as a region, Africa has been bypassed by globalization and 2. In the alternative, it is suffering from globalization. He suggests a much more complicated state of affairs.

By describing "globalization" as "a set of social practices that undergo constant renovation and reinvention" the author stretches a broad canvas on which to paint his various theses. And using this broad approach, he is able to place Africa's interconnectedness with the rest of the global economy within a systemic context that allows for a view of the globalization process that is not tied to clichéd world views.

Carmody points out that Africa is both central and peripheral to the global economy. It is central as a supplier of raw materials, but it has been marginalized in part by the decline in the price of these materials relative to finished goods that are mainly manufactured in developed nations. Africa's dual role in the global economy is as old as the slave trade and the colonization of the continent by European nation states.

The author uses Chapter Two (coauthored with Francis Owusu) to focus on how the competing interests of China and the United States impact on Africa's position in the global economy. He lays out statistical data and analysis to present a relatively clear picture of how China has come to be such a significant player on the continent, and why this alarms the United States. He also investigates the varying trade strategies

employed by the two nations to satisfy their insatiable appetites for raw materials. With each viewing the other as a major threat to its own energy security, they advance geo-economic strategies designed to give them each the upper hand. However, these strategies usually do not benefit the people living in the region. For example, Carmody points out that the ruling elites of oil rich African nations are wooed with arms and military assistance as these resources help secure those elites in their positions of power and insure the flow of oil to their benefactors.

The third chapter focuses on the significance of the abundance of commodities on the continent. The author points out that because of the growing demand for commodities “in 2007, Africa hosted seven of the world’s top twenty fastest-growing economies,” and that “for the first time in decades, poverty in sub-Saharan Africa declined from 45.9 percent in 1999 to 41.1 percent in 2007;” mostly due to Asian trade and investment and the U.S. demand for oil. But he also points out that there is a calamitous side to this picture. The potential for price instability for primary commodities, the negative environmental impacts of extraction, the absence of significant linkage effects to local economies, as well as the appreciable co-relation between resource wealth and violent conflict; means that these gains are possibly tenuous and not without costs.

Turning to the effects of resource wealth, in his fourth chapter Carmody uses both Chad and Sudan as case studies to assess the impact of the existence of oil reserves on African nations trying to find their place in the global economy. Here, the author discusses the concept of “Matrix Governance” perpetuating social problems by placing great importance on natural resource exportation. He explains that matrix governance occurs when Northern countries share sovereignty and then project their combined power into the Global South “to ensure vertical sovereignty sharing and continued resource extraction.” This is often referred to as “Cruciform Sovereignty.” It is important to understand that there is no “sharing” of sovereignty between the Global North and the Global South along the vertical axis within this configuration. The vertical axis in cruciform sovereignty is more for the injection of aid and the creation of wealth for the elites in order to engage in primary commodity extraction by the North.

Given the negatives attendant to Cruciform Sovereignty and resource extraction in African nations, the author wonders in Chapter Five why Zambia seems to have “overcome the resource curse,” and examines the reasons for its growth between 2003 and 2009.

He points out that China invested heavily in Zambian copper and coal; and that India invested in Zambia as well. In addition to direct foreign investment from China and India, the reintegration of South Africa in the regional economy and available markets in the DRC and Zimbabwe gave a boost to Zambia. Rising agriculture production and a nascent industrial capacity also figure into the picture. But Carmody ends this chapter by asking whether developmental planning or resource extraction will be chosen as the path forward in that nation’s future.

The socioeconomic impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is

discussed in Chapter Six with a focus on the penetration of mobile phones in Africa. The question is raised as to whether the spread of ICTs in Africa “represent a transformative moment in Africa’s economic history, or are previous power relationships merely being partially modified.” Carmody questions whether, despite the obvious advantages of enhancing communication capabilities; this new technology is just another “axis of renewed dependent development in Africa.”

The dependence of the mobile phone industry on the precious metal tantalum (extracted from coltan), coupled with the fact that 85% of the world’s known tantalum reserves are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gave rise to violent conflict there. Carmody reports that in 1998, two days after the then president of the DRC began to nationalize the country’s main coltan mining company, a rebellion was ignited with the help of the directors of that targeted company.

Violent conflict is not the only negative attendant to the rise of mobile phone use in Africa. The high cost of mobile phone ownership often strains family resources. Carmody point to studies that show how mobile phone usage in many instances in Africa, increases poverty, rather than reducing it.

Like so many issues examined in this book, there are positives and negatives at every turn. Referring to former U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan’s statement on building digital bridges in the world, the author suggests that it must be taken into account where these bridges “are developed and built, what kind of traffic crosses them and the direction of the flow.”

In his final chapter: “Global Turbulence and African Growth” Carmody takes into account the various themes presented in earlier chapters and assesses the prospects for Africa in this new global economy. He posits that Africa needs “to move up the value chain, into manufacturing, production and higher value-added services” and diversify from its great dependence on the extractive industries. He also surveys the opinions of other scholars and offers comparisons with the South American nations of Chile and Venezuela for consideration.

As I stated in the beginning of this review, this book is densely packed with ideas; but it is also extremely well structured. Each chapter and sub-chapter is necessary for the reader to accompany the author on his tours to the various vantage points from which to examine his theses. But this is not a book to solve difficult problems; rather it is meant to present difficult problems in a clear manner so that decision makers can better understand when they attempt to engage in problem solving. And this reviewer believes that “Globalization in Africa” can serve very well as a reference to the various currents that are impacting Africa in the current global economy.

A Review of
Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban's
*Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan:
Conflict, Law and Social Transformation*

by Marcus Jaeger*


The reader who is not accustomed to the author Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban may wonder about a 'western non-Muslim women' (p. 9) writing on Shari'a law. Fluehr-Lobban herself is aware of these shortcomings. However that is more than balanced by her long-standing expertise in both fields, Shari'a and Sudan Studies, having begun her research 1970. In 1987 she published her first work, on 'Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan' which in 2004 was translated into Arabic thereby stimulating discussion by a wider group of scholars in Islamic law and in Sudanese origins.

Her new book commences with the period before 1983 and the 'September laws' introduced by President Nimeiri, and continues the story with special emphasis on the influence of the NIF-backed military regime under President Omar Bashir with its 'Civilization Project' and the resulting changes in Sudanese society. It does not stop with Islamism yet looks for signs leading up to Post-Islamism. Her research led her as far as the Internally Displaced Camps around Khartoum and later to Juba, thereby giving not only a northern Sudanese perspective. There are numerous personal accounts within the research frame thereby, making it lively reading.

Two sentences, one from the introduction and one near the end of the book set the basic tone: "It suffices to say that in just about all respects the essential character of the Sudanese – generosity, modesty, patience, warmth and hospitality – remains intact." (p. 11) and: "This work grows from a deep respect for the faith of Islam and an adult lifelong collaboration and friendship with Muslims, Sudanese and others." (p. 317) The author of this book review was in frequent communication with Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban during his linguistic studies, and can confirm that these two sentences are foundational not just for the book, but also for all her research. Any critical appraisals in this book have to be seen in the light of these two quotes.

In the preface Fluehr-Lobban reflects on the unfortunate term 'Islamism' (p. XIV) as it stands too closely allied to the term 'Islam'.

The introduction provides a quick tour of developments in the Sudan since 1970, also placing a few terms of Shari'a law (such as *hadd* criminal penalties, p. 5) in context. From 2004 onwards Fluehr-Lobban faced additional challenges in pursuing



SHARI'A AND ISLAMISM IN SUDAN: CONFLICT, LAW AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, BY CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN. NEW YORK, NY: TAURIS ACADEMIC STUDIES, 2012. 320 PAGES. \$99.00.

her research than she had before 1989 due to the economic sanctions the US was putting on the Sudan, which also affected researchers from the US in the Sudan (p. 5 ff). For example, she was not allowed to take her own laptop from the US with her; by contrast, she experienced the kind and generous support of Sudanese citizens in different ways. One could question whether such support would make her blind to certain aspects in the community she was researching. However, Fluehr-Lobban's balanced reflection on her research activities gives no grounds for this suspicion.

The first three chapters provide an historical overview from past to present, with the first chapter dealing with 'Shari'a, Islam and Islamism in Sudanese History' and the second chapter focusing especially on 'Islamization, 1983-89', e.g. from the September laws onwards until the coming of the NIF-backed military regime.

The third chapter 'Shari'a and the Ascendance and Decline of the Islamist 'Civilization Project'' closes the historical overview. All the important players of the Bashir era, as Public Defense Forces, Organization of Martyrs, etc., which are prevalent today are introduced. Public order courts have dealt 'with petty infractions of Islamic law' yet frequently failed 'to meet standards for a fair trial'. The Shari'a issue led to a stalemate in the civil war with the South. The statement 'the hope that social justice will flow from Shari'a ... is not supported as yet by experience and history of modern Islamic movements' is also valid for the Sudan. A watershed was the NIF/NCP split and the isolation of Turabi which allowed new approaches towards the use of Shari'a law and peace-making with the South.

The fourth chapter gives a detailed and all-encompassing account of 'The New 1991 Codified Shari'a: Criminal and Family Law Courts and Judges' including aspects such as *hadd* penalties, women's issues, family law, homosexuality, apostasy, the death penalty, reconciliation, court proceedings, and kinds of courts. Due to British colonial administrators sidelining Shari'a in the Sudan after the time of the Mahdi all-encompassing Shari'a had to be reintroduced. In a sense the quest for Shari'a law was also a quest to find the country's post-colonial identity. Yet even the new Shari'a laws since 1989 are not a total break from the past, instead much is retained. Interestingly *hadd* sentences were more liberally distributed during Nimeiri's September laws than throughout the NIF regime. However 'the Numeiri regime was a US ally and little protest was heard from the West.' (p. 121)

Khartoum (including Omdurman and Khartoum North) is a growing urban centre. From a population of 500,000 in 1970/72, at the time the book was written it stands at about 8 million, leading to enormous changes, for example in public space (traffic jams!). The majority of the Sudanese population has never experienced a regime other than the NIF-backed military regime and its successors from 1999 onwards. Among the Khartoum inhabitants there have been a growing number of non-Muslims (up to the writing of the book) who should have a special protected status under Shari'a law. However the reality was frequently different. These demographic changes led to adaptations in Shari'a law as described in the fifth chapter 'Demographic Transformation: 'The New Sudan,' Under Construction in the Capital City'. One feature which survived increasing Islamism and other transformations was the continued existence of women

judges, whom the author had thought to have lost their jobs. (p. 180)

The sixth chapter 'Social Transformation: The Intended and Unintended Consequences in the Capital City' looks into intended and unintended consequences of the Islamist transformation. Emphasis is on family law: marriage, adoption, divorce. While the NIF-backed regime wanted to make marriage easier, did it really want the emergence of *urfi* marriages? Is *urfi* marriage with no dowry fornication (as regarded by some Islamists) or is it an adaptation of Shari'a law to the new urban environment? Fluehr-Lobban and the Sudanese she interviewed look at both sides of the coin. Further topics discussed are Islamic banks and Interest-Free economy.

The seventh chapter compares the Sudan with 'Comparative Cases: Iran, Northern Nigeria'.

The eighth and last chapter gives an appraisal of 'Shari'a and the Future of the Sudanese State'. While written before the separation of Southern Sudan in July 2011 its general thrust is still valid. The higher status of Shari'a courts achieved during the time of President Omar Bashir seems to remain in future, too. Yet what will happen to Muslim-Christian relations? Will harsh Shari'a application be relaxed leading towards some kind of post-Islamism?

While the facts presented in the book have been excellently researched the editing remains superficially. There are more typographical errors than usual; some of them are rather amusing: My favorite one is 'war windows' instead of 'war widows'.

The exchange rate between the Sudanese Dinar (SD) which remained quite stable from 1999 onwards is not coherently applied. For example 400,000 SD exchanged roughly into 1700 US-\$, not 400 US-\$ as stated in the text (p. 151, similar on p. 153).


Aside from these minor aspects, I would recommend the reviewed book not only to scholars in Sudanese affairs and in Shari'a law but also to members of NGOs working in the Sudan alongside Sudanese, to non-Sudanese politicians involved in foreign policy making, and to businessmen. Misconceptions which have led to unbalanced aid programmes for the Sudan, to political motions which while influencing the ordinary Sudanese person on the ground do not really change his/her situation, or to unsuccessful business relationships, could be avoided. Even Sudanese who had to leave their country at the beginning of the 1990s could be stimulated to glimpse some realistic hope for their own beloved country.

There is also an Arabic translation of the book by Mahgoub al-Tigani that will become available in the Sudan in 2013. So expect some fruitful discussions in the future!

** Marcus Jaeger is a computational linguistics trainer and consultant (especially Toolbox software). Currently he is writing a PhD on Dongolawi and Kenzi Nubian proverbs. Since 2011 he serves as book review editor of the SSA bulletin.*

A Review of
Giovanni R. Ruffini's
*Medieval Nubia: A Social
and Economic History*

by Jay Spaulding*



MEDIEVAL NUBIA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY,
BY GIOVANNI R. RUFFINI. NEW YORK, NY: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012. 320 PAGES. \$74.00.

It is a pleasure to introduce a very welcome benchmark in the course of Nubian Studies. This is the first work to turn to historical purposes the corpus of medieval documentary materials in Old Nubian, Coptic, Greek and sometimes other languages. It is the first study of medieval Nubian history to embrace a mature and sophisticated approach to historiography that makes judicious use of insights derived from the social sciences. It is the first study to take seriously the task of situating medieval Nubia in a wider historical context that includes not only the regions and cultures to every side, but also both the deeper past and the subsequent Sudanese legacy. It is a pioneering endeavor that opens doors to a wide range of questions and possibilities for further exploration.

At the heart of the project lie the documentary finds from Qasr Ibrim, an unusual Lower Nubian medieval urban site in Egypt excavated under less-than-ideal circumstances by diverse teams of salvage archaeologists who struggled to keep ahead of the rising waters of Lake Nasser. Numerous documentary finds vanished into very diverse institutional pockets both within Egypt and elsewhere, and the excavators, few of whom had even an elementary previous encounter with any form of Nubian, found daunting the task of making their discoveries public. A generation passed in the gradual philological mastery of the texts, which has now happily reached a point where historical inferences may be formulated. Giovanni Ruffini was a fortunate choice to begin this undertaking.

Medieval Nubia is a serious and complex book. An introductory chapter presents the site of Qasr Ibrim itself, and also the author's guiding perspectives concerning how the evidence derived from it should be considered. Ruffini's discussion is both stimulating and sobering; we know much more than our predecessors, but there is still far to go. Fortunately, powerful conceptual tools lie to hand, and documents still concealed may be revealed. Meanwhile, the book pursues four goals. The first is an elucidation of land sales in medieval Nubia, an institution whose surviving documentation is sufficient to allow the formulation of broader inferences. Second, the wider social ramifications of the sales themselves are explored to expose other aspects of Nubian society. Thirdly, the aspects of Nubian society thus delineated are compared to wider cultural settings adjacent both in space and time. Finally, it is found that medieval Nubia (insofar as

Qasr Ibrim represents it appropriately) “was a society both African and Mediterranean, both indigenous and Byzantine.”(p. 19)

Chapter 1 asks one to enter the world of lawyers, where words have very specific meanings that may or may not resemble what one finds in daily life, and where variations in minute nuances may bear portentous implications. It introduces the genre of land sale documents from Qasr Ibrim, both the published and at least some of the unpublished. Since much of the discussion to follow refers back to these records, it is vital to familiarize oneself with them at an early stage. Commensurate rewards will assuredly follow.

Chapter 2 addresses some implications of the controversial archaeological context in which one important group of documents was found, “House 177.” Who possessed the documents, and why? Some scholars have believed that the important “Archive 3” belonged to Adama, the contemporary Eparch of Nobadia. Ruffini, however, builds a persuasive case that a more likely possessor was a man named Mashshouda, entitled *choiak-eikshil*. Ruffini’s case rests upon a comprehensive reconstruction of all known social and familial relationships among the documented inhabitants of Qasr Ibrim and its environs, with due consideration to the diverse legal contexts within which the recorded names appear. Taken as a whole, Chapter 2 is thus a basic introductory sociological survey of medieval Qasr Ibrim based upon presently-available evidence.

Chapter 3 addresses the wider historiography that has been, or conceivably might be, brought to bear on the issue of Nubian land tenure. Ruffini challenges inferences drawn by previous scholars from social theorists such as Karl Polanyi and from Arab geographers, notably al-Mas`udi. He finds that these inferences are not applicable to Qasr Ibrim, and asks therefore that they be treated with appropriate reserve, if at all, in consideration of regions adjacent to Lower Nubia in space or time, conspicuously the more southerly areas of both ancient and post-medieval Sudan.

Chapter 4 examines the medieval Nubian land sale documents, most from House 177 at Qasr Ibrim, as a legal genre. They are found to follow certain formal conventions; these were not elaborate, but contain unusual features treated at length in subsequent chapters. Land was sold at diverse prices in return for an array of entities including gold and silver coins, livestock and slaves. Landholdings did not show signs of fragmentation, and may often have comprised whole *saqiyya*-irrigated plots or comparatively large fractions thereof. Plausible if fragmentary evidence of a governmentally-sponsored cadastral survey of lands on the Egyptian model awaits definitive publication and elucidation. Land sales were comparatively rare “momentous social events” (p. 85), and the records reveal evidence of defenses by the participants against the possible claims of kinsmen under unwritten Nubian rules of inheritance.

“Nubian land sales,” says Ruffini, “are potent social ceremonies in which local notables display their place in Nubian society.” (p. 90) The number of witnesses, the quantity and quality of the foods with which they were feasted, and the eminence of the scribes and family groups present all contributed to the competitive prestige-generating character of a land sale event. Chapter 5 is a conceptual *tour de force* that

explores the social dimensions of the land sale in exquisite detail, not all of which may be introduced here. Highly significant is the reading of the Old Nubian idiom “to gulp dates” as a legal formula implying resolution or completion. The competitive reciprocal feasting of witnesses, Ruffini finds, exemplifies a “transition from archaic economies with primitive exchange contracts between groups, on the one hand, and more advanced economies with formal contracts between individuals on the other.” (pp. 113-114) An assessment of the wealth of the participants in terms of social capital may be inferred through careful examination of the officials named in the documentary protocols, of the scribes and intermediaries, and of the witnesses ranked by gender, number, family and status.

Chapter 6 explores the Nubian legal tradition; what was the institutional context within which surviving documents should be understood? Ruffini finds it to be a two-sided synthesis, “the grafting of Greco-Roman legal forms, perhaps transmitted through the Coptic language, onto existing Nubian practices.” (p. 140) Extensive comparison is offered in support, not only in regard to land sales but also other genres of writing in Nubia. Contrast rather than continuity emerges, however, when medieval Nubian evidence is compared to contemporary Arabic counterpart literatures and to the subsequent records of Ottoman Nubia and Sinnar.

Chapter 7, entitled “Money, Rent, Taxes and Investment,” addresses questions of value. It represents a victory of ingenuity over recalcitrant primary sources, an exercise concerning which it is not possible to give due justice in a short review. Coined money is found to be more common than hitherto believed. The exchange rate between silver and gold (no more than 40 to 1) is found to resemble that of contemporary Egypt. The price of land was found to be low. Consideration of all surviving Nubian accounting records reveals a significant ambiguity; did one pay taxes or rent? Ruffini models an interpretation on Byzantine Egypt, concluding that “Nubian eparchs collect[ed] rent taxes as a public burden on their private wealth, in much the same way that Nubian *choiak-eikshils* held religious festivals as a public burden on their private wealth.” (p. 198). The purpose of land purchase was investment for profit. (Reviewer’s idea: The low price of land, combined with the absence of evidence for fractionalization, strongly suggests that at medieval Qasr Ibrim [as in early nineteenth-century Sinnar] the “sale of land” meant in practice the sale of an owner’s share to the products of the unit in question, within the context of a (probably unwritten) customary contract that apportioned these products among all who contributed to the productive process. The urge among the powerful to acquire additional lands as an investment may indicate that it would not have been socially acceptable for a landlord to intensify production on the estates he already owned—for example, by replacing free cultivators with slaves. The fact that even the evidenced form of transfer was considered controversial may be inferred from the highly-charged “potent social ceremonies” through which these “momentous social events” took place.)


Chapter 8 introduces “Qasr Ibrim’s other Archives,” which records enrich the detailed understanding of persons within the community, and offer a fascinating glimpse into the world of magic and healing.

In conclusion, Ruffini offers valuable proposals for future research, including the incorporation of information from the Arabic-language texts found at Qasr Ibrim and the further consideration of gender relations. He situates his arguments in relation to positions taken by others. In summary, he concludes, Qasr Ibrim offers “an Afro-Byzantine vision of medieval Nubia.” (p. 264) It is a vision both attractive and compelling.

**Dr. Jay Spaulding is a professor of History at Kean University. He has served as a consultant to several government agencies and as a media commentator on Sudanese affairs. He has been employed at Kean University since 1970, but took extensive leaves to conduct research in the Sudan, to teach as a guest instructor at Columbia University, Michigan State University and the University of Khartoum, and to accept a Fulbright fellowship at the University of Bergen, Norway.*

A Review of
 Todd J. Moss's
*African Development: Making Sense
 of the Issues and Actors*

by Enrico Ille*



AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: MAKING SENSE OF THE ISSUES AND ACTORS (2ND EDITION), BY TODD J. MOSS. BOULDER, CO; LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS, 2011. 283 PAGES. \$24.50.

This book is an updated version of Todd J. Moss' 2007 publication *African Development*. It is intended to “give the reader some basic facts, information, and words of caution *before* they approach development for study or work” (p. 4). Moss tries to draw a picture of Africa that avoids both blind optimism and inflexible pessimism by pointing to the continent's complex diversity. These ‘complexities and uncertainties of development’, as he calls his introduction, are outlined with the aim to raise both interest and awareness for opportunities and difficulties of development efforts, ultimately, so the conclusion, to meet “this marketplace of creative ideas” (p. 254) with innovations.

The author concludes with four messages: 1) Africa's “unlucky history” (p. 254) must be considered as intrinsic part of the continent's development, but should not lead to conclusions of immutability. 2) Africa's problems are strongly connected to problems of leadership and governance, therefore democratic change and (state) institution-building has to be an essential part of development efforts. 3) The aid industry active in Africa is – in spite of its life-saving contributions – “a mess of confused ideas, dysfunctional agencies, and as a whole [...] far from living up to its potential” (p. 254), which obviously calls for substantial improvements. 4) Globalization and its effects should be met neither with undifferentiated pros or contras, but its potential contribution to prosperity should be seen with a critical look if “rules regarding trade and development are fair and not fixed to Africa's disadvantage” (p. 255).

This proposed perspective, which may be called informed optimism, is pursued in three parts of the book. Part 1 (The Domestic Context) provides short sketches of mostly political history and present situations, concentrating in chapter 2 on colonial history and its ‘hangovers’, which leave Africa still in the “Pawns of larger global forces” (p. 34). Chapter 3 establishes as central observation that “even if many African nations appear unable to perform some fundamental functions of the state [...], there is nonetheless considerable decisionmaking and influence in the presidency” (p. 40). In the wake of this observation, Moss continues to juxtapose negative and positive developments with chapter 4 (Violent conflict and civil war) and chapter 5 (Political change and democratization). So long-term conflicts and possible underlying causes

– Sudan is mentioned as a country that “has been in some form of civil war since at least the 1950s” (p. 61) – are mentioned just as well as political innovations, such as NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (p. 85).

Part 2 (Core Development Questions) and Part 3 (Regionalism and Globalization) constitute the main body of the book, working out the conceptual maxims 1) that “[e]conomic growth is [...] not the same as development, but they are very closely related concepts” (p. 92), the former being “an extremely useful concept, both as a marker of progress and as a goal” (p. 93); 2) that “[t]he level of GDP or GNI per capita is the most basic measure of an economy’s level of advancement” (p. 92), especially “because income can actually tell us a lot about how well people live” (p. 93).

These maxims give a frame to the – often numerically based – arguments, why Africa fails to achieve such growth (chapter 6), why the structural adjustment and Post-Washington Consensus programmes – the direction of which is regarded as valid – had and have such difficulties (chapter 7), how international aid is related to these programmes of economic reform (chapter 8), plus more specific sections on debts (chapter 9) and poverty reduction programmes (chapter 10).

After a short introduction in the African Union and similar organizations (chapter 11), trade and business receive more attention (chapters 12 and 13). Pointing out that “[t]he primary focus of the development community [...] has been about governments”, the author urges here to realize the potential of private commercial actors and, more importantly, the reasons why they still play such a minor role in African economies, especially compared to foreign official aid. Qualified by a repeated caveat concerning the reliability of economic data on Africa, Moss shows through tables and graphs, among others, low private capital flows, the oil-centred direct investments in countries like Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, as well as the low ‘ease of business’ ratings, apart from contrary examples such as Rwanda.

With these numbers, Moss also makes the point – important especially for those normally not involved in numerical representation – that the productivity and scale of Africa’s population is far behind what the mainstream reader is used to. This is already one of the initially stated main messages, which also implicitly conveys who is regarded as prospective mainstream reader: “South Africa may be a regional giant, but its economy is about the same size as the state of Indiana. The other forty-seven economies’ total are about the same size as metropolitan Chicago” (p.14).

Here the associate professor of Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute is at his best: On 160 pages, the reader gets to know the main sources for statistical data, the main economic policy initiatives of the last decades, the main debates and organizational arrangements in the international development circles and the institutions dominating these circles. The details are ample for such a slim introductory publication, and the language plain and accessible.

However, there is a striking absence of a huge body of intellectual production, among others decades of knowledge production about social and economic structures of

African societies. This may be answered with Moss' explicit qualification that his book is not "a survey of the academic literature" (p. 3). The consequence of these omissions is a picture of development that shows – necessarily – some aspects in close detail and some in broad outlines. So Moss represents 'academics' in a short section about "The Various 'Languages' of Development" (p 11-12) as interested in "long-term theoretical relationships and statistical models" (p. 11). But to leave out the extensive research on development *not* based on such an interest has an implication worth mentioning here.

This display of 'academics' is more than a chosen priority. What is essential about – as Moss calls it – "an orthodox economic perspective" (p. 4) is that it bases the representation of others on the quantification of their productivity and their income. Moss highlights in point 4 of his Ten Tips for Sensibly Studying African Development (p. 12-14) that "[i]t's always political", in the sense that "all interventions [...] have implications for the allocation of influence and resources within a village or a family" (p. 12). Even clearer, he formulated before that "[d]evelopment is ultimately not about bricks and budgets but about social change" (p. 5).

But the reader waits in vain for hints as to what can make such implications and social change perceptible, or at least, which kind of literature covers this level of analysis. The actors the author promised in the title to make sense of remain larger blocks: the state governments, the international institutions, the elites, the poor, the Africans, etc. The specification of individuals in chapter 3 about Big Men does not help to grasp how the specific character of power networks can be understood. Short hints that "ethnicity by itself does not explain very much" (p. 66), albeit its potential mobilizing effect when invoked, do not help to get closer to the complex processes of identification occurring in social interaction, such as in frame of a development project. Tip no. 10 (Go!) suggests to meet real people and their problems immediately in Africa, but without at least mentioning the implications of such encounters.

The point is not that these aspects are not there at all; Moss' approach outlined in his Ten Tips is very broad in spite of the 'orthodox' starting point. But the position and weight of what is called "The domestic context" (70 pages) against the long parts based on information and concerns of development as an international business and "a growth industry" (p. 3) reproduces a familiar prioritization: What kind of 'sense-making' dominates the lives of those allegedly the main target of development interventions remains peripheral in the proposed approach to the field 'development'. In the best case, it constitutes the context, not the primary content. It is debatable, if this ought to characterize a book written as a first approach to Africa and developments occurring in it.

** Enrico Ille is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Anthropology, University of Halle, Germany. His research concerns the Sudan, especially the Nuba Mountains. He focuses on power relations and cultural identification, especially regarding competing concepts of the past and the future.*

A Review of
Haggai Erlich's
*Islam and Christianity in the Horn
of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan*

by Marcus Jaeger*


Haggai Erlich is a renowned scholar with a long history of research on Ethiopia. His book *Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity, and Politics Entwined*, written in 2007, was highly praised. This time he combines an examination of Ethiopia with two of its Muslim neighbours and their historical and political relationships: Somalia and the Sudan, especially since the late 19th century.

The first chapter of the book is an excellent summary of what is explored in later chapters. All the necessary background information is introduced and the tone of the book set: "The local and historical backgrounds of this [Islamic-Christian] interaction are of universal significance, for it was in this corner of the world, in the Horn of Africa, that Islam and Christianity first met, and the legacies of that initial meeting continue to affect their relations even today." (p. 1)

It may be debatable whether the Horn of Africa was the first place of Islamic-Christian interaction or whether Muhammed's earlier caravan journeys where he had come across Christians should be accorded this status. Nevertheless the experience of the Muslims fleeing in 615/616 from Mecca to Christian Ethiopia, and receiving protection from the Ethiopian king the *najashi* Ashama has shaped the history of all three countries the book deals with as well as other parts of the world. Some Muslims regard the *hijra* to Ethiopia as a pioneering example of later Islamic-Christian interaction; for other Muslims the importance of that event comes from the supposition that the *najashi* later adopted Islam, "was betrayed by his Christian subjects and died an isolated Muslim" (p. 2) justifying a less tolerant behaviour towards Christians.

The Christian counter-example is the story of the Muslim warrior Ahmad Gragn from Harar within modern-day Ethiopia who destroyed the Ethiopian Christian kingdom (1529-1543). This caused the so-called Ahmad-Gragn syndrome which characterises Christian Ethiopia's fear of Muslims both inside and outside the country.

In more recent history, Muslims introduced a third story explaining their view of Islamic-Christian interaction: According to one Muslim tradition, in A.D. 570 Abraha al-Ashram, an Ethiopian ruler of pre-Islamic Yemen, tried to demolish the Ka'ba, alas unsuccessfully. This story "because of its extreme negative message, had hitherto [e.g.



ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, SUDAN, BY HAGGAI ERLICH. BOULDER, CO: LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS, 2010. 225 PAGES. \$49.95.

until recently] rarely been mentioned.” (p. 7)

These three stories from the Horn of Africa’s history offer a variety of conceptual choices between militancy and compromise involving all parties in an area where religion and politics cannot be separated. Depending on what fits best in a given situation the inhabitants and even more so the religious leaders and governments in that region draw on the three episodes to further their goals. Erlich’s thesis is: “Perhaps the most important lesson ... is that religions carry all options. Muslims and Christians, even those remembered as uncompromising militants, could and did resort, as we shall see, to more than one concept of themselves and the other.” (p. 5)

The thesis is proved in the following chapters.

The second chapter “From Disastrous Confrontation to Pragmatic Friendship: Ethiopia and the Sudan, 1884-1898” deals with an example of a militant relationship becoming one of compromise and mutual understanding during the time of the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa. While the Mahdi reawakened the concept of the righteous *najashi*, with himself being like the prophet and therefore superior, the Khalifa first worked on the principle “Leave the Ethiopians alone” taken from the Hadith. On the other hand the Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV understood himself as an anti-Muslim crusader, even persecuting Muslims in his own realm and invading Sudanese territory, resulting in a military response by the Mahdiyya. After Yohannes IV’s death his successor Menelik changed course successfully, establishing a better relationship with the Sudan.

Towards the end of the second chapter there is a fitting summary: “The Mahdist side ... chose selectively from the varied reservoir of Islamic concepts of Ethiopia ... As a movement of radical Islam, it was in the position to reinterpret the Prophet’s dictum. It went all the way from the ... message of Christian Ethiopia’s illegitimacy, to a holy war ..., to accepting the status quo, and finally making peace with Menelik. ... This entire cycle ... was well within the range of Islamic concepts and interpretations of Ethiopia. ... The Christian Ethiopian side ... was initially motivated by the Gragn syndrome trauma, ... and ended by cultivating a diplomatic, pragmatic dialogue with an Islamic state.” (pp. 36+37) All the other chapters have similar appropriate summaries.

The third chapter “Radicalism, War and Pragmatism: Ethiopia and the Somalis, 1899-1920” looks at Ethiopian-Somali relations (including Somali inhabited areas within Ethiopia), maintaining that because Ethiopia did not encourage peaceful Christian-Islamic coexistence it established the conditions for the rise of fundamentalist groups among the Somali. However, one also learns about the Somali *sayyed* who inspired the struggle against the Ethiopians. Later in life after reshaping his initial doctrine of “total political Islam” (p. 84) based on Ibn Taymiyya towards a more pragmatic approach, he sought asylum in Ethiopia, the country he had fought against.

The fourth and fifth chapters return to the Ethiopia-Sudan theatre of politics: “Africanism, Arabism and Marxism: Ethiopia and Sudan, 1930-1991” and “The Return of Political Islam: Ethiopia and the Sudan, 1991-2009”. “From the late 1980s,

Sudan also returned to a religious identity” (p. 119) being drawn between adopting an African Islamic identity (being more moderate and in the spirit of local African Islamic traditions) or an Arab Islamic identity (incorporating Middle Eastern Islamic militancy). As in the early years of the Mahdiyya at the beginning of the NIF regime the Sudan and Ethiopia collided. When comparing both identities Erlich observes “When the Sudanese were less committed to militant religiosity, relations [with Ethiopia] were good.” (p. 137)

Even with Turabi being ousted from government, Islamic radicals have continued their influence on the interpretation of political events in the Horn of Africa. Erlich learnt of one Sudanese radical who regarded Barak Obama as an Ethiopian who would fulfill an ancient Islamic traditional prophecy of an Ethiopian destroying the Ka’ba. (p. 136) [The reviewer marvelled that in contrast there are some US Americans who regard Obama rather as a secret Muslim.]

The sixth and seventh chapters “Nationalism and Conflict: Ethiopia and Somalia, 1943-1991” and “Religion Returns to the Forefront: Ethiopia and Somalia, 1991-2009” take up the Ethiopia-Somalia relationship again, culminating in the Ethiopian capture of Mogadishu in 2006. For some Somalis and other Muslims this transformed Meles into a modern-day Abraha, a dangerous designation, as Ethiopia has become a multi-cultural and multi-religious society with a vocal Muslim minority, or maybe even a Muslim majority as some Muslims claim.

The eighth and final chapter “Religion and Politics in the Horn: Options and Choices” closes with a tone of optimism: “But religion ... can be separated from narrow-mindedness and enmity.”(p. 197)

The topic of the book is especially astonishing as Erlich is Jewish and therefore not able to visit countries like Somalia or the Sudan. The constraint is reflected in the preface where besides Ethiopian scholars no personal contacts within the Sudan or Somalia are mentioned. Erlich’s astonishing insights come from collecting and analyzing a wide range of bibliography, including sources written in Arabic.

There are three aspects which would be of interest to any researcher in Sudan studies:

1) Erlich’s approach of looking at the Sudan is not north-south with a special focus on Egypt, as is typical of many works; instead Erlich emphasises the connection to Ethiopia, its eastern neighbour. The content of the book explains why some Sudanese (North and South) feel especially attached to Ethiopia which repeatedly served as refuge when needed.

2) As a Jew Erlich may be in a better position to maintain a neutral position when analyzing policymaking involving Muslim and Christian dominated countries.

3) Throughout the book Erlich is especially interested in Islamic-Christian interaction, between Somalia as an Islamic state, the Sudan (at the time of writing) as an Islamic dominated state and Ethiopia as a Christian state with a strong Muslim component. As this book review is written in 2012 one might be permitted to ponder developments in

future interaction between the Sudan in the borders set in July 2011 as a state with 98% Muslims and the new country of Southern Sudan as a Christian and pagan orientated state with a large Muslim minority:

How will Southern Sudan treat its diverse Muslim minorities, like Yohannes IV or like Menelik? Will there be similar dynamics between Southern Sudan and the Sudan as between Ethiopia and the Sudan? They will never be the same as unlike Ethiopia, there are no Islamic traditions regarding Southern Sudan.

Another thought emerged in reviewing post-Meles Ethiopia: For the first time the Ethiopian government includes a Muslim deputy prime minister (Demeke Mekonnen; alas an Oromo, not one from the Muslim ethnic groups more closely related to the Somali). How would Erlich interpret such a development? What new forms of cooperation with Ethiopia's neighbours will result?

While an interpretation of modern states based on religious motives may not be everybody's taste, the logical structure and sound argumentation of each chapter and the book itself make it an excellent resource for any scholar not only of Ethiopian history and politics, but also of Sudanese affairs past and present. One could just wish for similar books on Sudanese-Chadian or Sudanese-Lybian relations.

A Review of
Deborah Isser's
*Customary Justice and the Rule of
Law in War-torn Societies*


by Mark Fathi Massoud*

In strife-torn environments that face a social and legal legacy rooted in political violence – like Sudan and South Sudan – how is the rule of law constructed? Where can disputes be resolved nonviolently, and how can law be used productively to marshal human energy to build stability and promote peacebuilding? Deborah Isser's edited volume, *Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies*, grapples with these and related questions about the role of state and non-state legal systems in building peace in post-conflict settings.

The book's goal is clearly delineated at the outset: to “deepen knowledge of how customary justice systems might further – or obstruct – the goals of stability and the rule of law in the immediate post-conflict period” (xi).

To achieve that research goal, the book's central argument has two components, substantive and procedural. Substantively, the book advances the study of legal pluralism by arguing that building the rule of law in post-conflict settings involves taking local forms of justice seriously, and ultimately appreciating the complex relationship between state law, non-state legal norms and processes, and state-building. Procedurally, the kind of work that is required to understand customary justice systems and their relationship to the state must be situated in and tailored to local history, institutions, and political and social context. That is, rule-of-law promoters must see themselves not merely as lawyers or state builders but as researchers adopting an ethnographic –rather than legalistic or technocratic – sensibility.

Following a succinct introduction, the book's main structure comprises seven case studies of customary legal systems in conflict and post-conflict settings across the global South: Mozambique, Guatemala, East Timor, Afghanistan, Liberia, Iraq, and Sudan (focusing on South Sudan prior to its 2011 independence). The cases follow a common narrative structure: first, illuminating the relevant informal justice systems in the country under study; second, describing the formal or state legal system; and third, explaining the integration – or, potential for integration – of the two legal systems. Each case ends with policy recommendations. The contributions are written by a mix of academics, international lawyers, and policy professionals of varying groundings and interests, from United Nations advisers to United States military consultants.



CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN WARTORN SOCIETIES, BY DEBORAH ISSER. WASHINGTON, DC: UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 2011. 400 PAGES. \$29.95.

Similarly, the book's intended audience is policy makers, primarily, and academics, secondarily (2).

Customary laws, the diverse authors uniformly agree, exist in myriad forms and spaces and often in the face of widespread mistrust of state laws and institutions, particularly during periods of violence. The cases in the book, then, are united by the inclination to take local values seriously when seeking to illuminate the evolution and substance of customary norms.

Each of the book's cases illuminates these local values and customs and their relationship to state institutions and legal systems. The Sudan case (authored by Francis Deng, the first South Sudanese Ambassador to the United Nations) and the Mozambique case (co-authored by anthropologist Stephen C. Lubkemann) offer exceptionally robust and ethnographic recordings of customary law.¹ Deng begins his illumination of Dinka customary law with an axiom: "It is not possible to understand customary law apart from the cultural values underpinning it" (286). In these and other cases, a tension exists between recognizing and appreciating customary law as a unique entity and suggesting – or, in some cases, reifying – a linear developmental progression from informality to formality, old to new, or tradition to modernity. This progression appears most clearly in recommendations to record or codify customary practices and to integrate customary law into the state legal system as it rebuilds following a period of conflict.

In these ways, the case studies in the book suggest legal pluralism involves integrating separate and distinct systems. But formal state law itself is made up of plural sources including custom and religion, and customary law cannot be separated from the state legal actors and religious leaders who have for centuries made sweeping attempts to incorporate, co-opt, or control it, as the historical backgrounds of the cases reveal. That is to say, while customary laws, religious laws, and state laws are categorized and cataloged separately in the book, the difficulties inherent to the overall project are certainly great: the line separating customary norms from state and religious law is a tremendously blurred one. Even in the world's robust democracies, dimensions of informality and custom appear in practice and often in the shadow of state law.²

Similarly, treating customary law as distinct from human rights and the rule of law suggests that human rights and the rule of law are realms of formality, rather than themselves also drawn from international customary practice among certain states. Common phrases in the book that reify the rule of law as a beacon for human rights—for example, "until the advent of the rule of law" (35) or "recognition of tribal law need not...come at the expense of...human rights" (241)—would seem to suggest that the rule of law can be understood to be a moment of change resulting in part from international intervention, rather than a complex and iterative (and itself sometimes regressive) process rooted as much in donor aspirations as in the experiences of war.

A seemingly natural progression from the rule of war to the rule of law also seems to suggest that components of the rule of law do not exist contemporaneous with violence, and that rule-of-law promotion is an antidote to, rather than a form of,

structural violence for the poor who experience it. In the Sudan chapter, Deng rightly acknowledges the strength, independence, and capability of Sudan's common-law-oriented judiciary and small but elite legal profession immediately following the country's 1956 independence. But the young legal profession at the time drew its authority in the nascent state while it was fighting a vicious war against its citizenry in the south. That is, weak forms of the rule of law may actually exist during periods of political violence or civil war, or during the most entrenched periods of colonialism and authoritarianism. Mapping the terrain of these forms and practices may be a key to sustaining a long-term rule of law rooted in local justice.

The book's focus on the challenges of building the rule of law is certainly a reminder to students of colonial history that the struggle to integrate customary law into the state is not new – colonial administrators faced a largely similar battle. Many of them chose to co-opt elite men from distinct tribes or ethnic groups to serve as liaisons between the state and the locality, providing them with financial or material resources in exchange for their participation in the formal system and their maintenance of social and political stability by hearing people's grievances and resolving their disputes. While the goals of colonial administrators and modern-day rule-of-law promoters are certainly different, many of the same issues remain as to how to stabilize the state by creating spaces for anger to defuse. State leaders – from colonial authorities to post-colonial autocrats – all have used key building blocks of the rule of law to promote stability in the face of conflict and violence: more courthouses, more judges, more prisons, more lawyers in the streets, and more law schools to educate more attorneys. These are the same personnel and institutions that modern legal development programs advance as the key building blocks of the rule of law.³

The book – particularly Isser's introduction and conclusion – is a critical statement to policy professionals about the importance of adopting an approach rooted in ethnography and legal anthropology in particular. Further research building on its findings would need to illuminate how political, economic, and social power play a role in the creation, transformation, and use of customary law. While elites and other authorities historically used customary law and traditional authorities for the benefit of a colonial apparatus (this was true in almost all the cases, including Guatemala, Mozambique, East Timor, Sudan, and Liberia which was not formally colonized), only certain norms and authorities were elevated, while others were not. In recording, codifying, or integrating today's customary norms into state law, which culture's or tradition's norms take precedence over others? In Sudan, for instance, to what extent do Dinka, Nuer, Islamic, and other norms play a role in local justice, and to what extent do they not? Whose local customary norms are represented or uplifted by the state, whose norms fade, and to what result?

Overall, the wide-ranging and detailed cases in Isser's book illuminate the importance—and challenges—of customary forms of justice to contemporary efforts to advance the rule of law. The success of these contemporary programs will be based on recognizing the layers of formality and informality in each legal system that poor people confront and the function of power in building law, legal systems, and cultures

of legal order in Sudan, South Sudan, and across the global South. *Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies* offers an impressive start in this direction for lawyers, policy makers, and academics interested in the role of law in conflict and peacebuilding.

Notes

1. Deng's account of Dinka customs draws from his book, *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law Among the Dinka of Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: Kush, 2004).
2. See Robert Ellickson, *Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
3. See Mark Fathi Massoud, *Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).


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A Review of
Matthew LeRiche & Matthew Arnold's
*South Sudan: From
Revolution to Independence*

by Scopas S. Poggo*

Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, authors of *South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence* have endeavoured to investigate the origins of Sudan's two civil wars, as well as the various conflicts that existed between rebel groups in South Sudan during 1955-2012. They have also examined the evolution of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from a small guerrilla force to a more conventional force that was determined to contain the well-organized, highly mechanized, and numerically superior Sudan Armed Forces (S.A.F.). In the same context, these authors have presented a detailed discussion of the transformation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) from its foundation with rudimentary political structures and apparatus to a legitimate, broad-based, socialist, and ultimately, a democratically-oriented political movement. The book presents new information on the internal military and political dynamics within the SPLA and SPLM. The role played by key personalities in the SPLA/SPLM, such as Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Salva Kiir Mayardit, Dr. Lam Akol, Aja Win, Dr. Riak Machar Teny, Pagan Amum, Oayi Deng, etc., is crucial to understanding the founding and consolidation of the SPLA/SPLM that paved the way for the subsequent secession of South Sudan from the Republic of the Sudan.

LeRiche and Arnold have provided a critical analysis of the internationalization of Sudan's second civil war, as its neighbours and other foreign powers became entangled in her domestic affairs. They provided a comprehensive discussion of the relations (friendly or hostile) between the South and the North during the period of peace negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Additionally, they have comprehensively discussed the Six-Year Interim period of South Sudan's Self-Government, the emergence of the New Republic of South Sudan, and the Post-Independence era of the nascent state. These authors have consulted a variety of primary and secondary sources. They have also elicited information from interviews with several South Sudanese military and political leaders. This wealth of information is original and has helped to shed light on several themes pertinent to the study. This book is an important contribution to the historiography on Sudan's second civil war, as well as the literature on inter-ethnic, intra-regional, and inter-regional conflicts.



SOUTH SUDAN: FROM REVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE, BY MATTHEW LERICHE AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. NEW YORK, NY: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012. 288 PAGES. \$37.50.

This book would be a valuable resource to graduate students, scholars, academics, historians, foreign country analysts or policy makers, religious organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and members of the civil society interested in Sudan's two civil wars. This book allows these individuals and organizations to familiarize themselves with the root causes of Sudan's second civil war, the nature of belligerent forces in Sudan's wars and conflicts, the role of diplomacy in peace negotiations, and the factors that pave the way for an independent nation and its sovereign status. LeRiche and Arnold are eloquent in their writing—their book is an easy read!

The authors of this book should have focused their attention on the origins of the second civil war and the subsequent developments that resulted in the independence of South Sudan. There was no need for them to provide a discussion on historical events prior to 1972 as a volume of rich literature on these historical events already exists. For example, several authors have provided exhaustive discussions and analysis of the arrival of the Turco-Egyptians and the British in the Sudan, and their subsequent rule in the country in the period 1821-1856, and the outbreak of Sudan's First Civil War (1955-1972). They include, Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Joseph Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey Through a State: from Ruin to Hope*. Omdurman: MOB Center for Sudan Studies, 2006; Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003; Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*. 2nd ed. Khartoum: A. Alier, 2003; Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 1955-1972*. New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981; Oliver B. Albino, *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970; and, Joseph Oduho and William Deng, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan*. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

The authors have presented the first civil war as a largely Equatorian—dominated conflict. It is true that the members of the Equatoria Corp, who planned and executed the Torit Mutiny on August 18, 1955, were primarily from ethnic groups in Eastern Equatoria. However, from 1965 to 1972, rebels from various ethnic groups in Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces joined the Anya-Nya resistance movement. The leadership of the political wing of the Anya-Nya resistance movements (SACDNU, SANU, SSPG, NPG, SSLM) comprised of Latuko such as Father Saturnino Lohure and Joseph Oduho; a Pojulu, Aggrey Jaden Lado; a Madi, Joseph Lagu; and Dinka such as William Nhial Deng, Gordon Muortat-Mayen, Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, and Enoch Mading de Garang. From 1970 to 1972, the Anya-Nya Movement adopted a policy of decentralization. This essentially meant that rebel forces carried out guerrilla operations against the Sudan Armed Forces in their respective provinces: Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile.

The authors have clearly articulated that the foundation for the SPLA/SPLM was laid by Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk military leaders, and that for the first decade of the

liberation war the bulk of the rebel army was from the Dinka and Nuer. However, it is important to note that large numbers of men from Equatoria province began to join the rebel movement before the end of that decade. LeRiche and Arnold have also portrayed the Dinka and Nuer officers and men as the only ethnic groups that largely waged the war in the South against the Sudan Armed Forces, and ultimately led the country to independence. Thus, the authors have frequently made references to Dinka and Nuer commanders such as John Garang de Mabior, Salva Kiir, Oyai Deng, Quol Manyang Juk, Riak Machar, Kerubino Kwany Bol, William Nyon Bang, and others. However, it is surprising that the authors have not mentioned Lt. General James Wann Igga, a Bari commander from Equatoria. He was one of the pioneers in the SPLA and later became the Secretary-General of the SPLM, a position that he held until Dr. John Garang reconciled with Dr. Riak Machar in 2002. Other senior Equatorian commanders included two Bari, Major General Thomas Cirillo and Major General Jadalla; a Latuko, Major General Obuto Momur; and a Kuku, the late Major General Scopas Loboro. These officers, together with their Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Zande, and Moru comrades waged the liberation war against the ASF and the Government of Sudan until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

One of the serious drawbacks of this book is that it lacks a bibliography, despite its collection of primary and secondary materials, such as interviews. "Endnotes" are not a substitute for a full-fledged book like this one! The bibliography could have been organized under the headings: "Interviews," "Secondary Sources," "Published Primary Sources," and "Archival Material."

LeRiche and Arnold have provided a first-hand detailed account of economic development in South Sudan at independence. However, they should have provided background knowledge on the economic history of South Sudan in the period 1943-2005. Benaiah Yongo-Bure's book, *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007) would have been an excellent reference source for these authors.

Despite these drawbacks, LeRiche's and Arnold's book is a significant contribution to the study of wars and conflicts in the Sudan in particular, and Africa at large.

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A Review of
Abdelrahim M. Salih's
*The Nineteenth-century Wars Between
the Manasir People of Northern Sudan
and the British Colonialist Invaders*


by Lt. Colonel Christopher Dalton*

As a student of military history and the son of an eminent British Victorian military historian I was intrigued by the subject of Dr. Salih's book "The Nineteenth-Century Wars Between the Manasir People of Northern Sudan and the British Colonialist Invaders."

Throughout the book, his writing style captivated me as he was able to habitually package complex and highly interwoven tribal, ethnic, political, and cultural relationships into a very readable style. While I found the focus of the book to be somewhat surgically focused on a relatively few "British" invaders, namely Col. Stewart, Charles "Chinese" Gordon's relationship in Khartoum, and the very challenging and tumultuous relief expedition of General Earle, culminating in the Battle of Kirbekan, I was disappointed in not having a larger portion of the text devoted to the significant engagements that were recorded during the turbulent 1800's in The Sudan.

Colonel Stewart certainly produced a challenging canvas upon which to paint the narrative of his role in alienating the Manasir such that his death was inevitable, if not coincidental with the grounding of the steamer Abbas. Dr. Sahih paints a very vivid portrait of Colonel Stewart's military background, his cultural makeup, and his prejudices. It is those prejudices, a distinct disdain for non-Europeans; belief in the superiority of the British, and an unspoken but clearly highlighted disbelief in the value of his mission. This last flaw becomes a signal throughout his experiences in The Sudan that, for me, flagged him as a marked man. In that region, word of mouth equated to today's internet and his "message" was plainly understood by those around him. Thus he had few friends and many enemies that served to isolate him from ready assistance and ultimately played a leading role in his death.

Where I was enthralled by Dr. Salih's writing lay chiefly in his depiction of the Manasir people as an exceptionally dynamic and yet cohesive community; one in which the powers of progress sought to recurrently push them aside as "progress" was sought in economics, politics, and influence. Laying between Egypt and Khartoum, yet surrounded by such a rich and historically dynastic region, Nubia for one, the Manasir people certainly deserved a greater role in the future of The Sudan than the history books record.



THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY WARS BETWEEN THE MANASIR PEOPLE OF NORTHERN SUDAN AND THE BRITISH COLONIALIST INVADERS, BY ABDELRAHIM M. SALIH. LEWISTON, NY: EDWIN MELLEN PRESS, 2012. 423 PAGES. \$159.95.

At times I was lost in trying to distill the frequent discussions of methodology, from the content of the particular chapter. While I understand the desire to provide a backdrop for what the reader is to encounter in the ensuing pages, I found trying to detach the mechanics from the content to be a laboring experience. Chapter 2, discussing the death of Sheik Nia'man Wad Gamr, the majority of the 34 pages are interwoven with content and methodology that left me consistently trying to refer back to previous pages to regain my context.

I believe the true strength of Dr. Salih's writing lays in the anthropological and genealogical study that he so thoroughly unfolded throughout the last 130 pages or so. Thus, in my mind, a clearer focus of the book was not in the wars between the Manasir and the British but the challenges that presided over the Manasir people remaining independent in the face of a technological, economic, and political progress for which they were ill equipped.

This is a terrific study for the serious East African Cultural Anthropological student, political scientist, or geography student. From a militarily historical perspective, the level of detail is a solid primer but not one upon which an in-depth analysis of the engagements between British and Manasir forces could be fully gleaned.

Nonetheless, this is a very engaging manuscript that offers the reader an opportunity to step into a community that is virtually invisible to the rest of the world.

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Note to Contributors

The Bulletin solicits the submission of news items of personal nature, announcements of upcoming scholarly events or anticipated publications, abstracts of dissertations or scholarly papers, panel proposals, articles, book reviews, bibliographical or historiographical essays, impressions about recent visits to the Sudan, research experiences in the Sudan, exchange programs with faculty in the Sudanese Universities, Sudanese proverbs, anecdotes, etc. Articles and other submissions should be typed with full author's name and short bio. All submissions should be sent via email to the editor at least three weeks before the production deadline.

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